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The focus-sensitive scalar particle even has an idiosyncratic distribution: it may associate
with a weak element in its immediate surface scope only if it is appropriately embedded. We
investigate such occurrences of even in two non-downward-entailing environments: in the
scope of non-monotone quantifiers and in the scope of desire predicates. We show that they
can be properly understood only if we assume that even can move at LF (Karttunen & Peters
1979, Lahiri 1998). The insights garnered in this investigation are then applied to the poorly
understood occurrences of negative polarity items in these environments. We argue that they
can be explained by assuming that their licensing is governed by a covert even (Krifka 1995,
Chierchia 2006). Finally, a parametric account of the differences in distribution between even
and other scalar particles is provided. We propose that the distribution of scalar particles is
determined by two morphological parameters and their competition for insertion.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
When a sentence is uttered, a set of alternative propositions is made salient. This set is to
a great extent conditioned by the intonational structure of the sentence - for example, by
which expressions in the sentence bear focal stress. There are operators in language that are
sensitive to these alternatives and some of them - most prominently even - require the alter-
natives to be ordered in a particular way with respect to their likelihood or noteworthiness.
This ordering is constrained by the axioms of probability theory and logic.
Distribution of even. The constraints on the likelihood or noteworthiness ordering of
alternatives effectively restrict the distribution of even. For example, if the minimal clause
in which even occurs at surface structure denotes a proposition that is most likely / least
noteworthy among its alternatives - we call such occurrences of even 'weak even' - then
even is unacceptable if the clause is unembedded. However, if the clause is embedded under
a downward-entailing operator, even may be acceptable (Lahiri 1998). In this dissertation,
we identify three further types of operators under which weak even may be acceptable:
* Weak even under non-monotone quantifiers
* Weak even under desire predicates (factive and non-factive)
" Weak even in imperatives
As in the case of embedding under downward-entailing operators, the felicity of weak even
under these operators is conditional on the properties of the context. The first objective of
the dissertation is to describe and explain these patterns, at least some of which have not
been previously discussed. We argue that they provide support for an approach to even that
assumes that even may move at LF (Karttunen & Peters 1979, Lahiri 1998).
Distribution of negative polarity items. The distribution of weak even in non-downward-
entailing environments mirrors the poorly understood distribution of negative polarity items
(NPIs) in these environments. For example, Linebarger (1987) and Kadmon & Landman
(1993) have observed that if particular conditions obtain in the context, NPIs may occur
under non-monotone quantifiers and under factive desire predicates. We add non-factive
desire predicates and imperatives to the list (cf. Giannakidou 2006):
" NPIs under non-monotone quantifiers
" NPIs under desire predicates (factive and non-factive)
" NPIs in imperatives
The second objective of the dissertation is to explain these occurrences of NPIs and their
context-dependence. We do this by assuming that their licensing is governed by a covert
even (cf. Krifka 1995, Chierchia 2006). This effectively reduces their licensing requirements
to those of weak even.
Concessive scalarity. Even is a member of a large family of scalar particles. However, not
all expressions commonly characterized as scalar particles have the distribution and semantic
import of even. A prominent class of expressions that does not are the so-called concessive
scalar particles - esto ke in Greek, aunque sea in Spanish and magari in Slovenian (cf.
Giannakidou 2007, Lahiri 2010). These expressions may only occur in downward-entailing
and modal environments. Intriguingly, their semantic import appears not to be uniform
across these two types of environments. The third objective of the dissertation is to account
for the distribution and import of these expressions. We achieve this by assuming that
they consist of a scalar and an existential component. Their distribution as well as their
apparently non-uniform semantic contributions are shown to follow from this decomposition
and independent mechanisms in grammar.
Scalar particles and competition. There are other expressions across languages that are
classified as scalar particles and have a more restricted distribution than even. Moreover,
in some languages different scalar particles exhibit complementary distribution. The fourth
objective of the dissertation is to explain the variation in the distributions of scalar particles.
We argue that this can be achieved by relying on two assumptions. The first assumption
is that scalar particles may differ in two respects: whether they are negatively marked and
whether they consist of one or two scalar components (cf. Guerzoni 2003, Lahiri 2010). The
second assumption is that scalar particles form scales and compete for insertion. These two
assumptions allow us to correctly identify five distinct classes of scalar particles.
Additivity. Although the condition that even imposes on the ordering of the salient alter-
natives - its scalar presupposition - plays the decisive role in constraining its distribution,
it is not the only inference that even generates. It also imposes an additive condition on the
context, which exhibits an intricate behavior. The fifth objective of the dissertation is to
shed new light on the additive inference triggered by even. A partial account is provided for
it that makes three assumptions: even is composed of a scalar and an additive component;
the two components may take distinct scopes at LF; and the additive component may not
generate pathological inferences (cf. Rullmann 1997).
1.1 Alternatives
Alternatives of a given sentence are primarily determined by the position of focus. In the fol-
lowing we describe the standard approach to the interpretation of focus (Rooth 1985, 1992),
which we are adopting. According to this approach, the focused (or F-marked) constituent
introduces alternatives to the constituent. These are then used to build up alternatives to
bigger constituents in a compositional manner. An informal example of this is given in (1):
the focus alternatives of the sentence in (1-a) in which the capitalized word is focused are
the propositions in (1-b). The ordinary meaning of the sentence is in (1-c). The alternatives
do not figure in the ordinary meaning of (1-a).
(1) a. JOHN arrived late
b. Alternatives to (1-a): that Mary arrived late, that Tom arrived late etc.
c. Ordinary meaning of (1-a): that John arrived late
Following Rooth (1992), we assume that the computation of the focus alternatives sketched
above proceeds in parallel to the computation of the ordinary meaning of the sentence
according to the composition rules in (2) and (3). Thus, each sentence is assigned a focus
meaning (= the set of its focus alternatives) in addition to its ordinary meaning.
(2) Terminal nodes
a. If a is a terminal node and is not F-marked, F(a) ={[ a ]J'C}
b. If a is a terminal node and is F-marked, F(a) = {[ # 19'c I type(#) = type(a)}
(3) Composition principle
If a is a branching node that is not F-marked, with daughters # of type 6 and - of
type (J,T), then F(a) = { a E Dr | 3b,c [ b E F(#) A c E F(y) A a = c(b) I }
Applied to our preceding example, the atomic constituents of the sentence in (1-a) have the
focus meanings in (4-b). The meanings of the complex constituents, which are composed
according to the principle in (3), are given in (4-cde) where (4-de) are notational variants.
(4) a. [JohnF [arrived late]]
b. F(arrived) ={[ arrived ]-'c}, F([ late ]9')= {[ late ]9'c},
F(JohnF) = {x x is a person}
c. F([ arrived late 19'c) = { [ arrived late 9,c }
d. F(JohnF arrived late) {p | 3xEF(JohnF)[p=Aw.[ arrived late 9'(x,w)=1]}
e. F(JohnF arrived late) {that x arrived late I x is an individual}
There exists a variety of expressions in language whose meaning is sensitive to alterna-
tives, i.e. that incorporate focus alternatives into the ordinary meaning of sentences in which
they occur. It is said that such expressions associate with focus (Jackendoff 1972, Dretske
1972, von Stechow 1982 among many others). The most prominent examples of these ex-
pressions are the focus particles only, also and even. Their semantic import is sensitive to
alternatives in the sense that their domain of quantification is restricted to a subset of the
focus meaning of their sister. Different positions of focus consequently result in different
meanings contributed by the particles. This is standardly demonstrated with the examples
in (5) that convey the distinct meanings expressed by the sentences in (6), respectively.
(5) a. John only introduced BILL to Sue
b. John only introduced Bill to SUE
(6) a. John introduced Bill and nobody else to Sue
b. John introduced Bill to Sue and to nobody else
If we assume that only takes clausal scope in (5), its domain in the two sentences differs as
described in (7-b) and (8-b).1 Since the import of only is to state that all the alternatives
that are true are entailed by its propositional argument, the meanings of the sentences in
(7-a) and (8-a) differ as well. The different meanings of the two sentences are given in (7-c)
and (8-c), which correspond to (6-a) and (6-b), respectively.
(7) a. [only C1] [John introduced BillF to Sue]
b. C, C { that John introduced x to Sue | x is a person }
c. Aw. Vq c { that John introduced x to Sue I x is a person }:
q(w) = 1 -+ that John introduced Bill to Sue C q
(8) a. [only C1] [John introduced Bill to SueF]
b. C, G { that John introduced Bill to x | x is a person }
c. Aw. Vq c { that John introduced Bill to x I x is a person }:
q(w) = 1 - that John introduced Bill to Sue C q
In many cases, as in (7) and (8), there does not seem to be a salient ordering among
the alternatives or if there is one, it is not exploited by the two operators. However, in
some cases, an ordering on alternatives is salient and is exploited. For example, only may
require its propositional argument to be ordered low with respect to the alternatives. This
is illustrated in (9) where the alternatives are linearly ordered with respect to the height
(or noteworthiness, likelihood) of the predicated rank in the military hierarchy. The scalar
inference is the only noticeable contribution that only makes to the sentence in (9-a): it is
less noteworthy in the context for John to be a lieutenant than for him to be a colonel or a
general. We represent this as in (9-d).
(9) a. John is only a LIEUTENANT
b. [only C 1] [John is a lieutenantF]
c. C, C { that John is a lieutenant, that John is a colonel, that John is a general }
d. Vq c C1: q <, that John is a lieutenant
In contrast to only, even is always accompanied by a salient noteworthiness or likelihood
ordering on alternatives. And the main contribution of even is to require the alternatives to
be ordered in a particular way with respect to it.
'There are different approaches to how this restriction may come about (Rooth 1985, 1992, von Fintel
1994, Beaver & Clark 2008 and others). We remain vague about the exact underlying mechanism and only
care about the end result: the domain of a focus-sensitive particle is a subset of the focus meaning of its
sister.
1.2 Scalarity
Similarly to only and other focus particles, even operates on a set of alternatives that is
determined by the focus structure of the clause to which it is adjoined. More precisely, its
domain of quantification is a subset of the focus meaning of its sister. For example, the
sentence in (10-a) has the structure in (10-b) and the set of alternatives over which even
quantifies is described in (10-c).
(10) a. Even JOHN arrived late
b. [even C 1] [JohnF arrived late]
c. C1 c { that x arrived late I x is a person }
The main semantic contribution of even is that it triggers a presupposition that is epistemic
in nature: it identifies the informational value of the meaning of its sister - its prejacent -
as greater than the informational values of an appropriate number of alternatives over which
it quantifies. To make this characterization operational, two questions need to be answered:
(i) What kind of informational value is even comparing? (ii) What counts as an appropriate
number of alternatives?
Ad (i). There is a rich literature on what is the most appropriate way to characterize the
informational value compared by even - likelihood, noteworthiness and relevance being the
most common candidates (Karttunen & Peters 1979, Kay 1990, Merin 1999, Herburger 2000,
van Rooy 2003 and others). For perspicuity, we will treat it as (subjective) likelihood and
discuss other possible characterizations where appropriate. The likelihood is conditioned on
a relevant information state in the context. 2 Thus, we assume that even presupposes that
the meaning of its sister is less likely than an appropriate number of alternatives over which
even quantifies. This ordering relation is subject to an important condition: it is faithful
to logical entailments between the alternatives. If an alternative entails another alternative,
the informational value of the latter cannot be greater than the informational value of the
former, i.e. the latter cannot be less likely than the former.
This observation follows from basic probability theory. Specifically, it follows from Kol-
mogorov's third axiom that states that the probability of a union of mutually exclusive
propositions equals the sum of the probabilities of the propositions:
if pi, p2, ... are mutually exclusive, Pr(p 1 U p2 U ... ) = Pr(pi).
Applied to our condition, if a proposition p entails a proposition q, it holds that the sum
of the likelihoods of p and qsp equals the likelihood of q. Since the likelihood of qsp is
2We leave the issues of informativeness of the scalar presupposition as well as its subjectivity aside in
the following. They relate to the broader issues of classification of projective meanings (e.g. Potts 2007 and
replies) and judge-dependence in epistemic language (Stephenson 2007, Yalcin 2008 and many others).
greater or equal to zero, it holds that the likelihood of p is at most as great as the likelihood
of q.3 As we will see, this seemingly innocuous principle has wide-ranging consequences in
grammar.
Ad (ii). The second question relates to the quantificational strength of the scalar presup-
position of even - it relates to what number or proportion of alternatives the propositional
argument of even should be less likely than. Karttunen & Peters (1979) proposed that the
propositional argument of even needs to be less likely than all of its alternatives that are
not identical to it. If we represent the relation of being less likely than with <, this gives
us the definedness condition in (12): all the alternatives in the domain of even, C, are less
likely than the propositional argument of even, p.
(12) [ even ja,"(C, p, w) is defined only if Vq c C [p # q -+ p <c q]
However, many examples have been brought forward that appear to be problematic for this
characterization. Two are provided in (13) (Kay 1990:89): for one to make it to the finals
is less likely than for one to make it to the semi-finals (13-a) and "having majors, captains,
or sergeants making major policy decisions would provide the basis for even more extreme
assertions" (13-b) (Kay 1990:90); even is acceptable in the two sentences nonetheless.
(13) a. Not only did Mary win her first round match, she even made it to the semi-finals
b. The administration was so bewildered that they even had lieutenant colonels
making policy decisions
Faced with data like (13), several maneuvers are possible. First: Karttunen and Peters'
proposal can be rescued by assuming that the universal quantification is restricted. For
example, the domain of even in (13-a) does not contain the proposition that Mary made it
to the finals and in (13-b) the propositions that majors were making policy decisions etc.
(cf. Lycan 1991). Second: Bennett (1982) and Kay (1990) have proposed that the scalar
presupposition of even involves existential quantification (14): there is an alternative in the
domain of even, C, that is less likely than the propositional argument of even, p.
(14) [ even ]9,c(C, p, w) is defined only if 3q E C [ p <, q]
It could be argued that if the presupposition in (12) was too strong, then the presupposition
in (14) is too weak. However, the same response to this objection is possible as above: the
domain of the quantifier may be appropriately restricted, possibly to a singleton set contain-
ing an extremely unlikely proposition.4 Third: Berckmans (1993) puts forward an ambiguity
approach - the scalar presupposition of even involves either existential or universal quantifi-
cation. Fourth: Francescotti (1995) proposes that the quantification involved is over most
'Similar considerations apply to other flavors of informational value that have been suggested to feature
in the scalar presupposition of even: informativeness, noteworthiness etc. An exception is Merin's (1999)
notion of relevance. As he explicitly notes, it is not faithful to logical entailments between alternatives: a
logically weaker proposition may be more relevant in his system than a logically stronger proposition.
4 Kay's (1990:66) characterization: "even indicates that the sentence [...] in which it occurs expresses,
in context, a proposition which is more informative (equivalently 'stronger') than some particular distinct
proposition taken to be already present in the context."
of the alternatives. Interestingly, the choice between these alternatives is inconsequential for
the purpose of this dissertation. For concreteness, we adopt the weakest, existential version
of the scalar presupposition in the following.
1.2.1 Upward-entailingness
The sentence in (10) triggers the scalar presupposition in (15-c). The alternatives over which
even quantifies in this sentence are logically independent - that John arrived late does not
logically entail, say, that Polly arrived late and vice versa. Accordingly, depending on what
information state the likelihood is conditioned, various orderings among the alternatives
may obtain. For example, taking into consideration only that John is the most punctual
person among the relevant individuals, then the existential quantification in (15-c) may
be verified by, say, the proposition that Mary arrived late (16-a). On the other hand,
taking into consideration that John was stuck in traffic and everyone else experienced no
comparable difficulties, there may be no proposition among the alternatives that would
verify the existential quantifier and the sentence could be undefined (16-b). In any case, due
to the independence of the alternatives in the domain of even, the scalar presupposition in
(15-c) is consistent with the condition (11) and in an appropriate context it may be true.
(15) a. Even JOHN arrived late
b. [even C1 ] [JohnF arrived late]
c. 3q G { that x arrived late I x is a person }: that John arrived late <c q
(16) a. that John arrived late <ci that Mary arrived late, that Sue arrived late etc.
b. that Mary arrived late, that Sue arrived late etc. <c2 that John arrived late
The condition in (11) teaches us that in some cases the ordering among the alternatives is
more constrained than in others. For example, if we have a set of alternatives of the form
given in (17-a) where an entailment relation obtains among them (17-b), then any ordering
on them has to satisfy the condition in (17-c).
(17) a. { that John arrived late n-times I n e N>o }
b. that John arrived late once - that John arrived late twice <=
c. ... < that John arrived late twice < John arrived late once
This fact constrains the distribution of even. For instance, the sister of even in (18-b) has
the alternatives described in (17-a). All of the alternatives entail the propositional argument
of even and are, according to (17-c), at most as likely as it. The scalar presupposition of
even, given in (18-c), is thus incorrect and the sentence is deviant.
(18) a. #John arrived late even ONCE
b. [even C 1] [John arrived late onceF]
c. 3q G (17-a): that John arrived late once <c q
1.2.2 Downward-entailingness
However, not all sentences that contain even that associates with a weak element, e.g. once,
in its immediate surface scope - weak even - are deviant. For example, when a weak even
occurs in the scope of a downward-monotone operator like negation, it is acceptable (19).
In its base position, even is predicted to trigger the same scalar presupposition as in (18-c),
which is inconsistent.
(19) John didn't arrive late even ONCE
Different accounts have been developed to deal with this perplexing fact. One of them - the
so-called scope theory of even (Karttunen & Peters 1979, Lahiri 1998) - proposes that the
scalar presupposition is not triggered under negation in (19) but above it. This is achieved
by covertly moving even above the negation (20-a). The scalar presupposition that even
triggers in its derived position is given in (20-b).
(20) a. [even C1] [not [e-ven-Gr} John arrived late onceF]
b. ]q e { that John didn't arrive late n-times I n E N>o }: that John didn't arrive
late once <c q
The scalar presupposition is compatible with the condition in (11). Namely, the alternatives
in the domain of even stand in an entailment relation described in (21-a) and so the ordering
among them must be compatible with (21-b). This holds for (20-b).
(21) a. ... += that John didn't arrive late twice = that John didn't arrive late once
b. that John didn't arrive late once < that John didn't arrive late twice < ...
1.2.3 Non-monotonicity
Another environment in which weak even may be licit is in the scope of non-monotonic
operators like exactly n NP. This is illustrated by the following example:
(22) Exactly four people in the whole world will open that dissertation even ONCE - the
author and the committee members
Again, even would trigger an incorrect scalar presupposition in its base position in (22). This
is computed in (23): the scalar presupposition triggered in the scope of the non-monotone
quantifier is in violation of (11).
(23) a. [exactly four people in the whole world] 4 [xp [even C 1] [t4 will open
that dissertation even onceF]]
b. [ XP ]J9, is defined only if 3q E { that g(4) will open that dissertation n-times
n| N>o }: that g(4) will open that dissertation once <, q
The scope-theoretic approach to even predicts that (22) may have an acceptable meaning if
even scopes above the non-monotone quantifier. In that case, its scalar presupposition would
not be in violation of (11): an intervening non-monotone operator between even and its weak
associate precludes an entailment relation among the alternatives in the domain of even.
What remains to be determined is in what contexts is the triggered scalar presupposition
plausible. We discuss these issues in chapter 2.
1.2.4 Modal environments
There are occurrences of weak even that appear not to be covered by (24): weak even may
occur in imperatives, under certain modals and under certain attitude predicates (25). In
light of traditional approaches to these environments (Hintikka 1962, Kratzer 1981), these
facts are puzzling. Namely, there do not seem to be any scope-bearing elements in (25) that
are not upward-monotone and so the presupposition triggered by even should be deviant,
regardless of whether even moves or stays in situ (26).
(25) a. Show me even ONE party that cares for the people
b. To pass the class, John needed to prove he attended the lectures even ONCE
c. The band hopes to someday make even ONE video of that quality
d. John is glad that Mary arrived on time even ONCE
(26) Initial prediction
a. Show me even ONE party that cares for the people
b. #[IMP [even C1] [you show me oneF party that cares for the people]]
c. #[even C1] [IMP {even-Gr} [you show me oneF party that cares ...]]
We discuss two competing explanations for why the prediction in (26) may be false. First:
The assumption that the imperative operator, certain modals and desire predicates are
upward-monotone is not warranted (Heim 1992, Levinson 2003, Villalta 2008 among others).
In fact, the data in (25) presents a new argument for the non-monotonicity of the operators
involved. Second: Although the imperative operator, modals and attitude predicates are
upward-monotone (e.g. von Fintel 1999), there is a rescue mechanism that if it applies
with these modals, it allows the sentences to be compliant with (11) and have plausible
entailments. Thus, both approaches to resolving the puzzle in (25) share the assumption
that the associate of even is not in an upward-entailing environment in those sentences. The
alternatives over which even quantifies in (25) after it scopes above the respective scope-
bearing elements do not stand in an entailment relation and so the scalar presupposition it
triggers is compliant with (11). We discuss these issues in chapter 3.
1.3 Polarity
There is an assortment of challenges that polarity items like any and ever pose for linguistic
theory. The two most prominent ones have been, on the one hand, finding an adequate
description of their distribution and, on the other hand, providing an explanation of this
distribution. There have been two main approaches to the first challenge. The first approach
claims that NPIs are licensed in the scope of DE operators, i.e. it assumes a semantic licensing
condition on NPIs (e.g. Ladusaw 1979). The second approach claims that because NPIs seem
to be licensed in a variety of non-DE operators, licensing of NPIs cannot be semantic but
must be pragmatic (e.g. Linebarger 1987). Some of the arguments of the latter approach,
which is "frustratingly unalgorithmic" (Linebarger 1987:381), have been successfully defused
by weakening the DE criterion to a Strawson-DE criterion: NPIs are licensed under operators
that allow for downward-entailing inferences on the assumption the presuppositions of the
conclusion are fulfilled (von Fintel 1999).
However, there are at least two types of environments that elude even the weakened
Strawson-DE condition on NPI licensing - NPIs may be felicitous in the scope of desire
predicates and in the scope of non-monotone quantifier phrases like exactly n NP (Linebarger
1987, Kadmon & Landman 1993, Rothschild 2006):
(27) a. I'm glad we got ANY tickets
b. Exactly three students did any work at all
We have already indicated that weak even may occur in both of these environments. An
account of this is provided in chapters 2 and 3 according to which weak even is licit in these
environments if even covertly scopes above the respective scope-bearing elements and the
context satisfies particular conditions. Interestingly, the exact same conditions need to be
satisfied by the context for NPIs to be felicitous in these environments. This parallelism
strongly suggests that we are dealing with closely allied phenomena.
We explain the felicity of NPIs under non-monotone quantifiers and desire predicates by
assuming that their distribution may be governed by a covert even (cf. Krifka 1995). In the
case of any and ever, this assumption is operationalized by having a covert even associate
with the domains of any and ever; the respective NPIs are 'licensed' if and only if the
inference triggered by even is satisfied in the context. Since the alternatives to the domains
of any and ever are their various sub-domains (Krifka 1995, Chierchia 2006), it holds that the
associate of even is in these cases weaker than its alternatives. Accordingly, our treatment of
weak even under non-monotone quantifiers and desire predicates, as propounded in chapters
2 and 3, naturally transfers to NPIs in these environments. A natural explanation is provided
for why NPIs are felicitous under non-monotone quantifiers and desire predicates only in
particular contexts, as observed by Linebarger (1987) and Kadmon & Landman (1993): the
scalar presupposition triggered by even is satisfied only in those contexts. These issues are
discussed at the end of chapters 2 and 3.
1.4 Typology
In addition to even, there is a variety of other elements in English and other languages
that are commonly classified as scalar particles. There is some variation between these
particles, both with respect to their distribution as well as to their semantic contribution in
different environments. However, they all share the definitive feature of triggering a scalar
presupposition. We tackle the typology of scalar particles in chapters 4 and 5.
1.4.1 Concessive scalarity
A particularly intriguing class of scalar particles is formed by the expressions aunque sea and
siquiera in Spanish (Alonso-Ovalle 2009, Lahiri 2010), esto ke in Greek (Giannakidou 2007)
and magari in Slovenian. These expressions are commonly called concessive scalar particles
(Giannakidou 2007). They differ from even in two important respects: (i) they have a more
limited distribution and (ii) they appear to trigger slightly different inferences in environ-
ments in which they occur. More to the point, the distribution of these particles is restricted
to downward-entailing and appropriate modal environments. In these environments, they
seem to contribute distinct meanings: in the former their contribution corresponds to that
of even, while in the latter it sometimes corresponds to that of at least.
We propose that concessive scalar particles are morphologically complex: they consist of
a scalar component corresponding to even and an existential component corresponding to at
least. Their distribution is governed by the inferences triggered by these two components - if
they are satisfied in the context, the occurrence of the concessive scalar particle is licensed.
This may be the case if the scalar component moves at LF above a downward-monotone
operator, stranding the existential component in the scope of the operator; this explains
the felicity of concessive scalars in downward-entailing environments. In the case where
the scalar component moves above a modal operator, we get a licit interpretation only if
the stranded existential component gets a free choice interpretation; this explains both the
felicity and the distinct import of concessive scalars in modal environments. We discuss the
so-called concessive scalar particles in chapter 4.
1.4.2 Scalar particles and competition
At first sight there appear to be many distributional differences between (non-concessive)
scalar particles across languages. However, a more careful examination reveals that their
distribution varies along only two dimensions. First: Scalar particles can be classified with
respect to whether they may associate with weak or strong elements in their immediate
surface scope - we call these particles weak and strong scalar particles, respectively. With
respect to this criterion, there are three main groups of scalar particles: (i) scalar particles
that may be weak or strong (even in English, meme in French, tudi in Slovenian), (ii) scalar
particles that may only be strong (sogar in German, celo in Slovenian, hasta in Spanish),
and (iii) scalar particles that may only be weak (so much as in English, auch nur, einmal
in German). Across languages, the implicational relation in (28) can be observed (cf. Gast
& van der Auwera 2011).
(28) Implicational relation for strong scalar particles
There is a scalar particle that is only strong in the language
=* There is a scalar particles that is only weak in the language
We propose that scalar particles that are only weak decompose into two operators: one that
requires its sister to denote a strong proposition and one that requires its sister to denote
a weak proposition (cf. Guerzoni 2003, Lahiri 2010). These complex scalar particles then
compete for insertion with scalar particles that are only composed of the former operator
(sogar). The competition is regulated by independent principles in grammar - in particular,
the principle that requires one to use alternatives with stronger presuppositions if those are
satisfied in the context. Thus, if we have to insert a particle that will associate with a
weak element in its immediate surface scope, we must insert auch nur since this particle
will globally trigger stronger presuppositions than sogar. Accordingly, sogar may only be
adjoined to clauses that denote strong propositions. Finally, there are scalar particles that
are ambiguous with respect to which of the two operator combinations they spell out (even,
mane).
Second: In some languages, a further type of blocking effect is observed with weak scalar
particles: some weak scalar particles occur only in the immediate scope of negation (e.g.
niti in Slovenian, einmal in German), while other weak scalar particles never occur in the
immediate scope of negation (e.g. tudi in Slovenian, auch nur in German). Roughly, the
following implicational relation holds for those languages:
(29) Implicational relation for weak scalar particles
There is a scalar particle that may only be weak and that only occurs in the imme-
diate scope of negation in the language =- No other weak scalar particle that may
only be weak occurs in the immediate scope of negation in the language
We propose that this variation follows from the Elsewhere Principle. Some weak scalar
particles bear an uninterpretable negative feature (e.g. niti) but are otherwise semantically
indistinguishable from other weak scalar particles (e.g. tudi). Accordingly, they may only be
used under clausemate negation where their negative feature can be checked. An appropriate
Elsewhere Principle dictates that if a weak scalar particle is to be used under negation in
the respective languages, it must be the one with the negative feature.
Taking all of this into account, we propose a very sparse account for the variation among
(non-concessive) scalar particles. We reduce it to variation in morphology: (i) There is a
core ingredient common to all scalar particles - this is the scalar component whose content
corresponds to that of even. (ii) Some scalar particles in addition spell out a weak scalar
component. Finally, (iii) some of these latter particles also spell out a negative feature. All
else follows from blocking. These issues are discussed in chapter 5.
1.5 Additivity
The scalar presupposition is not the only inference that even gives rise to - it often induces
an additive inference as well. This is illustrated in (30). Considering the discussion of the
quantificational strength of the scalar presupposition, it is unsurprising that there has also
been some debate with respect to the quantificational strength of the presupposition, as
indicated in (30-b): e.g. Karttunen & Peters (1979) have proposed that it is existential,
while van Rooy (2003) treats it as (restricted) universal inference.
(30) a. Even JOHN arrived late
b. Additive inference: Some/all people other than John arrived late
The additive inference is commonly assumed to be a presupposition (or conventional impli-
cature) (Karttunen & Peters 1979 and many others). This is supported by the data in (31):
the additive inference cannot be suspended (31-a) (- it is not a conversational implicature)
and it shares projective behavior of presuppositions (31-b) (- it is not part of assertion).
(31) a. #Even JOHN arrived late though, fortunately, no one else did
b. Possibly even JOHN arrived late
=> Some/all people other than John arrived late
However, not all occurrences of even are accompanied by an additive inference. Two
factors play a role in this: (i) whether the alternatives in the domain of even are compatible
with each other (32) and (ii) whether even is weak or not (33), i.e. whether even moves or
not according the scope theory. In (32), the alternatives in the domain of even are mutually
exclusive and the inference that John danced only with someone else at yesterday's party is
not generated; the sentence would be inconsistent if it were. In contrast, the alternatives in
the domain of even in (30) are compatible and an appropriate additive inference is generated
(von Stechow 1990, Rullmann 1997).
(32) Yesterday at the party, John even danced only with SUE
Additive inference:
In (33-a), we have a configuration where even must move above sorry at LF; no inference
about how often John attended the class (or is sorry that he did) is triggered. For example,
the sentence can be used in a context in which John attended the class exactly once. In
(33-b), we have a configuration where even stays in situ; an additive inference is triggered
that John is sorry that he attended the class twice (or more times).
(33) a. John is sorry that he attended the class even ONCE
Additive inference:
b. John is even sorry that he attended the class ONCE
Additive inference: that John is sorry that he attended the class twice
We will account for the asymmetries in (30)-(33) by assuming (i) that the additive and
the scalar presupposition may be triggered in different positions - i.e. even decomposes
into a scalar, which may move, and an additive component - and (ii) that the additive
presupposition is wired to avoid contradictoriness or triviality (cf. Rullmann 1997).
1.6 Outline of the dissertation
The first two chapters of the dissertation deal with weak even and NPIs occurring in the
scope of non-downward-entailing operators:
Chapter 2: Non-monotonicity. We begin the chapter by discussing an approach to weak
even that assumes that even may scope out of its base position at LF (Karttunen & Peters
1979, Lahiri 1998). The mechanics of the approach are illustrated on the occurrences of weak
even in the scope of downward-entailing operators. A prediction of the approach is that weak
even may also be acceptable under non-monotone operators. We show that the prediction
is borne out: weak even is acceptable under non-monotone quantifiers if the sentence and
the context of its use satisfy particular properties. The approach is extended to deal with
certain poorly understood occurrences of NPIs in these environments.
Chapter 3: Desire. In this chapter we look at occurrences of weak even in desire state-
ments, in imperatives and under certain modals. Two strategies are pursued in trying to
explain these occurrences and the constraints they impose on the context. First: Desire pred-
icates, imperative operators and certain modals have a non-monotone semantics (cf. Heim
1992, Levinson 2003, Villalta 2008, Lassiter 2011). The occurrence of weak even in their
scope is correctly predicted to be possible. Second: Desire predicates, imperative operators
and modals have an upward-entailing semantics (von Fintel 1999). The occurrence of weak
even in their scope is thus unexpected. What rescues weak even in these environments is a
grammatical strengthening mechanism. Both approaches face several challenges. In partic-
ular, the first approach faces a difficulty with data that is indicative of desire predicates etc.
being upward-entailing operators, while the second approach faces a difficulty in constraining
the strengthening mechanism to not overgenerate.
The fourth and fifth chapter of the dissertation tackle the cross-linguistic differences between
scalar particles. We discuss their decomposition and their competition for insertion:
Chapter 4: Concessive scalarity. We begin the chapter by describing the distribution and
semantic import of expressions that have been characterized as concessive scalar particles
(Giannakidou 2007 and others). We account for their distribution by decomposing them
into a scalar and an existential component. This decomposition together with independent
mechanisms in grammar also allows us to correctly derive their semantic import which at
first sight appears to be non-uniform across downward-entailing and modal environments.
Chapter 5: Scalar particles and competition. Even belongs to a variegated fam-
ily of scalar particles. At least five classes of (non-concessive) scalar particles have been
distinguished across languages (cf. Gast & van der Auwera 2011). The chapter begins by
exemplifying these different classes. Subsequently, we show that this variation can be ac-
counted for by assuming (i) that scalar particles differ with respect to two morphological
parameters (whether they have an extra scalar component, a negative feature) and (ii) that
they form scales and compete for insertion.
The final chapter looks at the additive inference that commonly accompanies even:
Chapter 6: Additivity. The preceding four chapters focused solely on one component of
the meaning of even - its scalar presupposition. This chapter looks at its second constitutive
component - its additive presupposition. The focus is on the different additive entailments
that arise when even associates with a weak predicate across an appropriate operator at
surface structure and when even associates with a weak predicate in its immediate scope
at surface structure. The differences in additive entailments are captured by a decomposi-
tion of even into two elements that may take distinct scopes at LF: a bearer of the scalar
presupposition, EVEN, and a bearer of the additive presupposition, ADD.
CHAPTER 2
Non-monotonicity
The scalar particle even has a restricted distribution: if it associates with a weak element in
its immediate surface scope - weak even for short - it must be appropriately embedded. The
necessary condition on the appropriateness of the embedded environment is that it is not
upward-entailing. That is, the environment either has to be (Strawson) downward-entailing
or non-monotone. However, being embedded under a (Strawson) downward-entailing or a
non-monotone operator is not yet a sufficient condition for the felicity of weak even: it also
has to hold that the embedding sentence is less likely in the context than a salient alternative.
A similar pattern is evinced also in the distribution of negative polarity items (NPIs).
The primary focus of the chapter is on the distribution of weak even and NPIs under non-
monotone quantifiers. This distribution clearly discloses the dependence of the respective
elements on the properties of the embedding sentences as well as the contexts of their use. We
provide a uniform explanation of this sensitivity. The uniformity follows from the assumption
that the distribution of NPIs may be governed by a covert even. This effectively reduces their
licensing requirements to those of weak even. And weak even is licit under non-monotone
quantifiers (and in other environments) if and only if even scopes above the non-monotone
operator (or other non-upward-entailing operators) and triggers an inference that is satisfied
in the context. The above-mentioned sensitivity of weak even to the properties of the
embedding sentence and the context of its use emerges from this.
The backdrop to our discussion is presented in section 2 where we look at weak even in
downward-entailing environments. The felicity of the respective occurrences of weak even is
explained in scope-theoretic terms: even triggers a correct presupposition because it moves
out of its base position at LF (Karttunen & Peters 1979, Lahiri 1998). A prediction of the
approach is that weak even may be acceptable also in the scope of non-monotone quantifiers.
Section 3 shows that this prediction is borne out: if the context satisfies particular conditions,
weak even is licit in the scope of non-monotone quantifiers. Section 4 describes an alternative
approach to weak even according to which even under non-monotone quantifiers may be the
spell-out of a different lexical item than in positive sentences. This is the so-called ambiguity
approach to even (Rooth 1985, Rullmann 1997). It faces two issues: (i) it does not explain
the sensitivity of weak even to factors external to the minimal clause in which it is located and
(ii) it does not explain why weak even may occur in non-monotone but not upward-entailing
environments. Section 5 extends the analysis of weak even to occurrences of NPIs under non-
monotone quantifiers. We zoom in on the indefinite NPIs any and ever. Following Krifka
(1995) and Chierchia (2006), we assume that structures containing any and ever contain
an alternative-sensitive operator that associates with their domain; if the operator triggers
correct inferences, the NPIs are 'licensed.' We show that if the operator is a covert even, the
NPIs effectively instance weak even configurations and their licensing requirements reduce
to those of weak even. Section 6 concludes.
2.1 Background
We describe Lahiri's (1998) approach to weak even in downward-entailing environments: if
even triggers an unsatisfiable scalar presupposition in its base position, it may covertly move
above a downward-monotone operator where its scalar presupposition may be satisfied (cf.
Karttunen & Peters 1979, Heim 1984). The prediction of this approach is that weak even
may be acceptable in other non-upward-entailing environments as well.
2.1.1 Likelihood and logic
Even triggers the scalar presupposition that the likelihood of its propositional argument
is lower than that of a relevant alternative (Bennett 1982, Kay 1990). We assume in the
following that this is the only semantic contribution of the particle.
(1) [ even I]9'(C, p, w) is defined only if ]q c C [ p <c q].
If defined, [ even ]9'c(C, p, w) = 1 iff p(w) = 1
For example, the sentence in (2-a) has the structure in (2-b) where even takes clausal scope at
LF and associates with the focused element John. The meaning of the sentence is computed
in (2-c): the sentence presupposes that there is an alternative that is more likely than that
John arrived late, while its assertive meaning is that John arrived late.
(2) a. Even JOHN arrived late
b. [even C1] [JohnF arrived late]
c. [ (2-b) ]9P'(w) is defined only if ]q c { that x arrived late | x is a relevant
individual }: that John arrived late <c q. If defined, [ (2-b) ][9c(w) = 1 iff John
arrived late in w
The scalar presupposition triggered by even is subject to the principle in (3), which
follows from the axioms of basic probability theory. The principle imposes a hard condition
on the distribution of even: if even is adjoined to a clause whose focus alternatives entail it,
it will trigger a scalar presupposition that is in violation of (3) and is thus unsatisfiable.
An illustration of the application of the principle is given in (4)-(6). The sentence in (4-a)
has the structure in (4-b) where even associates with the weak element once. The domain
of alternatives over which even quantifies is described in (4-c).
(4) a. #John arrived late even ONCE
b. [even C 1] [John arrived late onceF]
c. C, C { that John arrived late n-times I n c N>o }
It holds that all the alternatives over which even quantifies entail its prejacent (5-a). The
principle in (3) then tells us that the likelihood ordering in (5-b) obtains, i.e. it is at least
as likely that John arrived late once as that he arrived late twice etc.
(5) Entailment and likelihood relations among alternatives
a. ... => that John arrived late twice > that John arrived late once
b. ... <c that John arrived late twice <c that John arrived late once
Even in (4-b) triggers the scalar presupposition in (6). This scalar presupposition contradicts
the logical fact in (5-b). Namely, it cannot hold that there is an alternative that is more
likely than that John arrived late once as well as that John arriving late once is at least
as likely as all of its alternatives. That is, since the prejacent of even in (4-b) denotes a
proposition that is entailed by its alternatives, it cannot be less likely than one of them.1
(6) [ (4-b) J9,c is defined only if 3q E Ci: that John arrived late once <e q
A puzzle emerges when we look at certain embedded occurrences of even - in particular
at the occurrences of even in the scope of a (Strawson) downward-entailing (DE) operator.
These are functions that satisfy the condition in (7), where the cross-categorial entailment
(=:>) is defined as in (8) (von Fintel 1999).
(7) Strawson DE functions
A function f of type (6, T) is Strawson downward-entailing iff for all x,y of type 6 such
that x => y and f(x) is defined: f(y) -> f(x)
(8) Cross-categorial entailment
a. For p, q of type t: p => q iff p = 0 or q = 1
b. For f, g of type (J,Tr): f -> g iff for all x of type 6: f(x) -> g(x)
A sentence with weak even occurring in the scope of a DE operator is in (9-a). If the sentence
were to have the structure in (9-b), it would trigger the scalar presupposition in (9-c). As
'Notice that as long as the domain of even contains more than one alternative, the scalar presupposition
triggered by even in (4-b) violates (3) also if even were to quantify universally (i) (Karttunen & Peters 1979).
Namely, since the domain of even contains alternatives that are not identical with the prejacent, these are
falsely presupposed to be more likely than the prejacent.
(i) [ even j9'e(C, p, w) is defined only if Vq e C I p # q -+ p <c q].
If defined, [ even ]9,'(C, p, w) = 1 iff p(w) = 1
(ii) [ (4-b) ]9,' is defined only if VqEC 1 : q # that J arrived late once -+ that J arrived late once <c q
we have seen in the preceding discussion, this presupposition is in violation of (3) and thus
unsatisfiable. (9-a) should accordingly be pragmatically deviant, contrary to fact.
(9) a. John didn't arrive late even ONCE
b. [not [[even C 1] John arrived late onceF]
c. C1 C { that John arrived late n-times I n E N>o }
d. [ (9-b) ]s,c is defined only if Eq G C1: that John arrived late once <c q
2.1.2 Rescue by movement
Karttunen & Peters (1979) have argued that even may covertly scope out of its base position
(cf. Kay 1990 and others for a similar assumption). Naturally, since the arguments of
even in its scoped position are different from those of even in its base position, the scalar
presuppositions of even in the two positions will differ as well. Lahiri (1998) builds on this
insight to explain the asymmetry between positive and negative sentences with weak even
that we have encountered above: a rescue hatch is available to even in negative sentences -
it may covertly move above negation. That is, Lahiri assumes that in addition to (9-b), the
sentence in (9-a) may also have the LF in (10-a) where there is an intervening entailments-
reversing operator between the scoped even and its associate once. The alternatives over
which even quantifies in its scoped position are described in (10-b): they are the relevant
focus alternatives to the sister of the scoped even.
(10) a. [even C1] [not {even-Gr} [John arrive late onceF]
b. C1 C { that John didn't arrive late n-times I n E N>o }
It holds that the prejacent of even in (10) entails all of its alternatives (11-a). According
to the condition in (3), a satisfiable likelihood ordering on the alternatives in (10-b) will
instance (11-b): the prejacent is at most as likely as all of its alternatives.
(11) Entailment and likelihood relations among alternatives
a. ... -= that John didn't arrived late twice e that John didn't arrive late once
b. that John didn't arrive late once <, that John didn't arrive late twice <c ...
The scalar presupposition of (10-a), given in (12), is thus satisfiable. Since it is natural to
assume that not all alternatives are equally likely, it is also true in the actual context. This
explains the felicity of weak even in negative sentences. 2
(12) [ (10-a) ]9,'(w) is defined only if ]q E C1 : that John didn't arrive late once < q. If
defined, [ (10-a) ]9'c(w) = 1 iff John didn't arrive late once in w
2Notice that the same state of affairs obtains if even is defined as a universal quantifier: since all the
alternatives are at least as likely as the prejacent, they may very well all be more likely than the prejacent.
(i) [ (10-a) ]9'c is defined only if Vq E Ci: q -A that John didn't arrive late once -+ that John didn't
arrive late once <lc q. If defined, [ (10-a) ]9 'c(w) = 1 iff John didn't arrive late once in w
The same reasoning applies to occurrences of even in other DE environments, e.g. in the
scope of downward-monotone quantifiers and in the antecedent clauses of conditionals. This
is illustrated in (13) and (14). If even were to stay in situ in (13-a)/(14-a), it would trigger
an incorrect scalar presupposition. However, if it moves above the respective downward-
monotone operator, its sister in the derived position (Strawson) entails all of its alternatives
(15).3
(13) a. Less than three people arrived late even ONCE
b. [even C1] [less than three people] 1 [{even-Gr} ti arrived late onceF
c. C1 C { that less than three people arrived late n-times I n E N>o }
(14) a. If John arrived late even ONCE, he will be fired
b. [even C1] [if [feven--Gr} John arrived late onceF], he will be fired]
c. C1 C { that if John arrived late n-times, he will be fired I n C N>o }
(15) Entailment relations among alternatives
a. ... that less than three people arrived late thrice <-= that less than three people
arrived late twice - that less than three people arrived late once
b. ... that if John arrive late thrice he will be fired -<= that if John arrive late twice
he will be fired <- that if John arrive late once he will be fired
The scalar presuppositions triggered by even in (13-b) and (14-b) are given in (16). They
comply with (3) and are correct: since the prejacent of even is the logically strongest alter-
native, it may very well be less likely than one of the other alternatives.
(16) a. [ (13-b) 11' is defined only if Iq c { that if John arrived late n-times, he will
be fired I n c N>o }: that less than three people arrived late once <c q
b. [ (14-b) 19'c is defined only !q e { that if John arrived late n-times, he will be
fired I n G N>o }: that if John arrived late once he will be fired <c q
2.1.3 Prediction
The core ingredient of Lahiri's (1998) proposal is that even may move to avoid triggering an
incorrect presupposition. He has shown that if even that associates with a weak element in
3 1t is worth pointing out that (14) is problematic for the movement theory of even, as has been forcefully
argued by Rullmann (1997). Namely, we are required to assume that even moves out of an adjunct clause,
which is otherwise an island for movement.
One suspicious feature of the scope theory is that it attempts to solve a semantic problem
by assigning wide scope to an element without any independent justification that this sort of
exceptional scope assignment is actually possible (Rullmann 1997:48)
A possible way to defuse this issue has been suggested by Lahiri (2006): the scalar presupposition that
accompanies sentences with even is triggered by an even-like operator (EmphAssert in Krifka 1995, E in
Chierchia 2006) that is attached at the clausal level to check the relevant feature of even; even itself is
truth-conditionally vacuous, it stays in situ and primarily conditions the insertion of the even-like operator.
In the following, however, we retain for perspicuity reasons the more common assumption that even itself
moves and that it can exceptionally move out of islands. We defer a more systematic study of the exceptional
scope of scalar particles in English and across languages to another occasion.
its immediate surface scope moves above negation or other downward-monotone operators
at LF (17), the resulting structure can have a consistent and plausible interpretation since
downward-monotone operators reverse entailments. That is, the scalar presupposition that
even triggers in its derived position accords with the condition in (3): its prejacent is not
entailed by its alternatives.
(17) [even C] [. OPDE [t --- oneF ---
However, if even associates with a weak predicate in its immediate surface scope, movement
of even across an operator that reverses entailments is not a necessary but a sufficient
condition for compliance with (3). Rather, the necessary condition is that even moves across
an operator that is not upward-entailing. Besides downward-monotone operators, these
include non-monotone operators.
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Thus, sentences that instance a configuration along the lines of (19) where even associates
with one and moves across a non-monotone operator at LF will have interpretations that
are compliant with (3) - the scalar presupposition of scoped even is satisfiable. However, a
consistent interpretation is not necessarily a plausible interpretation. The following section
investigates the conditions under which such presuppositions are plausible.
(19) [even C] [t OPNM t een-G- OneF--
2.2 Non-monotonicity
We show that weak even is acceptable in the scope of non-monotone quantifiers if particular
conditions obtain in the context. These conditions are more involved than those imposed by
the occurrences of weak even under downward-monotone operators.
2.2.1 Consistency
Quantifier phrases of the form exactly n NP denote functions that are non-monotone in both
their restrictor and their scope. A function is non-monotone iff it is neither upward-monotone
nor (Strawson) downward-monotone:
(20) Non-monotone functions
A function f of type (J, r) is non-monotone iff (i) there are x,y of type J s.t. x
y, f(x) is defined and f(y) =* f(x) and (ii) there are x,y of type J s.t. x =* y, f(y) is
defined and f(x) # f(y)
The non-monotonicity of exactly QPs is illustrated in (21) and (22). For example, if exactly
three people ate kale and another person ate carrots, it is false that exactly four people
ate kale but true that exactly four people ate vegetables (21-a). On the other hand, in a
situation in which exactly four people ate kale and another person ate carrots, it is true that
exactly four people ate kale but false that exactly four people ate vegetables (21-b).
(21) Non-monotonicity of the scope of exactly QPs
a. Exactly 4 people ate vegetables Exactly 4 people ate kale
b. Exactly 4 people ate kale #> Exactly 4 people ate vegetables
(22) Non-monotonicity of the restrictor of exactly QPs
a. Exactly 4 people who ate vegetables left #> Exactly 4 people who ate kale left
b. Exactly 4 people who ate kale left * Exactly 4 people who ate vegetables left
A few examples in which even associates with a weak predicate (open, once, one) in its
immediate scope under a non-monotone quantifier are given in (23). An example with even
associating with a weak predicate in the restrictor of a non-monotone quantifier is in (24).
(23) a. Exactly four people in the whole world have even OPENED that dissertation
b. Exactly two congressmen have read the constitution even ONCE - Dennis
Kucinich and Ron Paul
c. Exactly ten percent of American teenagers have read even ONE book
(24) Exactly two people who even OPENED that dissertation were present at the defense
The scalar presupposition triggered by even in these sentences is satisfiable if even scopes
above the non-monotone quantifiers. We illustrate this for (23-a): the sentence has the
structure in (25-b) and even quantifies over the alternatives in (25-b).
(25) a. Exactly four people in the whole world have even OPENED that dissertation
b. [even C 1] [t [exactly four people] 1 [T Feven-Gr} ti have openedF that
dissertation]]
c. C1 9 {that exactly 4 people x that dissertation I x is open, read or understand}
It holds that the alternatives in (25-c) are mutually logically independent (26-a). In partic-
ular, none of the alternatives except the prejacent entail the prejacent (26-b).
(26) a. Vp, q E C1 : p q --+ p n q {p, q, 0}
b. Vp e C1 : p C that exactly four people opened the dissertation
-+ p that exactly four people opened the dissertation
The scalar presupposition triggered by even in (25-b) is thus satisfiable, i.e. it is compliant
with the condition in (3): propositions that are mutually logically independent may in
principle stand in any kind of likelihood relation to each other.
(27) [ (25-b) ]J'c(w) is defined only if 3q E C1 : that exactly four people in the whole
world opened that dissertation <c q. If defined, [ (25-b) ]9'c(w) = 1 iff exactly four
people in the whole world opened that dissertation in w
However, satisfiability does not imply plausibility. This can be seen if we slightly modify
the examples in (23). Two types of modifications of the quantifier phrase are made in (28):
in one case the domain of the quantifier phrase is narrowed (28-a), while in the other cases
a higher numeral is used in the quantifier phrase (28-bc). The sentences are pragmatically
deviant. Notice that if the associate of even in (28) is replaced by a strong element, the
sentences become acceptable (29).
(28) a. #Exactly four of the five people attending the seminar have even OPENED that
dissertation before the first session
b. #Exactly four hundred congressmen have read the constitution even ONCE
c. #Exactly fifty percent of American teenagers have read even ONE book
(29) a. Exactly four people of the five people attending the seminar have even UNDER-
STOOD that dissertation
b. Exactly four hundred congressmen have read the constitution even SEVEN
times
A slightly different type of modification is made in (30). It concerns the content of the
main predicate: they are modified in such a way that their extension naturally consists of
few individuals that satisfy the description in the quantifier phrase. Again, if the weak
associates are replaced by strong associates, the acceptability of the sentences improves (31).
(30) a. #Exactly four people in the whole world have even OPENED that dissertation
that is practically impossible to obtain
b. #Exactly ten percent of congressmen were involved in even ONE sex scandal
(31) a. Exactly four people in the whole world have even UNDERSTOOD that disser-
tation that is practically impossible to obtain
b. Exactly ten percent of congressmen were involved in even SEVEN sex scandals
2.2.2 Plausibility
The goal of the rest of this section is to explain the contrast observed between (23), (28) and
(30), and to pinpoint the conditions that the sentences and the contexts of their use need to
satisfy for the scalar presupposition triggered by weak even to be correct.
The correctness of the scalar presupposition depends primarily on how many individuals
in the domain of the non-monotone quantifier are expected to be in the denotation of the
main predicate and its alternatives. For example, if the sentence is the one given in (32), its
felicity depends primarily on how many people in the world are expected to open and, say,
read that dissertation.
(32) Exactly four people in the whole world have even OPENED that dissertation
This expectation translates into the likelihoods of the prejacent and its alternatives. More to
the point, a proper understanding of the likelihood of the respective alternatives over which
even quantifies is achieved by comparing each alternative to appropriate propositions with
which it spans the logical space. For example, (a) the likelihood that exactly four people in
the world opened that dissertation depends on (b) the likelihood that more than four people
in the world opened that dissertation and (c) the likelihood that less than four people in the
world opened that dissertation. If either (b) or (c) is very high, then (a) will be low. This
follows from the fact that (a), (b) and (c) are likelihoods of mutually exclusive propositions
that span the logical space; if one of the likelihoods is high, the other two likelihoods are low
according to Kolmogorov's third axiom. Thus, if the expectation is that, say, fifty people
opened that dissertation, the likelihood that more than four people opened it is high (b) and
the likelihood that less than four people opened it is ignorable (c). The fact that (b) is high
then implies that (a) is appropriately low.
We begin by explaining the correctness of the scalar presupposition triggered by even in
(32), repeated in (33). That is, we begin by describing the contexts in which it is less likely
that exactly four people in the whole world opened that dissertation than that exactly four
people in the whole world read that dissertation. Subsequently, we show why an analogous
explanation does not go through with the deviant examples in (28) and (30).
(33) a. Exactly four people in the whole world have even OPENED that dissertation
b. 3q E {that exactly 4 people x that dissertation I x is open, read or understand}:
that exactly 4 people opened that dissertation <, q
Plausible presuppositions
The reason behind why the relation described in (33-b) is correct in the actual context is
threefold:4 (i) there is an expectation that more than four people in the world will open that
dissertation, (ii) this expectation is significantly greater than the expectation that more than
four people in the world will read that dissertation (not only because the latter proposition
entails the former), and (iii) it is not expected that less than four people will open or read
the dissertation, i.e. the difference in expectation that less than four people will open that
dissertation and that less than four people will read that dissertation is negligible. This is
graphically represented in Figure 2-1: it is expected that, say, around thirty-five people open
that dissertation, that around twenty people read that dissertation, and that around ten
people understood that dissertation.
These factors conspire to allow the likelihood that exactly four people in the world opened
that dissertation to be lower than the likelihood that exactly four people in the world read
that dissertation - it is more unexpected that only exactly four people opened that disserta-
tion than that only exactly four people read or understood that dissertation (cf. the distance
in Figure 2-1 between the expected number of people that VP-ed and the value that exactly
four people VP-ed, where VP is open, read or understand).
More formally, the likelihoods of the relevant alternatives are determined as in (34) and
(35). These formulas are corollaries of Kolmogorov's third axiom and the fact that the
respective propositions partition the logical space (that more than four, exactly four and
less than four people VP-ed). To verify the scalar presupposition in (33-b), we need to show
that (34) is lower than (35) in the actual context.
4For brevity, we will assume in the following that the existential statement in (33-b) is verified by the
proposition that exactly four people read that dissertation.
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Figure 2-1: Expected number of people x-ing that dissertation. Indication of the unexpect-
edness of exactly four people in the whole world having opened that dissertation.
(34) the likelihood that exactly 4 people in the world opened that dissertation
= 1 - the likelihood that more than 4 people in the world opened that diss.
- the likelihood that less than 4 people in the world opened that diss.
(35) the likelihood that exactly 4 people in the world read that dissertation
- 1 - the likelihood that more than 4 people in the world read that diss.
- the likelihood that less than 4 people in the world read that diss.
The comparison between (34) and (35) can be represented as in the table in Figure 2-2: the
prejacent and the relevant alternative are situated with respect to propositions with which
they span the logical space. (34) corresponds to #, while (35) corresponds to #'. And (34)
is lower than (35) iff the relation described in (36) obtains.
Figure 2-2: Likelihoods (0,#') of two alternatives
(36) Restatement of the scalar presupposition (33-b)
# =1 - a - -y < 0' =1 - a' - -y'. Equivalently: a' - a < - -'
The scalar presupposition in (33-b) is felicitous if -y is considerably higher that -y' in the
preceding talbe (more people are expected to open than to read the dissertation), while the
difference between a and a' is small (it is relatively unlikely that less than four people in
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the world opened or read that dissertation). As we have indicated in Figure 2-1, this easily
obtains in the actual contexts and the presupposition in (33-b) is thus not only compatible
with (3) but also correct (the quantification is verified by the proposition that exactly four
people read that dissertation). This means that the occurrence of weak even in (33-a) is
acceptable in the respective context.
If the context were such that it would be expected that only few people have read that
dissertation, the scalar presupposition in (33-b) would be false and weak even would not
be acceptable. An example of such a context is one where that dissertation refers to a
dissertation in a field where dissertations do not serve a purpose other than satisfying an
antiquated degree requirement. This is arguably the case in biosciences where dissertations
tend to be commented compendia of previously published papers that are quickly superseded
by newer papers. In this case, the expectation is that fewer than four people will open that
dissertation and that at most the main supervisor will read and understand it, as indicated
in Figure 2-3.
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Figure 2-3: Expected number of people x-ing that (biosciences) dissertation. Indication of
the unexpectedness of exactly four people in the whole world having read that dissertation.
Accordingly, in such a context, it is more unexpected that exactly four people read (and un-
derstood) that dissertation than that exactly four people opened that dissertation. And this
transfers to the respective likelihoods: it is more likely that exactly four people opened that
dissertation than that exactly four people read that dissertation. The scalar presupposition
triggered in (33-b) is false in such a context and weak even is unacceptable:
(37) #Exactly four people in the world even OPENED that (biosciences) dissertation
In the cases where the associate of even is a numeral, the same reasoning applies. For
example, the sentence in (38-a) has the structure in (38-b) and triggers the scalar presup-
position in (38-d). In the following we assume for brevity that the verifier of the scalar
presupposition is the proposition that exactly two congressmen read the constitution twice.
(38) a. Exactly two congressmen have read the constitution even ONCE
b. [even C1] [exactly 2 congressmen read the constitution onceF]
c. C1 C { that exactly 2 congressmen read the constitution n times I n E N>o }
d. -q E Ci: that exactly 2 congressmen read the constitution once <, q
The scalar presupposition is plausible in the actual context. Namely, in the actual context
the expectation is that many congressmen read the constitution once (say, around two hun-
dred) but that few of these congressmen read the constitution more than once (say, around
fifty congressmen read it thrice), as indicated in Figure 2-4. Accordingly, it is more unex-
pected that only exactly two congressmen read the constitution once than that exactly two
congressmen read the constitution twice or more often.
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Figure 2-4: Expected number of congressmen reading the constitution x times. Indication
of the unexpectedness of exactly two congressmen reading the constitution once.
These expectations suffice for the plausibility of (38-c): (i) the likelihood that exactly two
congressmen have read the constitution once is low because of the high likelihood that more
than two congressmen have read it once; (ii) the likelihood that exactly two congressmen
have read the constitution twice is higher because it is not as likely that more than two
congressmen have read it twice as that more than two congressmen have read it once. This
is schematized in (39): (39-c) follows from Kolmogorov's third axiom and the fact that
the respective propositions partition the logical space. Thus, the existential presupposition
described in (38-c) is not only consistent but also correct in the actual context. This means
that the occurrence of weak even in (38-a) is felicitous. As before, if the expectations in the
context were different, the scalar presupposition might be false and weak even unacceptable.5
'At this point, it is worth looking at the prediction for (38-a) by the approach that adopts a universal
scalar presupposition (Karttunen & Peters 1979). The unrestricted universal scalar presupposition of even
in (38-a) is given in (i). It is trivially false - since it is practically impossible that exactly two congressmen
have read the constitution, say, a thousand times, it cannot be the case that it is least likely that exactly
two congressmen read the constitution once.
(i) Vq E {that exactly two congressmen have read the constitution n times I n E N>o}:
that exactly two congressmen have read the constitution once <c q
(39) a. Pr (more than 2 - once ) >> Pr ( more than 2 - twice )
b. Pr (less than 2 - once ) ~ Pr ( less than 2 - twice) 0
c. => Pr ( exactly 2 - one ) < Pr (exactly 2 - twice)
The generalization underlying the distribution of weak even under non-monotone quan-
tifiers furnished by the above discussion is in (40): if the context is such that the main
predicate and its stronger alternatives are expected to obtain of relatively many individu-
als in the domain of the non-monotone quantifier, then it is less likely that the weak main
predicate obtains of relatively few individuals than that some stronger alternative obtains of
relatively few individuals.
Implausible scalar presuppositions: QP variants
We have already described some special contexts in which sentences containing weak even
under non-monotone quantifiers are unacceptable (cf. dissertations in biosciences example).
We now turn to two classes of sentences with weak even under a non-monotone quantifier
that are unacceptable in most natural contexts, including the actual context. We begin by
looking at the variants of (23) in which we have tinkered with the quantifier phrase. The
first example is the sentence in (41-a): if even stays in situ, it triggers an unsatisfiable
presupposition; if even scopes above the non-monotone quantifier, as in (41-b), it triggers
the scalar presupposition in (41-d). This presupposition is satisfiable - it complies with (3).
(41) a. #Exactly four of the five people attending the seminar have even OPENED that
dissertation before the first session
b. [even C1] [g [exactly four people] 1 [t feven-Gr} ti have openedF that
dissertation]]
c. Sq e {that exactly 4 people of the 5 people x that dissertation before the first
session |x is open, read or understand}: that exactly 4 people of the 5 people
opened that dissertation before the first session <>c q
However, the presupposition is incorrect. Namely, the expectation in the actual context is
that few people will open the assigned readings prior to the first session of the seminar. For
Accordingly, as was accentuated in the introductory chapter, an appropriate restriction of the domain of
quantification of even is required - e.g. to propositions that describe congressmen reading the constitution
a reasonable number of times (ii). This restricted presupposition is satisfied in the actual context and weak
even is predicted to be acceptable.
(ii) Vq E {that exactly two congressmen have read the constitution n times | <<}
that exactly two congressmen have read the constitution once <c q
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Figure 2-5: Expected number of people attending having x that dissertation. Indication of
the unexpectedness of exactly four people attending the seminar having read that disserta-
tion.
example, if the seminar consists of five participants, the expectation in the actual context
is that perhaps three students open the assigned readings, two of these students read them,
and one student understands them, as indicated in Figure 2-5. In accordance to this, it is
more unexpected for exactly four of the five students to read or understand that dissertation
than for exactly four of the five students to open that dissertation (cf. the distance between
the expected number of people that VP-ed and the value that exactly four people VP-ed,
where VP is open, read or understand in Figure 2-5). In terms of likelihood: since it is more
likely that less than four people read or understood that dissertation than that less than four
people opened that dissertation (42-b) and it is unlikely that more than four students read
that dissertation, it follows from Kolmogorov's third axiom that it is less likely that exactly
four of the five students read or understood that dissertation than that exactly four of the
five people opened that dissertation (42-c). The scalar presupposition in (41-c) is thus false
in the actual context, which explains the pragmatic deviance of the sentence with weak even
in (41-a).
(42) a. Pr (more than 4 - open) Pr ( more than 4 - read) ~0
b. Pr (less than 4 - open ) < Pr ( less than 4 - read)
c. =- Pr ( exactly 4 - open ) ;> Pr (exactly 4 - read)
The explanation of the pragmatic deviance of (28-b) proceeds similarly: the sentence
has the structure in (43-b) and triggers the scalar presupposition in (43-c). The sentence
is pragmatically deviant because the likelihood of the prejacent of scoped even is greater
than the likelihood of the proposition that exactly four hundred congressmen have read the
constitution twice or more times. We explicate this in the following.
(43) a. #Exactly four hundred congressmen have read the constitution even ONCE
b. [even C1 ] [t exactly 400 congressmen read the constitution onceFi
c. 3q E { that exactly 400 congressmen have read the constitution n times I n E
N>o }: that exactly 400 congressmen have read the constitution once <c q
The expectation in the actual context is that many congressmen read the constitution at least
once (say, close to four hundred) and that much fewer congressmen read the constitution
more than once (say, around two hundred read it twice and, optimistically, around one
hundred read it thrice etc), as indicated in Figure 2-6.
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Figure 2-6: Expected number of congressmen having read the constitution x times. Indica-
tion of the unexpectedness of exactly 400 congressmen having read the constitution twice.
It thus holds that although (i) it is likely that less than four hundred congressmen read the
constitution once, (ii) it is much more likely that less than four hundred congressmen have
read the constitution twice (or more often) (44-b). It follows that the likelihood that exactly
four hundred congressmen read the constitution once is at least as great as that exactly
four hundred congressmen read it twice (or more often) (44-c). This means that the scalar
presupposition in (43-c) is false in the actual context, resulting in the pragmatic deviance of
the sentence.
(44) a. Pr (more than 400 - once) ~ Pr (more than 400 - twice) ~0
b. Pr (less than 400 - once ) << Pr (less than 400 - twice)
c. Pr (exactly 400 - once ) > Pr (exactly 400 - twice)
The generalization underlying the infelicity of weak even in above examples is compiled in
(45): if the context is such that the stronger alternatives to the main predicate are expected
to obtain of relatively few individuals in the domain of the non-monotone quantifier, then it
is more likely that the weak main predicate obtains of relatively many individuals than that
some stronger alternative obtains of relatively many individuals.
Implausible scalar presuppositions: VP variants
We now switch to the variants of (23) in which the main predicate and its alternatives are
unlikely to obtain of many individuals (30). A pertinent example is in (46): the structure
of the sentence in (46-a) is given in (46-b) and its satisfiable scalar presupposition is given
in (46-c) - since the alternatives in the domain of even are mutually logically independent,
any likelihood ordering may obtain on them.
(46) a. #Exactly ten percent of congressmen were involved in even ONE sex scandal
b. [even Cr] [+ exactly 10% of congressmen were involved in oneF sex
scandal]
c. E { that exactly 10% of congressmen were involved in n sex scandals I n c
N>o }: that exactly 10% of congressmen were involved in one sex scandal <c q
Similar to our discussion of dissertations in biosciences, it is expected that the main pred-
icate obtains of only few individuals in the domain of the non-monotone quantifiers (say,
around five percent of congressmen) and that the stronger alternatives to the main predicate
obtain of even fewer individuals, as indicated in Figure 2-7. It is thus more unexpected that
exactly 10% of congressmen were involved in, say, two sex scandals than that exactly 10% of
congressmen were involved in one sex scandal. This transfers to likelihoods of the respective
propositions: it is more likely that exactly 10% of congressmen were involved in one sex
scandal than that exactly 10% of congressmen were involved in two or more sex scandals.
Thus, the scalar presupposition in (46-c) is incorrect, which explains the infelicity of (46-a).
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Figure 2-7: Expected percentage of congressmen involved in x sex scandals. Indication of
the unexpectedness of exactly 10% of congressmen being involved in two sex scandals.
The generalization underlying the infelicity of weak even in the above example is an
extreme case of (40): if the context is such that the main predicate and its stronger al-
ternatives are expected to obtain of very few or perhaps no individuals in the domain of
the non-monotone quantifier, then it is more likely that the weak main predicate obtains
of relatively few individuals than that some stronger alternative obtains of relatively few
individuals.
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2.2.3 Summary
If even associates with a weak predicate in the scope of a non-monotone operator, it triggers
a consistent scalar presupposition if it covertly scopes above the non-monotone operator
(48). Namely, in that case, the alternatives over which even quantifies are mutually logically
independent and in principle any likelihood ordering may hold on them, including the one
presupposed by even.
(48) [even C] [+ OPNM [t ... I oneF .-
The scalar presupposition that even triggers in its scoped position is not necessarily correct.
That is, particular conditions need to obtain in the context for the sentence with weak even
under a non-monotone quantifier to be licit. These conditions relate to the expectation about
how many individuals in the domain of the non-monotone quantifier are in the denotation
of the main predicate and its alternatives. We have derived three generalizations concerning
these conditions.
The first generalization underlies the fact that weak even may occur in the scope of a
non-monotone quantifier that contains a low numeral or proportion. The predicate P in (49)
corresponds to the meaning of the VP containing the weak associate of even - e.g. open that
dissertation in (50)- while P' is its relevant focus alternative - e.g. read that dissertation.
If it is expected that many people opened that dissertation and that fewer people read that
dissertation, the scalar presupposition in (50) is correct: it is less likely that only exactly
four people opened that dissertation than that exactly four people read that dissertation.
(49) Exactly four people in the whole world have even OPENED that dissertation
The second generalization is the obverse of the first generalization and underlies the fact
that weak even may not occur in the scope of a non-monotone quantifier that contains a
high numeral or proportion.
(5 Geeaizat io aothighl n1umber (prop 101ortlonls)
If P and lP' are altrnti e redcates with PV P and P' is ver'y lkyto obtain
of relativelyv fewndiiuas thenl it'is les;s likely th'at P' will obtainl of arltivl
h6ig nube of idividuials than'Athat P Will obtai of a relativelyhig number wl'ofI~~~~~ 4 t lull r o 11
ind ividual
For example, since it is expected that fewer than four hundred congressmen read the con-
stitution once or more times, it is more likely that exactly four hundred congressmen read
the constitution once than that exactly four hundred congressmen read the constitution, say,
twice. This explains the infelicity of weak even in (50-b).
(50) a. Exactly two congressmen have read the constitution even ONCE
b. #Exactly four hundred congressmen have read the constitution even ONCE
The third generalization, which is an extreme case of the first generalization, underlies the
fact that weak even may not occur in the scope of a non-monotone quantifier that contains
a low numeral or proportion if the main predicate and its alternatives are expected to obtain
of only few or no individuals in the domain of the non-monotone quantifier.
q R
For example, since it is expected that only very few congressmen were involved in a sex scan-
dal, it is more likely that exactly ten percent of congressmen (= a relatively low proportion)
were involved in one sex scandal than that exactly ten percent of congressmen were involved
in more than one sex scandal. This explains the infelicity of weak even in (52-b).
(52) a. Exactly ten percent of congressmen read even ONE book
b. #Exactly ten percent of congressmen were involved even ONE sex scandal
2.3 Ambiguity
We have assumed above that sentences with weak even are acceptable only if even moves
above an appropriate operator at LF. An alternative to this approach has been developed by
Rooth (1985): in certain environments, even may be assigned a meaning that is the reverse
of the meaning of even in positive sentences.
2.3.1 Downward-entailingness
A different resolution of the contrast in (53) is possible if Rooth's (1985) ambiguity approach
to even is adopted.' According to this approach, even comes in two varieties, given in (54).
The first lexical item is identical to the one proposed by Karttunen & Peters (1979) and has
an unrestricted distribution (54-a), while the second item triggers the reverse presupposition
and has the distribution of a negative polarity item (54-b).
(53) a. #John arrived late even ONCE
b. John didn't arrive late even ONCE
(54) a. even ]9'c(C, p, w) is defined only if Vq E C [ p # q -+ p <e q].
If defined, [ even ]9'c(C, p, w) = 1 iff p(w) = 1
b. [ evenNPIgc(C, p, w) is defined only if Vq E C [ p / q -- q <,- p].
If defined, [ evenNPIgC(C, p, w) - 1 iff p(w) = 1
Nothing changes with respect to occurrences of weak even in positive episodic sentences.
For example, the sentence in (53-a) is deviant since only a plain even may occur in it, which
triggers an incorrect scalar presupposition (55-a); negative polarity even is not licensed in a
positive sentences (55-b).
(55) a. #[even C 1] [John arrived late onceF]
b. *[evenNPI C1 ] [John arrived late onceF]
This changes in negative sentences. As in positive sentences, even in (53-b) may either be the
plain even or evenNpI. However, the structure with evenNpI is licit since evenNpl occurs under
negation and negation licenses NPIs (56). Furthermore, the scalar presupposition triggered
by evenNpI in (56) is consistent and plausible (57): the logically weakest alternative - that
John arrived late once - may be likelier than all of its alternatives.
(56) [not [[evenNpI C1] [John arrived late onceF]]
(57) [ (57-b) ]9'c(w) is defined only if for n>1, that John arrived late n-times <c that
John arrived late once. If defined, [ (57-a) ]9'c(w) = 1 iff John didn't arrive late
once in w
The ambiguity approach is subject to two objections. The first objection is conceptual
in nature: there is nothing in the meaning of evenNpI that could shed light on why it occurs
only in negative polarity environments. In the same spirit, it is not clear why evenNpI should
have a restricted distribution rather than the plain even. The second objection is empirical
in nature and is based on observations by Heim (1984) and Schwarz (2000): the felicity of
even with a weak associate can be shown to be sensitive to content that is external to the
minimal clause in which even is generated. This is demonstrated in (58): (58-a) is licit, while
(58-b) is pragmatically deviant. The only difference between the sentences is in the scope
of the quantifier. That is, there is no difference between the two sentences with respect to
6Parallel to our discussion in the introductory chapter, an existential variant of the scalar presupposition
is possible on this approach as well. Since we reject the approach on other grounds, we stick to Rooth's
original formulation. We continue to ignore the additive presupposition as before.
the minimal clause in which evenNpI is base-generated and the licenser of the NPI. Since the
respective environment is downward-entailing, the ambiguity theory predicts there to be no
difference in the felicity of the two sentences.
(58) a. Every student who read even ONE paper will pass the exam
b. #Every student who read even ONE paper will fail the exam
(59) a. [[every student] [1 [[evenNPI C 2] ti read oneF paper] j will pass]
b. #[[every student] [1 [[evenNPI C2] t1 read oneF paper] | will fail]
The scope theory of Karttunen & Peters (1979) that Lahiri adopts is in a better position to
explain the contrast in (58). Namely, in its scoped position, the arguments of even differ in
the two sentences and, accordingly, the scalar presuppositions triggered by it.
(60) a. [even C1] [every student who read oneF paper will pass]
b. #[even C1 ] [every student who read oneF paper will fail]
The scalar presuppositions of (60) are given in (61). Although even has in the two structures
in (60) different arguments, its prejacent is in both cases entailed by all the alternatives in
its domain. So, the prejacent of even is in both structures in (60) at most as likely as the
alternatives and the scalar presupposition is in principle satisfiable. This means that the
pragmatic deviance of (60-a) is not due to even triggering a presupposition that violates (3);
it is rather due to the falsity of the presupposition in natural contexts.
(61) a. 3q E {that every student who read n papers passed the exam I n c N>o}:
that every student who read one paper passed the exam <c q
b. 3q E {that every student who read n papers failed the exam I n c N>o}:
that every student who read one paper failed the exam <c q
Namely, it naturally holds that if someone read many papers, it is more unlikely that they
will fail than if they read fewer papers. Accordingly, the unexpectedness of every student who
read (at least) one paper failing the exam hails primarily from the unexpectedness of every
student who read more than one paper failing. It thus arguably holds that the alternatives
in the domain of even in (61-b) are not noticeably more likely than the prejacent. This is
the reason for the falsity of the presupposition and the pragmatic deviance of the sentence
(cf. Schwarz 2000:8 for further discussion). Crucially, such a treatment is not available
to ambiguity theory: since even stays in situ in both sentences in (58), it has the same
arguments in both sentences and thus triggers the same presupposition in both sentences.
2.3.2 Non-monotonicity
The above issues for the ambiguity approach to even also emerge when it comes to occur-
rences of weak even in the scope of non-monotone quantifiers. The first issue is that it is not
obvious that the negative polarity evenNpI should be licensed in the scope of a non-monotone
quantifier, i.e. in an environment that is not (Strawson) downward-entailing. However, as
we will see in the next section, NPIs are sometimes licensed in non-monotone environments,
so evenNPl might fall into that class of NPIs. Be that as it may, it remains a mystery as
to why evenNpI should be licensed in this environment but not in upward-entailing environ-
ments. The second issue is that, as in the case of downward-entailing quantifiers, the felicity
of weak even in the scope of a non-monotone quantifier depends on the content external to
the minimal clause in which even is base-generated as well as on contextual factors. This is
illustrated in (62) and (63).
(62) a. Exactly two congressmen have read the constitution even ONCE
b. #Exactly four hundred congressmen have read the constitution even ONCE
(63) a. Exactly ten percent of American teenagers read even ONE book
b. #Exactly ten percent of congressmen were involved in even ONE sex scandal
We have derived this contrast in acceptability in the scope-theoretic approach to even by
showing that the scalar presuppositions of scoped even in (62-b) and (63-b) are false in the
actual context, while the scalar presuppositions of (62-a) and (63-a) are correct.
This is not an available option for the ambiguity theory. Namely, the theory assigns the
infelicitous sentences the structures in (64). The scalar presuppositions triggered by evenNpI,
given in (65), are correct in both structures and evenNPI is embedded in both structures under
a QP expressing the same proportion. Based on this, it is not clear how an ambiguity theory
could account for the observed contrast between the two sentences.
(64) a. [exactly 10% of American teens] 1 [[evenNp, Co] ti read oneF book]
b. [exactly 10% of congr.] 1 [[evenN-p Co] t, be involved in oneF scandal]
(65) a. 3q c { that g(1) read n books I n c N>o }: that g(1) read one book <c q
b. 3q E { that g(1) was involved in n sex scandals I n E N>o }: that g(1) was
involved in one sex scandal <c q
2.4 Negative polarity items
Negative polarity items like any and ever may occur under non-monotone quantifiers. Their
acceptability is context-dependent in the same way as the acceptability of weak even in
this environment. We propose that this is due to their distribution being governed by the
inferences triggered by a covert even that associates with them.
2.4.1 Licensing of negative polarity items
Downward-entailingness
Negative polarity items (NPIs) are expressions that have a restricted distribution. A major
goal of linguistic theory is to appropriately describe this distribution, i.e. to answer the
question under what operators are NPIs licensed. This is the so-called licensor question
(Ladusaw 1996:326). A prominent answer to this question defined the licensors of NPIs in
syntactic/semantic terms (66) (Fauconnier 1975, Ladusaw 1979): an occurrence of an NPI
is licit only if it is in the scope of an appropriate DE operator (66).7
(66) NPI licensing condition (version 1 of 3)
An NPI is only grammatical if it is in the scope of a DE operator
This condition was subsequently modified to account for two types of data. First: The
distribution of some NPIs is restricted to only a subset of DE environments:
(67) a. John didn't come home in weeks
b. #If John comes home in weeks, you can be happy
This is captured by having different NPIs be subject to different NPI licensing conditions,
all of which can be defined in semantic terms (Zwarts 1998). For example, the NPI in weeks
must occur in the scope of an anti-additive operator, 8 while the NPIs any and ever may
occur under any DE operator:
(68) NPI licensing condition (version 2 of 3)
Some NPIs (any, ever) are only grammatical if they are in the scope of a DE
operator. Other NPIs (in weeks) are only grammatical if they are in the scope of an
anti-additive operator
Second: Any and ever are licensed in the scope of only (69). This is problematic for (68)
since only does not denote a DE function, as indicated in (70-a). However, it does denote a
Strawson DE function, as indicated in (70-b).
(69) Only John saw anyone
(70) a. Only John ate vegetables -> Only John ate kale
b. Only John ate vegetables & John ate kale -> Only John ate kale
In light of the data in (69), the licensing condition in (68) was weakened to the condition in
(71) (von Fintel 1999). Since (71) is properly weaker than (68), it subsumes licensing of any
and ever under DE operators as well their licensing in the scope of expressions like only,
sorry and in antecedent clauses of conditionals.
(71) NPI licensing condition (version 3 of 3)
Some NPIs (any, ever) are only grammatical if they are in the scope of a Strawson
DE operator. Other NPIs (in weeks) are only grammatical if they are in the scope
of an anti-additive operator
7 Another pertinent question in this respect is Ladusaw's (1996:326) licensing relation question - in what
relation must the NPI stand to its licensor. It pertains to issues related to intervention effects. We leave
these issues aside in the following (cf. Chierchia 2006, Guerzoni 2006 for a recent discussion).
8 A function f of type (3, r) is anti-additive iff for all x,y of type J: f(x V y) * f(x) A f(y).
Non-monotonicity
There are prominent occurrences of any and ever that are in violation of even the weakened
licensing condition in (71). In particular, NPIs may occur under non-monotone quantifiers:
(72) Exactly four people in the whole world have ever read that dissertation: Bill, Mary,
Tom, and Ed (Linebarger 1987:373)
(73) a. Exactly three people with any money showed up (Rothschild 2006)
b. Exactly three people did any work at all
It holds that exactly n NP is not a Strawson DE operator. An occurrence of any kind of
NPI in its scope is thus unexpected on (71). Linebarger (1987) took the occurrence of NPIs
under non-monotone quantifiers as suggestive of the fact that the NPI licensing condition
should be syntactic/pragmatic in nature: direct licensing of NPIs occurs if they are in the
immediate scope of negation (cf. Baker 1970); in the absence of negation, NPIs are licensed
by an allusion to a sentence with negation (Negative Implicature). Negative Implicature of
(72) that is responsible for licensing of ever is given in (74) where ever is in the immediate
scope of negation (Linebarger 1987:373).
(74) Everyone who is not Bill, Mary, Ed, or Tom has not ever read that dissertation
Linebarger also observed that "NPI acceptability [under exactly QPs] decreases with the
magnitude (context determining what counts as large) of the number expression modified
by exactly." This is illustrated in (75). She proposed to derive this from the Negative
Implicature: "it is pragmatically strange to bank on an implicature in [(74) ] from a large
QP, and hence contextually large numbers do not license NPIs."
(75) #Exactly 456 people have ever read that book all the way through (Nishiguchi 2004:5)
The main problem of such an approach to NPI licensing is that it is "frustratingly unal-
gorithmic" (Linebarger 1987:381, though see Linebarger 1991:166). As such, it is not clear
that it brings one closer to resolving the licensor question. In contrast, Ladusaw's approach
is "impressively algorithmic" (Linebarger 1987:361) but fails to account for the felicity of
NPIs under non-monotone quantifiers. Now, there have been proposals to further weaken
the NPI licensing condition in (71) to include non-monotonic NPI licensers (e.g. Progovac
1994:279; Rothschild 2006). However, in light of Linebarger's discussion of examples like
(75) such a strategy is inadequate: it fails to capture an important characteristic of NPIs
under non-monotone quantifiers - their context-dependence.
2.4.2 Another classification of polarity items
We have noted above that not all NPIs exhibit the same distributional pattern, e.g. some
NPIs may occur under any DE operator, while others occur only under anti-additive opera-
tors. Furthermore, it is known at least since Borkin (1971) that even NPIs that do not differ
in their distribution sometimes induce distinct pragmatic effects in sentences in which they
are used. Two prominent differences relate to their behavior in questions and their context-
dependence. On the basis of these two criteria, two classes of NPIs can be distinguished:
regular NPIs and so-called even-NPIs (Heim 1984, Krifka 1995, Chierchia 2010).
Bias in questions
Borkin (1971) has observed that NPIs like any and ever may be used in questions irrespective
of the speaker's expectations about the possible answers to the question (76-a). On the other
hand, minimizer NPIs like a red cent may be used in questions only in contexts in which the
speaker expects a negative answer - the questions have a negative bias (76-b). Furthermore,
the negative bias that we observe with minimizers comes about also in questions containing
stressed any and ever (76-c).
(76) a. Did Mary contribute any money? (- no bias)
b. Did Mary contribute even a red cent? (~- negatively biased)
c. Did Mary contribute ANY money AT ALL? (~~> negatively biased)
Guerzoni (2004) derived the contrast in (76-ab) from the absence of even in (76-a) and its
presence in (76-b). Namely, under the assumption that questions denote sets of answers and
that even may scope out of its base position, Guerzoni shows that the sentence in (76-b)
only has one LF that denotes a set containing a defined answer - and the defined answer is
negative. This is illustrated in (77)-(79). The sentence in (77-a) has two possible structures
that differ in the scope of even with respect to the trace of whether.
(77) a. Did Mary contribute even a red cent?
b. [whether [1(st)(st) [ti. [even C2] [Mary contributed a red cent]]]]
c. [whether [1 [[even C; [ti {even-G } [Mary contributed a red cent]]]]
If we simplify Guerzoni's semantics and assume that the meaning of whether is the one in
(79), we derive the meanings for the two structures as in (79) and (81).
(78) [ whether ]9,' = Af((st)(st))(st). {f(Ap.p), f(Ap.-'p)}
The LF in (77-b) denotes a set containing two propositions, both of which trigger an in-
correct scalar presupposition (80): the prejacent - that Mary contributed a minimal amount
of money (a red cent) - is entailed by all the alternatives - the propositions that Mary
contributed a non-minimal amount of money - and thus in violation of the condition in (3).
(79) [ (79-a) ]9,c = [ whether ]f'c(Af.f([ [even C2] M contributed a red cent ]1 ''))
- { ~[even C 1] Mary contributed a red cent ]1 ,c
i [even C 1] Mary contributed a red cent ]9'c}
(80) 3q E {that M contributed n cents I n E N}: that Mary contributed a red cent <c q
The LF in (77-c) denotes the set described in (81). The first answer in (81) imposes the
same requirement on the context as the propositions in (79) - it is thus undefined in any
context. The second answer in (81) triggers the presupposition in (82). This presupposition
may be correct: the proposition that Mary didn't contribute a minimal amount (a red cent)
entails all the alternatives and may be less likely than them.
(81) [ (81-b) 19,c = [ whether ]9'c(Af.[ even C1L9,c(f([ M contributed a red cent ]9'c)))
- ({ [even C 1] Mary contributed a red cent 19'c,
even C19'c(,[ Mary contributed a red cent ]9'c)}
(82) 3q E {that Mary didn't contribute n cents I n e N}:
that Mary didn't contribute a red cent <, q
The non-presuppositional meaning of the second answer is that Mary did not contribute a
minimal (or greater) amount of money. Thus, the only LF of the sentence in (77-a) that
denotes a set with a proposition that is consistent with (3) is (77-c): its denotation is a set
that contains an undefined positive answer and a defined negative answer. This derives the
bias of the question. Finally, if we were to assume that the question in (76-c) contains a
covert even that associates with the NPI, Guerzoni's approach could be utilized to explain
its bias as well (see section 2.4.3).
Context dependence
The same expressions that trigger bias in questions exhibit also greater context-dependency.
This has been observed by Heim (1984) and Schwarz (2000). For example, there is a contrast
in acceptability of the sentences in (83): the sentence (83-a) is acceptable, while (83-b) is
marked. However, the only difference between (83-a) and (83-b) is in the content of the
scope of the universal quantifier. That is, there is no difference between the sentences with
respect to the minimal clause in which the NPI is generated nor with respect to the licensor
of the NPI. This means that the NPI in (83) is sensitive to content external to the minimal
clause in which it is located.
(83) a. Everyone that lifted a finger to help was rewarded
b. #Everyone that lifted a finger to help was wearing blue jeans
If the sentences are modified to contain the unstressed NPI ever instead of lift a finger, the
difference in acceptability disappears (Heim 1984). This is illustrated in (84). That is, the
felicity of the NPI in (84) does not depend on the content external to the clause in which it
is located.
(84) a. Everyone that has ever helped was rewarded
b. Everyone that has ever helped was wearing blue jeans
The asymmetry between (83) and (84) can be explained if we assume that (83) but not
(84) contains a covert even, which we represent with EVEN, that takes matrix scope and is
responsible for the restricted distribution of the respective NPI. The licensing requirement
of unstressed ever is that it is in the scope of a DE operator, which is satisfied in (84). The
licensing of lift a finger is more involved: the NPI denotes a weak predicate and has EVEN
associating with it. If even stays in situ, it triggers an incorrect scalar presupposition. If it
scopes out of its base position, we obtain the structures in (85-a) and (86-a), respectively.
The scalar presupposition triggered by even is satisfiable in both (85) and (86). However,
there is a difference between the two with respect to their correctness.
First: It holds that the likelihood of being rewarded plausibly depends on whether one
has helped, and it is indeed less to already be rewarded if one has helped a little than if one
has helped a lot. Thus, the scalar presupposition of (83-a), given in (85-b), is correct.
(85) a. [EVEN C1] [everyone that [lifted a finger]F to help was rewarded]
b. 3q {that everyone that has done x work to help was rewarded | x is an amount}:
that everyone that has lifted a finger to help was rewarded <c q
Second: (83-b) is different. Since it holds that the weak associate of EVEN is in a DE
environment, it holds according to (3) that the prejacent of the scoped even in (86) is at most
as likely as its alternatives. However, since in the actual context the likelihood of wearing
blue jeans does not depend on whether one helped, it is difficult to evaluate whether the
prejacent and its alternatives have noticeably different likelihoods, i.e. whether the prejacent
is noticeably less likely than some alternative. This is responsible for the pragmatic deviance
of the sentence (cf. Schwarz 2000:8 for further discussion).
(86) a. [even C1] [everyone that [lifted a finger]F to help was wearing blue j.]
b. #3q {that everyone that has done x work was wearing blue jeans I x is an amount}:
that everyone that has lifted a finger to help was wearing blue jeans <c q
Similar to what we have observed with negative bias, stressed NPIs any and ever pattern
like minimizer NPIs and unlike unstressed any and ever: they are sensitive to the content
external to the minimal clause in which they are located. This is illustrated in (87). If
we were to assume that the sentences in (87) contain a covert even, the contrast could be
explained along the lines of (85) and (86).
(87) a. Everyone that did ANYTHING AT ALL to help was rewarded
b. #Everyone that did ANYTHING AT ALL to help was wearing blue jeans
Summary: two classes of NPIs
We have described two criteria that distinguish two types of NPIs - minimizer NPIs and
stressed any and ever, on the one hand, and other NPIs, on the other hand. Following
Schmerling (1971), Heim (1984) has argued that minimizers come with a possibly covert
even. Krifka (1995) assumes that something similar holds for stressed NPIs: their licensing
involves an even-like operator EmphAssert. In both cases, the NPIs are argued to be licit -
'licensed' - if the scalar presupposition triggered by the accompanying even (EmphAssert)
is true in the context. We have shown that this assumption explains the negative bias that
minimizers give rise to and their context-dependency.9
2.4.3 Domain alternatives and exhaustification
We propose that while the distribution of minimizers and stressed NPIs is governed by a
covert even, the distribution of unstressed any and ever may be governed by a covert even.
Following Krifka (1995) and Chierchia (2006), we operationalize this by assuming that any
and ever have a focused domain and that an appropriate alternative-sensitive operator is
9Licensing of NPIs by even is not a peculiarity of English but is rather found across languages. In some
cases the even/also component is morphologically transparent. Two such examples are Hindi NPIs ek bhii
and kosi bhii (Lahiri 1998) and Serbian/Croatian i-wh and ni-wh NPIs (Progovac 1994 for description).
required to associate with it. If the operator is a covert even, any and ever are acceptable
if and only if even triggers a presupposition that is satisfied in the context.
Domain alternatives
In the preceding subsections we discussed the description of the distribution of NPIs accord-
ing to which they are restricted to occur in the scope of Strawson DE operators. Krifka
(1995) and Chierchia (2006) attempt to provide an explanation of this restriction. They
propose that the meaning of any and ever is that of regular nominal and adverbial indefi-
nites. However, any and ever in addition obligatorily introduce alternative quantifiers that
differ from any and ever only with respect to their domain of quantification. In line with the
introductory chapter, we can represent the introduction of alternatives as being induced by
grammaticalized focus on the domain of quantification of any and ever (cf. Krifka 1995:219;
Chierchia 2010). The meaning of any book is given in (88). It is a plain existential quantifier:
(88) [ [any DFJ book ]9,c = AP(,et). Awe. ]x [ D(x) A book(x) A P(x,w) ]
The alternatives to the focused domain of any are its various sub-domains, as given in
(89-a). For example, if the domain consists of three objects (say, a, b and c), its alternatives
are the sets given in (89-b).
(89) a. F(DF) { D' I C D}
b. F(DF) ={ D' D' {a,b,c} } = {{a,b,c}, {b,c}, {a,c}, {a,b}, {a}, {b}, {c}}
The alternatives to any book are given in (90): they are existential quantifiers that differ
from any book solely with respect to their domain of quantification. The property of this
characterization of NPIs and their alternatives that is crucial for our purposes is that all
the alternatives to the focused domain of any entail the domain and, accordingly, all the
alternatives to the NPI entail the NPI (cf. (8) for definition of cross-categorial entailment).
This follows from the facts (i) that the alternatives to the domain are its subsets and (ii)
that existential quantifiers are upward-entailing.
(90) F([any DFJ book) = { AP. Aw. 3x [ D'(x) A book(x) A P(x,w) ] | D' C D }
The alternatives introduced by an NPI must be exhaustified. This means that there has
to be an appropriate alternative-sensitive operator in the structure that associates with the
focused domain of the NPI. The NPIs are consequently 'licensed' if the inferences triggered by
the respective operator are licit. This presents a slight reconceptualization of NPI licensing:
instead of treating the embedding operators or embedded environments as NPI licensors, the
respective alternative-sensitive operators could be said to perform that role if they trigger
licit inferences (cf. Chierchia 2010).
Exhaustification with EVEN
One operator that may associate with the focused domains of any and ever is a covert even
operator (EmphAssert in Krifka 1995, E in Chierchia 2006).1o We represent it with EVEN
and assign it the same meaning that we assign to even (91). In a structure where EVEN
associates with the domain of an NPI, the NPI is 'licensed' if the scalar presupposition
triggered by EVEN is licit in the context.
(91) [ EVEN ]9'c(C, p, w) is defined only if Iq E C [ p <c ql.
If defined, [ EVEN ]g,(C, p, w) - 1 if p(w) = 1
Since the domain of an NPI is entailed by all of its alternatives - its alternatives are the
various subsets of the domain - it holds that if EVEN associates with it, it may trigger a licit
scalar presupposition only if there is a non-upward-entailing operator intervening between it
and the NPI.
Upward-entailing environments
If there is no intervening non-upward-entailing operator between EVEN and the NPI, EVEN
triggers an unsatisfiable scalar presupposition. This is illustrated in (92) and (93) where
we assume for concreteness that there are three books in the domain of any: Syntactic
Structures (SS), Lectures on Government and Binding (LGB) and The Logical Structure of
Linguistic Theory (LSLT). The domain of any is focused and its focus alternatives are its
various subsets, e.g. the singleton set containing LSLT, the set containing LGB and LSLT
etc. EVEN associates with it (92-b). Accordingly, the alternatives over which even quantifies
are the propositions of the form that John read a book from D' where D' is a set containing
one or more of the three above-mentioned books (92-c).
(92) a. #John read any book
b. EVEN C0 [John read [ any DF book]
c. Co C F(John read [any DF] book) =
{Aw.3x[book(x) A D'(x) A read(John,x,w)] I D'C{SS, LGB, LSLT}}
{that John read SS or LGB or LSLT, that John read SS or LGB, that
John read LGB or LSLT, ... , that John read LGB, that John read LSLT}
The meaning of (92-b) is computed in (93): the sentence presupposes that there is an alterna-
tive in the domain of EVEN that is more likely than the prejacent; the non-presuppositional
meaning of the sentence is that John read a book in the set containing SS, LGB and LSLT.
(93) [ (93-b) ]9'c(w) is defined only if 3q c Co: that John read SS, LGB or LSLT <1 q.
If defined, [ (93-b) ]9'c(w) =1 iff John read SS or LGB or LSLT in w
The scalar presupposition in (93) is incompatible with the principle (3). Namely, it holds
that the prejacent of EVEN in (92-b) is entailed by all the alternatives in the domain of EVEN
10The other operator is a covert only operator (ScalAssert in Krifka 1995, 0 in Chierchia 2006). We leave
licensing by a covert only aside in this dissertation (cf. Chierchia 2010 for a comprehensive study of it).
and is thus at least as likely as them (94). This contradicts the scalar presupposition in (93).
Since the scalar presupposition is incorrect, the sentence is deviant.
(94) a. Vq E {that John read SS or LGB or LSLT, that John read SS or LGB, ...,that
John read LSLT }: q => that John read SS or LGB or LSLT
b. Vq E {that John read SS or LGB or LSLT, that John read SS or LGB, ...,that
John read LSLT }: q <cthat John read SS or LGB or LSLT
Downward-entailing environments
If any book is in the scope of a DE operator and EVEN associates with its domain, the NPI
may be licensed. This is illustrated in (95-a): EVEN that associates with the domain of any
takes scope above the negation (95-b). Its domain of quantification is described in (95-c).
(95) a. John didn't read any book
b. [EVEN CO] [not [John read [any DF] book]]
c. Co C F(not [John read [any DF] book]) =
{Aw.-2x[book(x) A D'(x) A read(John,x,w)] D'{SS, LSLT, LGB}} =
{that John didn't read SS or LGB or LSLT, that John didn't read SS or
LGB, ..., that John didn't read LGB, that John didn't read LSLT}
The prejacent of EVEN in (95) entails all the alternatives in the domain of EVEN and it is
thus at most as likely as them (96).
(96) a. Vq E {that John didn't read SS, LGB or LSLT, that John didn't read SS or
LGB, ...}: that John didn't read SS or LGB or LSLT => q
b. Vq E {that John didn't read SS, LGB or LSLT, that John didn't read SS or
LGB, ...}: that John didn't read SS or LGB or LSLT <c q
The meaning of (95-b) is computed in (97). The scalar presupposition triggered by EVEN
is in light of (96) arguably correct: there may very well be an alternative in the domain of
EVEN that is more likely than the prejacent.
(97) [ (95-b) ]"'c(w) is defined only if 3q E Co: that John didn't read SS, LGB or LSLT
<,c q. If defined, [ (95-b) ]9'c(w) = 1 iff John didn't read SS, LGB or LSLT in w
The correctness of the scalar presupposition triggered by EVEN in (95-b) is all that is needed
for the NPI to be acceptable in the respective sentence, i.e. for it to be 'licensed.' This
explains the felicity of (95-b).
Questions and obligatory exhaustification with EVEN
In the preceding section, we have observed a difference in pragmatics between unstressed
and stressed NPIs any and ever: unstressed NPIs did not trigger bias in questions and
were not sensitive to content external to the minimal clause in which they were generated,
while stressed NPIs did trigger bias in questions and were sensitive to content external to
the minimal clause in which they were generated. This difference is explained if we assume
that unstressed NPIs are optionally licensed by EVEN, while stressed NPIs are obligatorily
licensed by EVEN. In case an NPI is licensed by EVEN it triggers bias in questions and
exhibits context-dependence. For example, the bias of the question in (98-a) falls out from
the fact that the only LF of (98-a) that denotes a set with a defined answer is (98-c) and the
answer that is defined is negative (99): EVEN in the positive answer triggers a presupposition
that is in violation of (3), as we have seen in (93). No such bias obtains with unstressed
anything since in that case the sentence does not have to be parsed with EVEN. Finally, the
fact that there is a parse of the question in which the interrogative clause denotes a set with
a defined answer suffices for the stressed NPI to be licensed.
(98) a. Did Mary contribute ANYTHING AT ALL?
b. [whether [1(st)(st) [tl(,t)(,t) [EVEN C 2] Mary contribute [any DF] thing]]]
c. [whether [1(st)(st) [EVEN C2] [tl(t)(,t) Mary contribute [any DF] thing]]]
(99) [ (98-c) ]9 ,c = [ [EVEN C1] Mary contribute [any DF] thing ]9',
[ EVEN Cijc(-,[ Mary contribute [any DF] thing ]9 c)}
Prediction: non-monotone environments
In the cases where EVEN associates with the domain of an NPI, the licensing requirements
of the NPI effectively reduce to the licensing requirements of weak even. Namely, EVEN that
associates with the domain of any or ever associates with a weak predicate. The prediction
is then that, similarly to weak even, NPIs may be acceptable in the scope of non-monotone
operators.
2.4.4 Derivation: NPIs under non-monotone quantifiers
If any and ever are licensed by EVEN, they should be able to occur under non-monotone
quantifiers and they should exhibit the same context-dependence that we observe with oc-
currences of weak even under non-monotone quantifiers: the scalar presupposition triggered
by EVEN is satisfied only in particular contexts. As we have discussed above, this is what
indeed obtains: the felicity of any and ever in the scope of non-monotone quantifiers is
conditional on the expectations in the context.
(101) a. Exactly four people in the whole world have ever read that dissertation
b. #Exactly four hundred people in our school have ever read that dissertation
Low numeral or proportion in the QP
We begin by looking at two felicitous occurrences of NPIs in the scope of non-monotone
quantifiers (102). The discussion parallels the one of weak even in section 2.2.
(102) a. Exactly three students read any book at all
b. Exactly four people in the whole world have ever read that dissertation
We propose that the NPIs in (102) are licensed by EVEN, i.e. the alternative-sensitive
operator that associates with the focused domain of any and ever in (102) is EVEN. The
sentence in (102-a) may have either structure in (103). The structure in (103-a) has an illicit
interpretation: its scalar presupposition is given in (104) and it violates the principle in (3).
Namely, all the alternatives in the domain of EVEN in (103-a) entail the prejacent of EVEN.
(103) a. [exactly three students 8 [[EVEN C1] ts read [any DF] book at all]]
b. [EVEN C 1] [exactly three students read [any DF] books at all
(104) [ (104-a) ]9,' is defined only if 3q E { that g(1) read a book in D' | D' C D }: that
g(1) read a book in D <c q
The scalar presupposition of EVEN in (103-b) incurs no such violation since EVEN scopes
above a non-monotone operator. The alternatives over which EVEN quantifies in such a
configuration are described in (105-b) - they are mutually logically independent and in
principle any likelihood ordering may obtain on them.
(105) a. [EVEN C1] [exactly three students read [any DF] books at all
b. C1 C { that exactly three students read a book in D' | D' C D }
The meaning of the structure in (105-a) is computed in (106). For concreteness, we assume
that the only books in the domain of any are Syntactic Structures, Lectures on Government
and Binding, and The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory. The sentence presupposes
that there is an alternative in the domain of EVEN that is more likely than its prejacent; its
assertive meaning is that exactly three students read a book.
(106) [ (106-a) ]9,'(w) is defined only if 3q E {that exactly 3 students read a book in D'
| D' C {SS, LGB, LSLT}}: that exactly 3 students read SS, LGB or LSLT <c q.
If defined, [ (106-a) ]9'c(w) = 1 iff exactly 3 students read SS, LGB or LSLT in w
As we have already indicated above, the scalar presupposition in (106) does not violate
the principle in (3). Moreover, it is satisfied in contexts in which (i) it is very likely that
more than three students read SS or LGB or LSLT and (ii) it is less likely that more than
three students read, say, LGB or LSLT. An example of such a context is one where it is
expected that around thirty students in the department read SS and that, say, at least three
but not more than ten students read LGB or LSLT, as depicted in Figure 2-8.
In such a context, it is less likely that only exactly three students read one of the three
books than, say, that exactly three students read one of the two more difficult books (107).
This means that the scalar presupposition in (106) is verified by the proposition that exactly
three students read LGB or LSLT. Furthermore, the described context corresponds to the
actual context, which explains the perceived felicity of (102-a).
(107) a. Pr(more than 3 - SS v LGB v LSLT) >> Pr(more than 3 - LGB v LSLT)
b. Pr(less than 3 - SS v LGB v LSLT) P Pr(less than 3 - LGB v LSLT) ~ 0
c. => Pr(exactly 3 - SS v LGB v LSLT ) < Pr(exactly 3 - LGB v LSLT)
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Figure 2-8: Expected number of students reading books in x. Indication of the unexpected-
ness of exactly three students reading SSVLGBVLSLT.
Although the sentence in (102-a) is licit in the actual context, there are natural contexts in
which the scalar presupposition of (102-a) would not be satisfied. For example, if the sentence
is about students in the first grade of elementary school, it is pragmatically deviant. Namely,
the expectation in such a scenario is that no student read any book at all. It then holds that
it is at least as likely that exactly three students read a book from a big set of books than
that exactly three students read a book from a subset of that big set of books. This shows
that the acceptability of the NPI does not depend solely on the size of the numeral in the
QP but always also on the relevant expectations in the context.
(108) a. Exactly three students (in the department) read any book at all
b. #Exactly three students (in the first grade) read any book at all
The reasoning that we have just illustrated for any NPIs applies also in the case of the
adverbial NPI ever in (102-b). The sentence in (109-a) has the structure in (109-b) where
EVEN takes scope above the non-monotone quantifier and associates with the focused domain
of ever.
(109) a. Exactly four people in the whole world have ever read that dissertation
b. [EVEN C1] [exactly 4 people have [ever DF] read that dissertation]
We assign the NPI ever the simplistic existential meaning in (110): its first argument is a
domain that contains moments (or time intervals), D, while its second argument is a function
from times to propositions, P. The semantic import of ever is to existentially close the time
argument of its second argument.
(110) [ ever DF gqc P0,st)-Aws. ~It [ D(t) A P(t,w) ]
The alternatives to the focused domain of ever are its various subdomains. The alternatives
of a clause containing ever are sketched in (111): they are the propositions that there is a
time t at which John has accomplished reading the dissertation where t is in a particular
subset of D.
(111) F([ever DF] John read that dissertation) ] =
{ Aw. 3t [ D'(t) A [ read ]9,c(John,Diss,t,w) ] D' C D }
{ that John read that dissertation sometime in D' I D' C D }
The sentence (102-b) has the structure in (112-a): ever is embedded under a non-monotone
quantifier, while EVEN takes scope above the quantifier and associates with the domain of
ever. The alternatives over which EVEN quantifies are given in (112-b).
(112) a. [EVEN C1] [exactly 4 people 1 [[ever DF] t1 read that dissertation]]
b. C1 9 {that exactly 4 people read that dissertation sometime in D' | D' C D}
The structure in (112-a) has the meaning in (113). The scalar presupposition triggered by
EVEN is satisfiable since all the alternatives in its domain are mutually logically independent
and in principle any likelihood ordering may obtain on them.
(113) [ (113-b) ]19'(w) is defined only if 3q E C1 : that exactly 4 people in the whole
world read that dissertation sometime in D <1c q. If defined, [ (113-b) ]J'0c(w) = 1
iff exactly 4 people in the whole world read that dissertation sometime in D in w
The presupposition is satisfied in contexts in which it is expected (i) that many people read
that dissertation sometime in the longest period D and (ii) that fewer people read that
dissertation sometime in a shorter period of time D'. For example, it is satisfied in a context
in which it is expected (i) that, say, around thirty people read that dissertation sometime
or other in D and (ii) that around ten people read that dissertation sometime in the shorter
period D' after the dissertation has been submitted, as depicted in 2-9.
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Figure 2-9: Expected number of people reading that dissertation sometime in x. Indication
of the unexpectedness of exactly four people reading that dissertation in D.
In such a context it holds that it is less likely that only exactly four people read that disser-
tation sometime in the long period D than that exactly four people read that dissertation
sometime in the shorter period D' (114). Thus, the scalar presupposition is verified by the
alternative that exactly four people read that dissertation sometime in the shorter period D'.
This setup corresponds to the actual context where there is an expectation that (linguistics)
dissertations are read by many. This explains the felicity of (102-b)."
(114) a. Pr(more than 4 - long period D) >> Pr(more than 4 - short period D')
b. Pr(less than 4 - long period D) ~ Pr(less than 4 - short period D') ~ 0
c. = Pr(exactly 4 - long period D) > Pr (exactly 4 - short period D')
We have shown that if an NPI is licensed by EVEN, it instances a weak even configuration.
Consequently, it is subject to the licensing requirements of weak even - the scalar presup-
position triggered by the scalar particle that associates with the weak domain of the NPI
must be satisfied in the context. Accordingly, the distribution of NPIs under non-monotone
quantifiers is partly governed by the principle in (40), repeated below, where P corresponds
to the meaning of the VP containing any or ever and P' corresponds to a relevant focus
alternative.
(40) Generalization about low numbers (proportions)
If P and P' are alternative predicates with P' => P and P is very likely to obtain
of relatively many individuals, then it holds that it is less likely that P will obtain
of a relatively low number of individuals than that P' will obtain of a relatively low
number of individuals
High numeral in the QP
Any and ever are acceptable in the scope of non-monotone quantifiers with (relatively) low
numerals if EVEN associates with their focused domain and triggers a scalar presupposition
that is satisfied in the context. Any and ever tend to be illicit in the scope of non-monotone
quantifiers with (relatively) high numerals:
(115) a. #Exactly thirty-three senators read any book by Chomsky
b. #Exactly four hundred people in our school have ever read that dissertation
The reason for the deviance of the sentences in (115) lies in the scalar presupposition that the
sentences trigger. The sentence in (115-a) may have the structure in (116-a); EVEN associates
with the domain of any and in accordance quantifies over the alternatives in (116-b) where
we assume for concreteness that the only relevant books by Chomsky are Manufacturing
Consent, Hegemony or Survival and Syntactic Structures.
(116) a. [EVEN C1) [exactly 33 senators read [any DFJ book by Chomsky]
b. C1 C {that exactly 33 senators read a book in D' | D' C {MC,HS,SS}}
The meaning of the structure in (116-a) is computed in (117). Its presupposition is that there
is an alternative in the domain of EVEN that is more likely than the prejacent of EVEN. As
"If EVEN were to involve universal quantification instead of an existential one, the scalar presupposition
triggered by EVEN would be felicitous if the domain of EVEN were appropriately restricted. If no restriction
would obtain, i.e. if the domain of EVEN were identical with the focus alternatives of the sister of EVEN, a
false presupposition would be triggered. Namely, the domain of EVEN would contain alternatives where ever
would quantify over single moments (or very short intervals). The likelihood that exactly four people read
that dissertation at some particular moment (or in some particular very short interval) would be minimal.
before, the presupposition does not violate the condition in (3) since the alternatives are
mutually logically independent and in principle any likelihood ordering may obtain on them.
However, the fact that the scalar presupposition triggered by EVEN is satisfiable is not
sufficient for the NPI to be licensed - the presupposition has to be satisfied.
(117) [ (117-b) ] 9,'(w) is defined only if ]q E C1 : that exactly 33 senators read MC, HS
or SS <c q. If defined, [ (117-b) ]Ic(w) - 1 iff exactly 33 senators read MC, HS
or SS in w
The expectation in the actual context is that much fewer than thirty-three senators read
Manufacturing Consent or Hegemony or Survival (say, around ten senators) and that almost
no one read Syntactic Structures, as depicted in Figure 2-10.
expected number
40
33
20
10 (
main predicate
MCVHSVSS MCVHS MCVSS ---
Figure 2-10: Expected number of senators reading a book by Chomsky in x. Indication of
the unexpectedness of exactly thirty-three senators reading MCVHS.
In such a context, it is then at least as likely that exactly thirty-three senators read a book
among MC, HS or SS as that exactly thirty-three senators read a book from a proper subset
of the set containing MC, HS or SS (118-c). This follows from (i) the fact that it is at least
as likely that less than thirty-three senators read a book from a proper subset of the set
containing MC, HS or SS as that less than thirty-three students read MC, HS or SS (118-b)
and (ii) the fact that the likelihood that more than thirty-three students read a book by
Chomsky is practically zero (118-a). The scalar presupposition in (117) is thus not satisfied
in the described scenario. Consequently, the sentence is marked and the NPI is not 'licensed.'
(118) a. Pr(more than 33 - MCVHSVSS) ~ Pr(more than 33 - MCVSS) ~ 0
b. Pr(less than 33 - MCVHSVSS) > Pr(less than 33 - MCVSS)
c. -> Pr(exactly 33 - MCVHSVSS) > Pr(exactly 33 - MCVSS)
If the expectations in the context were appropriately different, the felicity of the sentence
would improve. For example, if the domain of any were not restricted to books by Chomsky
but would contain all the books, the scalar presupposition triggered by EVEN would be licit.
Namely, the expectation is that everyone of the hundred senators read some book or other;
it is then more unexpected (less likely) that only exactly thirty-three senators read a book
from a big set of books than that exactly thirty-three senators read a book from some subset
of the big set of books.
(119) a. Exactly thirty-three senators read any book at all
b. #Exactly thirty-three senators read any book by Chomsky
Analogous reasoning applies to examples with ever. The infelicitous sentence in (120-a)
has the structure in (120-b). The alternatives over which EVEN quantifies are given in (120-c):
they are mutually logically independent and any likelihood ordering may obtain on them.
(120) a. #Exactly 400 people in the whole world have ever read that dissertation
b. [even C 1] [exactly 400 people [ever DIF read that dissertation]
c. C1 C {that exactly 400 people read that dissertation sometime in D' | D'CD}
(121) [ (121-b) ]9'c(w) is defined only if -q E Ci: that exactly 400 people in the whole
world read that dissertation sometime in D <c q. If defined, [ (121-b) ]9'c(w) - 1
iff exactly 400 people in the whole world read that dissertation sometime in D in w
The expectation is that a lot fewer than four hundred people have read that dissertation
sometime in the long period D (say, around thirty) and that, trivially, at most that many
have read it sometime in some shorter period of time, as depicted in Figure 2-11. It is thus
at least as likely that exactly four hundred people have read that dissertation sometime in
the long period D as that exactly four hundred people have read that dissertation sometime
in some shorter period. The scalar presupposition in (121) is thus false in the actual context.
This explains the pragmatic deviance of the sentence in (120-a).
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Figure 2-11: Expected number of people reading that dissertation in x. Indication of the
unexpectedness of exactly 400 people reading that dissertation in D'.
These last two examples illustrate the second generalization underlying the restricted
distribution of NPIs and weak even under non-monotone quantifiers (45). It is repeated below
where P corresponds to the meaning of the VP containing any or ever and P' corresponds
to a relevant focus alternative.
(45) Generalization about high numbers (proportions)
If P and P' are alternative predicates with P' => P and P' is very likely to obtain
of relatively few individuals, then it is less likely that P' will obtain of a relatively
high number of individuals than that P will obtain of a relatively high number of
individuals
2.4.5 Summary and consequences
The felicitous occurrences of NPIs in the scope of non-monotone quantifiers and their context-
dependence are puzzling for the semantic characterization of NPI licensing in (68): non-
monotone quantifiers are neither Strawson DE nor anti-additive operators.
(71) NPI licensing condition
Some NPIs (any, ever) are only grammatical if they are in the scope of a Strawson
DE operator. Other NPIs (in weeks) are only grammatical if they are in the scope
of an anti-additive operator
This lead Linebarger to adopt a different characterization of the NPI licensing condition -
one that relies on the pragmatic notion of Negative Implicature. Instead of pursuing this
path, which results in a "frustratingly unalgorithmic" treatment of NPIs, we have suggested
that NPIs under non-monotone quantifiers are licensed by EVEN. More precisely, we have
followed Krifka (1995) and Chierchia (2006, 2010) in assuming that expressions like any
and ever induce domain alternatives that need to be utilized by an appropriate alternative-
sensitive operator. One such operator is EVEN. If EVEN associates with the domains of any
and ever, their licensing requirements effectively reduce to those of weak even. Accordingly,
we obtain the prediction in (100), which parallels (18).
(100) Prediction
An NPI may be acceptable if it is in the scope of a (Strawson) downward-monotone
operator or a non-monotone operator
If any and ever occur in the scope of non-monotone quantifiers, EVEN that associates with
their domains and scopes above the non-monotone quantifiers triggers a satisfiable scalar
presupposition. The presupposition is satisfied in contexts in which appropriate expectations
obtain: (i) the meaning of the VP with the NPI obtains of a higher number/proportion of
individuals than what is expressed in the non-monotone quantifier and (ii) the relevant
alternatives to the VP with the NPI obtain of a significantly lower number of individuals
than the meaning of the VP with the NPI. We have shown that the necessary condition for
this is that the numeral or proportion in the non-monotone quantifier is appropriately low.
2.5 Conclusion
The scalar presupposition triggered by even is subject to the condition in (3). That is, if
even triggers a presupposition that its prejacent is less likely than an alternative that entails
the prejacent, the sentence will be unacceptable.
(3) Scalarity and entailment
If a proposition p entails a proposition q, q cannot be less likely than p
Lahiri (1998) discusses occurrences of even that associate with a weak predicate in their
immediate surface scope and are embedded under a DE operator. If the scalar presupposition
of even would be computed in its surface position in those cases, it would be in violation of
(3). He shows that if even moves above the DE operator at LF, its scalar presupposition
may be correct (cf. Karttunen & Peters 1979, Heim 1984).
(122) [even C] [ OPDE [t ... OnLF----
DE environments are not the only environments in which weak even is predicted to be able
to occur. Rather, the prediction is that it should be able to occur under any operator that
is not upward-entailing. Namely, movement of even above a non-upward-entailing operator
suffices for it to trigger a scalar presupposition consistent with (3).
(18) Prediction
A weak even may be acceptable if it is in the scope of a (Strawson) downward-
monotone operator or a non-monotone operator
(123) [even C] [* OP [t ... jeven-G} oneF ---
We have shown that this prediction is borne out. However, although the scalar presupposi-
tion triggered by scoped even is consistent with (3) if there is an intervening non-monotone
operator between it and its weak associate, it is not satisfied in every context. We have delin-
eated the conditions that are necessary for this scalar presupposition to be satisfied. Three
generalizations were shown to follow from these conditions: (i) the numeral (proportion) in
the non-monotone quantifier phrase must be relatively low, (ii) the main predicate must be
expected to obtain of sufficiently more individuals in the domain of the quantifier than its
alternatives and (iii) the main predicate must be expected to obtain of more individuals in
the domain of the quantifier than what is described by the numeral in the quantifier phrase.
Subsequently, we have extended the proposal to a "recalcitrant arena of NPI licensing:"' 2
NPIs under non-monotone quantifiers. We have argued that the NPIs that felicitously occur
under non-monotone quantifiers are licensed by EVEN. We have operationalized this idea in
the framework of Krifka and Chierchia where indefinite NPIs are, roughly, treated as having
focused domains with which an appropriate alternative-sensitive operator must associate. If
the operator is EVEN, NPIs may be acceptable if they are in the scope of a non-upward-
entailing operator. This treatment allowed us to account for Linebarger's (1987) observation
about the context-dependence of these NPIs, which mirrors what we find with weak even.
12von Fintel (1999:98) has used this turn of phrase to refer to licensing of NPIs under operators that are
Strawson DE but not strictly DE.
CHAPTER 3
Desire
Weak even is acceptable only if it is in a non-upward-entailing environment - in upward-
entailing environments it gives rise to contradictory scalar entailments. Desire predicates
and the imperative operator have commonly been treated as upward-entailing (von Fintel
1999, Schwager 2005). Accordingly, acceptable occurrences of weak even in their scope that
we describe in this chapter are unexpected. We pursue two strategies to deal with this puz-
zle. First strategy: Instead of assuming that desire predicates and the imperative operator
are upward-entailing, they should be treated as non-monotone operators (cf. Heim 1992,
Levinson 2003 for desire predicates). If even that associates with a weak element scopes
above them, it triggers a scalar presupposition that can be satisfied in appropriate contexts.
Second strategy: Although the assumption that desire predicates and the imperative oper-
ator are upward-entailing is correct, there is a strengthening mechanism that can apply in
grammar and rescue the occurrences of weak even in their scope. Both strategies face certain
challenges: the first strategy has issues with the apparent monotonicity of desire predicates,
while the second strategy has issues with constraining the strengthening mechanism so that
it does not rescue weak even in other otherwise upward-entailing environments.
Section 1 introduces the puzzle: weak even may occur in desire statements, in imperatives
and certain other modal environments. Section 2 accounts for these occurrences of weak even
by adopting a non-monotonic semantics of desire predicates and the imperative operator.
The main challenge for this approach is that the respective operators do not appear to exhibit
non-monotonic behavior independently, which is discussed in greater detail in the appendix.
Section 3 presents an alternative account of the data according to which weak even is licit
in these environments because a covert strengthening operator is inserted above the desire
predicates and the imperative operator and even may scope above it. Section 4 extends the
analysis to account for occurrences of certain NPIs in these environments - NPIs that are
licensed by a covert even. Section 5 concludes.
3.1 The puzzle
Weak even may occur in the scope of non-negated desire predicates, in imperatives, and
under certain modals. Furthermore, weak even does not occur under other attitude predi-
cates, including believe, intend and command, and it is marked under (performative) deontic
modals.
3.1.1 Even in desire statements and imperatives
Non-factive desire predicates
Weak even may occur in the scope of non-factive desire predicates hope, would like and their
synonyms. A few naturally occurring examples of this kind are given in (1) and (2).
(1) Weak even under hope
a. I hope to someday make even ONE video of that quality
b. The group hopes to encourage "even ONE person among the tens of thousands
of poor souls ensnared in this self-destructive lifestyle"
c. Melissa Rose Bernardo is a freelance writer in New York City who hopes someday
to acquire even ONE-FOURTH of Stacy Morrison's optimism
d. After the numerous failed attempts to have another baby, Eric and Jamie hoped
to see even ONE OR TWO healthy embryos
e. I aspire to having even ONE-TENTH the talent for lyrics writing that these three
havel
(2) Weak even under would like
a. And I would like you to identify even ONE website that says "We only host
infringing material - legitimate content is not welcome!"
b. In fact, I would like to find even ONE person who hasn't had at least one paper-
cut this year. People without hands do not count
c. Jeremy Lindman would like to protect even just one kid from a stranger and he
feels it is worth an ordinance2
Similar examples can also be found with the non-factive desire predicate want, though their
acceptability is at least for some of our consultants degraded.
(3) Weak even under want
a. I want to see even ONE of you nay sayers create a scenario, a route, a locomotive,
some rolling stock, some buildings
b. I want to change even ONE person's comprehension of a person with a neuro-
logical problem
'http://vimeo.com/8918647, http://www.myspace.com/thombarker, http://www.afamichigan.org/...,
http://www.lemondrop.com/..., http://www.sgn.org/... (all the cited links can be activated in the elec-
tronic version of the dissertation and have been shortened for space reasons)
2http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100925/..., http://www.murdershewrites.com/..., http://ci.north-
branch.mn. us/MinutesAgendas/...
c. Everyone wants to prevent even "ONE bad incident" as BellaQuest points out
d. We all wanted to find even ONE little thing that would make us feel like he really
cared3
Another conspicuous instance of a non-factive desire predicate that licenses weak even in
its scope is wish. A desire statement with wish entails that the proposition denoted by the
sentential complement of wish is taken by the attitude holder not to have obtained.
(4) Weak even under wish
a. I wish I wrote even ONE riff featured on ANY Death album
b. This Haley chick wishes she could sing even ONE note close to Janis
c. Star babies wished that even ONE of them had brought a raincoat instead of a
bookshelf4
Besides weak even, also certain NPIs are felicitous in the just described environments. For
example, we find stressed NPIs, so-called superlative quantifiers like the slightest NP and
the faintest NP (Fauconnier 1975) as well as some minimizers like give a damn in the scope
of the above-mentioned desire predicates.
(5) Some instances of NPIs under would like, hope
a. And I also hope that ANYONE is still reading this thread
b. She [...] hopes to make the slightest difference in their lives
c. I would sure like my fellow citizens to give a damn'
(6) Some instances of NPIs under wish
a. I wish I had the faintest idea how to identify Australian crows
b. She wishes that she were the slightest bit charming
c. I wish they would lift a finger to make it work better
d. My son is a sweet, kind, funny, smart, well adjusted kid, but he really wishes his
father gave a damn about him
e. There are millions of poor people out there who wish they had so much as a cup
of rice to feed their family of ten
f. He wished ANYONE AT ALL would look at him with that same love and sweet-
ness 6
Further examples of non-factive predicates that have the same priority flavor as desire predi-
cates include the semi-modal verbs need (to) and ought (to) (cf. Portner 2009 for classification
of modals). Two examples of need (to) licensing weak even and NPIs are in (7), while some
naturally occurring examples of weak even and NPIs under ought (to) are in (8).
'http://forums.steampowered.com/..., http://www.braingrace.com/..., http://www.people.com/...,
http://www.ctmirror.org/...
4 http://www.johnsoncitypress.com/..., http://www.youtube.com/..., http://www.youtube.com/...,
http://thecoachellareview.com/...
shttp://en.forums.wordpress.com/..., http://www.srph.tamhsc.edu/..., http://reston.patch.com/...
6 http://www.fanfiction.net/..., http://www.flickr.com/..., http://www.fanfiction.net/...,
http://www.pcgamer.com/..., http://www.pankmagazine.com/..., http://thepassionatecook.typepad.com/...
(7) Weak even and NPIs under need
a. If you're going to convict him, you'll need hard evidence that there's ANYTHING
illegal in what he did (Linebarger 1987:374)
b. If you want to pass my class, you'll need hard evidence that you attended my
lectures even ONCE
(8) Weak even and NPIs under ought
a. While you quoted several proponents of forced drugging, you ought to have
quoted even ONE of the many organized groups of psychiatric survivors
b. If the article wants to claim that for Strauss "natural right" is a "myth," then
its author really ought to give even ONE single textual reference to support his
claim
c. Those willing to simply say cut $4,400,000,000 perhaps ought to have at least the
faintest idea what that means in terms of impact on state and local government
services7
Factive desire predicates
It is well-known at least since Kadmon & Landman (1993) that weak even as well as some
NPIs may occur in the scope of factive desire predicates like glad. Two representative exam-
ples are given in (9).8
(9) Weak even and NPIs under glad
a. John is glad that he read even ONE paper on this topic
b. I am glad that ANYBODY likes me AT ALL
Furthermore, weak even and NPIs are licensed also in the scope of factive evaluative
predicates like good, great, fantastic, and interesting:
(10) Weak even under other evaluative predicates
It's good/great/fantastic/interesting that John solved even ONE exercise
Rhetorical imperatives
The final class of modal environments in which weak even may occur are imperatives. The
felicity of weak even in imperatives is illustrated in (11), while in (12) we have imperatives
that contain two types of NPIs - stressed NPIs and minimizers.
7http://www.ovimagazine.com/..., http://gabriellacoleman.org/..., http://bearingdrift.com/...
"However, it has been pointed out by Linebarger (1991:173) and Van der Wouden (1997:162) that at least
some minimizers are illicit in the scope of glad:
(i) a. *I'm glad that she contributed a red cent to the ACLU
b. *I'm glad that he budged an inch
(11) Weak even in imperatives
a. Show me even ONE party that cares for the people
b. Break even ONE record that I can't
c. Give me even just ONE reason not to hurt you
(12) Some NPIs in imperatives
a. Find me a politician that EVER cared for us AT ALL
b. Show me a party that would so much as lift a finger to help the poor
These imperatives may be given natural paraphrases with the embedding predicates chal-
lenge, defy and dare (13). Interestingly, if we make the paraphrases non-performative by
changing the the patient and the tense of the clause, weak even remains licensed (14).
(13) a. I challenge you to show me even ONE party that cares for the people
b. I dare you to score even ONE goal against my team
(14) John challenged Steve to show him even ONE party that cares for the people
Another batch of imperatives with weak even is given in (15). They have a slightly different
flavor than the imperatives above and cannot be paraphrased with challenge or dare but
rather with plead or urge.
(15) a. If you can't come, PLEASE donate even ONE DOLLAR
b. I've gone hungry for few days; please give me even one nut!
c. Choose even just one thing in your life and decide to make better choices about
it9
(16) I had fantastic, beyond expected, luck with them last year and I urge you to plant
even ONE of these tubers 0
3.1.2 Extra inference about probability
An important feature of desire statements containing weak even has been glossed over in
the preceding discussion: they are accompanied by a distinct bias. This has been famously
discussed under the heading of "settle for less" by Kadmon & Landman (1993). The basic
characteristic of these contexts is brought out in their discussion of (17), reflected in the
quote below:
(17) I'm glad we even got THESE tickets!
(1) What I really want is better tickets. (2) We didn't get better tickets. (3) We
got these tickets, which I wouldn't normally be glad about. (4) I settle for less,
and I'm glad about what I have. (Kadmon & Landman 1993:385)
A comparable state of affairs obtains also with some occurrences of weak even under non-
factive desire predicates and in imperatives. The condition that the sentences in (18), re-
9 http://iam.bmezine.com/..., http://purpleslinky.com/..., http://blog.foodservicewarehouse.com/...
10http://www.cherrymenlove.com/gardeningflowers/...
peated from above, impose on the context is characterized in (19). We call the condition low
probability bias.
(18) a. Show me even ONE party that cares for the people
b. I would like to find even ONE person who hasn't had at least one paper-cut
this year
If we apply (19) to the example in (18-b), the relevant set of alternatives in the context
consists of the propositions that I find n people, for n > 0, which corresponds to the focus
meaning of the sentential complement of would like without even. The sentence is felicitous
only in contexts in which none of the alternatives has - according to me, the attitude holder
- a non-negligible probability. If this condition is not satisfied in the context, the sentence
sounds odd.
As we will argue more extensively in section 3.4.2, (19) also correctly subsumes the
relevant aspect of the "settle for less" context accompanying (17) - the context must be such
that the attitude holder takes it to have been unlikely that any alternative to the embedded
clause would obtain. Contrary to Kadmon and Landman's claims, weak even and NPIs may
occur under glad even if an alternative that entails the sentential complement of glad is true
in the context - it only has to hold that it was unlikely according to the attitude holder that
it would obtain. This is evidenced by (20), a naturally occurring example.
(20) Just be glad that the Eastern networks could even FIND Elko, let alone have a
camera there to record the speech"
Before continuing, we should discuss a class of data that at first sight appears problematic
for the characterization in (19). For example, in none of the examples in (21) does it seem
to hold that it is particularly unexpected for the respective alternatives to obtain. That is,
the sentences in (21) appear not to trigger the low probability bias: e.g. it is very likely that
Tyson will inspire a lot of kids and due to his self-confidence he probably believes in it too
(21-a); in the same vein, the speaker in (21-b) may be convinced that he is an influential
person and that his articles help many people.
(21) a. Tyson, who said he hopes to inspire even ONE kid to turn his life around, has
given similar speeches around the world
b. I'm so glad my article helped even ONE person - makes it worth it
c. It would make me sooooo happy inside that I helped just even ONE person...
let alone millions of other migraine suffers out there12
iihttp://www.wayiplay.com/...
1 2http://www.lvrj.com/..., http://www.pickthebrain.com/..., http://www.naturalcalm.ca/...
The same considerations hold also for the imperative sentences in (22), repeated from above.
For example, the first imperative may be addressed to a known philanthropist from whom
one may expect a high donation.
(22) a. If you can't come, PLEASE donate even ONE DOLLAR
b. Choose even just ONE thing in your life and decide to make better choices
about it
We suggest that the sentences in (21) and (22) do not in fact counterexemplify the low
probability bias - the only difference between these and the previous cases is that bias in
(21) and (22) comes with a flavor of polite pretense. For example, it arguably holds that
although Tyson may in fact be certain that he will inspire many kids, the quote in (21-a)
presents him as being excessively humble and falsely modest - i.e. the low probability bias
is satisfied under pretense, so to speak. The same reasoning can be extended to imperatives
in (22). This allows us to stick to (19) as a uniform characterization of all the above data.
3.1.3 Beliefs, intentions and commands
Weak even is not licit in all modal environments. For example, it is unacceptable in the
scope of doxastic predicates, intend and certain directive predicates like command and order.
Beliefs
There is an intriguing contrast between, on the one hand, imperatives, bouletic attitude
predicates and certain priority modals and, on the other hand, doxastic attitude predicates
and modals with respect to their ability to license weak even in their scope - only the former
can do it. This is evidenced by (23), which contains transforms of three desire statement
from above into belief and doxastic modal statements.
(23) a. #1 believe to have found even ONE person without a paper-cut
b. #I know that ANYBODY likes me
c. #She might be the slightest bit charming
Intentions and commands
We have already suggested in our discussion above that at least some speakers find weak
even unacceptable in the scope of the desire predicate want. The predicate intend is even
more resilient to licensing of weak even. This is illustrated by the minimal pair in (24): weak
even is acceptable under would like, but unacceptable under intend.
(24) a. I would like to find even ONE party that cares for the people
b. #1 intend to find even ONE party that cares for the people
Furthermore, there is also some variation in the domain of directive predicates with respect
to licensing of weak even. Unlike under challenge and urge, weak even is unacceptable in
the scope of directive predicates command and order .
(25) a. I challenge you to find even ONE party that cares for the people
b. #I command you to find even ONE party that cares for the people
Finally, weak even is also unacceptable in the scope of modal auxiliaries must, can and may,
even on their (performative) deontic interpretation (26).
(26) a. Find me even ONE party that cares for the people
b. #You must find me even ONE party that cares for the people
The above contrasts are puzzling considering that all the respective embedding expressions
in (24)-(26) fall into the same broad family of bouletic, deontic and teleological predicates
and modals. The pattern is summarized in the following table:
(27) Priority expressions that do not license weak even
a. want (for some speakers), intend, plan
b. command, order, demand, require
c. must, can, may
3.1.4 A brief statement of the puzzle
According to the standard characterizations of desire predicates, modals and imperatives,
they are upward-monotone modal operators (Hintikka 1962, von Fintel 1999, Schwager 2005
and others). Accordingly, if weak even occurs in their scope, it should trigger an inconsistent
scalar presupposition. This is exemplified in (28): the sentence (28-a) has one of the struc-
tures in (28-bc) - even either stay in situ or scopes above hope - and should thus trigger
one of the scalar presuppositions in (29).
(28) a. I hope to make even ONE video of that quality
b. I hope [[even C1 ] PRO to make oneF video of that quality]]
c. [even C1] [I hope [PRO to make oneF video of that quality]]
(29) a. [ even ]I9c(C, [ I make one video of that quality ]), w) is defined only if
]q E {that I make n videos of that quality I n E N>o}: that I make one video
of that quality <c q
b. [ even ]g,c(C, [ I hope [PRO to make oneF video of that quality] ]I', w)
is defined only if 3q e {that I hope to make n videos of that quality I n E N>o}:
that I hope to make one video of that quality <, q
Both presuppositions in (29) run afoul of the axiom that the scalar presupposition of even
is faithful to implication, which is repeated in (30) from previous chapters.
Namely, since it holds that the proposition that I make one video is entailed by all of the
alternatives, e.g. by the proposition that I make two videos, it is at least as likely as all of
them (31). This is incompatible with the presupposition in (29-a) that there is an alternative
that is more likely than that I make one video.
(31) ... <c that I make three videos of that quality <c that I make two videos of that
quality <c that I make one video of that quality
And since it holds that the proposition that I hope to make one video is entailed by all of
the alternatives, e.g. by the proposition that I hope to make two videos, it is at least as
likely as all of them as well (32). This is incompatible with the presupposition in (29-b) that
there is an alternative that is more likely than that I hope to make one video.
(32) ... <c that I would like to make two videos of that quality :c that I would like to
make one video of that quality
3.2 Non-monotonic desire
This section presents an account of the above data and puzzles in a framework that treats
desire predicates and imperatives as non-monotone operators (Heim 1992, Levinson 2003,
Villalta 2008, Lassiter 2011 for desire predicates).
3.2.1 Overview of the proposal
Several approaches to desire predicates treat them as non-monotone instead of upward-
monotone operators (Heim 1992, Levinson 2003, Villalta 2008, Lassiter 2011 among others).
The licit occurrences of weak even in the scope of these operators are thus correctly predicted
to be possible by these approaches. For example, even in its derived position in (33-b) triggers
the scalar presupposition in (33-d). This presupposition is compatible with (30). Namely,
the domain of even, given in (33-c), contains only mutually independent propositions and
so the likelihood relation described in (33-d) may obtain on them. The felicity of weak even
under desire predicates and in imperatives is on this approach subsumed by the prediction
discussed in the introductory chapter, repeated in (34): weak even may be acceptable in
non-monotone environments.
(33) a. I hope to make even ONE vide of that quality
b. [even C1] [t I 7 hope [{even-Gi PRO7 to make oneF video ...1]
c. C1 C { that I hope to make n videos of that quality I n E N>o }
d. 3q E C1 : that I hope to make one video of that quality <e q
(34) A prediction of the scope-theoretic approach to even
A sentence with a weak even may be acceptable if even is at surface structure in the
scope of a (Strawson) downward-monotone operator or a non-monotone operator,
i.e. in the scope of a non-upward-monotone operator
Besides showing that the scalar presupposition of scoped even is consistent, a satisfactory
account of weak even needs to resolve four additional questions: (i) in what contexts is the
scalar presupposition triggered by scoped even correct, (ii) what is responsible for the bias
that accompanies the occurrences of weak even in desire statements, (iii) what rules out
weak even in epistemic statements, and (iv) what rules out weak even under intend and
command.
Ad (i). The scalar presupposition in (34-d) is plausible in contexts in which it holds that
if there are preferences that distinguish making a certain number of videos from making
another number of videos, they will be such that making the greater number of videos is
better than making the lower number of videos. In such a context it holds that if I hope
to make one video of that quality and I have preferences that distinguish between making
one video of that quality and, say, making two videos of that quality and, finally, I take it
to be possible that I make two videos of that quality, then I hope to make two videos of
that quality. Furthermore, the reverse does not hold in such a context: if I hope to make
two videos of that quality and I have preferences that distinguish between making one and
making two videos of that quality, it is not necessarily the case that I hope to make one video
of that quality - e.g. I may be indifferent between making one and not making one video of
that quality. This one-way conditional relation between the two alternatives necessitates the
proposition that I hope to make one video of that quality to be more unexpected (less likely)
in the context than, say, the proposition that I hope to make two videos of that quality.
Ad (ii). The extra inference that accompanies weak even in desire statements and in
imperatives is derived by pragmatic reasoning about the beliefs of the attitude holder. In
a context in which the scalar presupposition of even is satisfied, it holds that there are
alternatives that the attitude holder prefers to his described desire. Since desires are causally
connected to the pursuits of the attitude holder, having a weaker desire will result in pursuit
of outcomes that correspond to the weaker desire and that have a lower utility for the attitude
holder than the outcomes corresponding to a stronger desire. This is legitimate only if their
expected value is not lower than the expected value of the outcomes one would pursue if he
had a stronger desire. This is the case only if the likelihood of the latter is sufficiently low.
Ad (iii). The infelicity of weak even in the scope of doxastic predicates follows from the
fact that they have a different semantics than desire predicates. In particular, they have
the standard modal semantics, according to which they are upward-monotone operators
(e.g. Hintikka 1962). The scalar presupposition of weak even triggered in such sentences is
incorrect, regardless of whether even stays in situ or scopes above the doxastic predicate.
Ad (iv). Intend and command have a non-monotone semantics and so the scalar presuppo-
sition triggered by weak even in these sentences is compatible with the condition on scalarity
in (30) if even scopes above the predicates. However, being compatible with (30) is not a
sufficient condition for the felicity of weak even - the scalar presupposition triggered by even
has to be plausible in the respective context. We show that this is not the case with intend
and command. Roughly, this is due to the fact that intentions and commands are stable and
under control of the attitude holder in a way that is different from desires.
3.2.2 A negation-related semantics of desire
There is a variety of approaches that treat desire predicates as having a non-monotone
semantics. Many of these are derivative on Heim's (1992) negation-related approach (e.g.
Levinson 2003, Villalta 2008, Lassiter 2011), which we adopt for concreteness.
Beliefs and preferences
Heim (1992) proposes that to want p is to believe that p is desirable (good), though she does
not explicitly discuss this paraphrase.' The belief component of the meaning of want is
identical to Hintikka's treatment of believe whose core ingredient is the doxastic accessibility
function that is relativized to the attitude holder and a world (35).
(35) Dox(i,w) ={w' | w' is compatible with what i believes in w}
The second ingredient of the meaning of want involves the notion of desirability (goodness),
which is defined with the help of the comparative notion of preference. 4  A preference
relation basically relates possible worlds (e.g. von Wright 1963, Rescher 1967). And because
different individuals may have different preferences in different situations, the relation is
parametrized to individuals and situations/worlds. We symbolize the preference relation
with >i,, in prefix notation where i, w stand for the individual and the world parameter,
respectively. Furthermore, we assume that the relation >- is a complete partial order, i.e. the
relation is reflexive, transitive, anti-symmetric and complete. Strict preference >- is defined
in the standard way: p >-,, q iff p ti,. q and -(q dew p).
Now, the basic preference relation between worlds can be lifted to propositional relata, i.e.
to a relation between sets of worlds. There are different ways in which this extension may be
defined. Heim (1992) employs the so-called all-all preference relation between propositions
that requires all the worlds in the 'better' proposition to be preferred over all the worlds in
the 'worse' proposition."
Definition 1 (All-all preference). For any individual i, any world w, any preference relation
_ ,, among worlds, and any propositions p, q: p > i,w q =df Vw',w"(p(w') 1 A q(w") =1
-+ w' > i,w w".
13 In lieu of this, Heim (1992:193) builds on the intuition expressed by Stalnaker: "wanting something is
preferring it to certain relevant alternatives, the relevant alternatives being those possibilities that the agent
believes will be realized if he does not get what he wants." This intuition is not far from our paraphrase, as
we will see, since p is desirable only if it is preferred over its alternatives, say, -p.
'
4 Similar notions have been entertained in moral and economic theory where goodness and desirability are
standardly given negation-related characterizations (see Brogan 1919, von Wright 1963, Bricker 1980 among
others). For example, Moore (1993:25) provides the following description of what is right:
to assert that a certain line of conduct is, at a given time, absolutely right or obligatory, is
obviously to assert that more good or less evil will exist in the world, if it is adopted, than if
anything else be done instead.
15 Such a characterization of preference has also been entertained by von Wright (1963:31):
[A] ny given total state of the world, which contains p but not q, is preferred to a total state of
the world, which differs from the first in that it contains q but not p, but otherwise is identical
with it.
Desire as ceteris paribus preference
We can now combine the belief and the preference components. Heim proposes that the
relata in the meaning of desire statements are sets of belief worlds of the attitude holder
nearest to the respective anchor belief world. This is captured by employing a class selection
function SIM that assigns to each world w and a proposition p the subset of p containing
only the worlds that are maximally similar to w (Lewis 1973).
Definition 2. For any set of worlds W, any proposition p C W, w E W and comparative
similarity relation <: SIM( ,w,p) --df Aw'. p(w') = 1 A Vw"(p(w") =1 -+ w' <, w").16
A non-dynamic rendition of Heim's definition of want is given in (36): that an agent wants
p means that the agent believes that p is desirable, all else being equal,1 i.e. the agent
believes that it would be better if he were in one of p worlds than if he were in one of -,p
worlds, all else being equal.
(36) If defined, [ want ]9'c(>-, p, i, w) = 1 iff Vw' c Dox(i, w):
SIM(w', Dox(i, w)np) >-i,w SIM(w', Dox(i, w)- p)
Besides guaranteeing the correct presupposition projection, the reason why the argument of
SIM in (36) is a subset of the belief state of the agent is to guarantee that what is compared
involves worlds compatible with the beliefs of the agent and not worlds outside her doxastic
pool. The semantics of other desire predicates is built up in a parallel fashion, though some
modifications might be needed. For example, the sentential complement of wish is taken not
to be believed by the holder of the desire. This requires us to tweak one of the relata of the
preference relation: one is comparing p worlds that are in the minimally revised belief state
of the agent that otherwise believes -p. The revision is required since none of the worlds in
the agent's belief state are p worlds and the first relatum in (37) would be empty.
(37) If defined, [ wish ]J9c(>-, p, i, w) = 1 iff Vw' E Dox(i, w):
SIM(w', rev(Dox(i, w)) n p) >-i,w w'
The need for a revision operator in the characterization of the semantics of wish reflects
two deeper requirements that desire predicates impose on the context: the propositional
argument of want must be compatible with the beliefs of the attitude holder and it may not
be entailed by them. In Heim's semantics in (36) and (37), these are naturally conditioned
by a general principle of non-vacuity: if Dox(i, w) were a subset of p, SIM(w', DOx(i, w)-p)
in (36) would be empty and the truth-conditions would be vacuous (trivial proposition); if
DOX(i, w) and p were mutually exclusive, SIM(w', Dox(i, w)np) would be empty and the
truth-conditions would again be vacuous (Heim 1992:198).
(38) [ want ]9'c(p,i,w) is defined only if Dox(i,w) n p / 0 and Dox(i,w) n p # Dox(i,w).
If defined, [ want ]9'c(p,i,w) = 1 iff Vw' E Dox(i,w): SIM(w',Dox(i,w)np)
>i,w SIM~w',DOx (i, w) -,p)
16 That is, siM(5,w,p) is the set of worlds w' in p such that no other world in p is more similar to w with
respect to < than w'. We leave the similarity relation argument out of most of the subsequent representations.17This paraphrase is correct to the extent that we assume that the preference relation >- does not vary
across the doxastic alternatives of the attitude holder, i.e. ViVwVw'EDox(i,w) [ >-i, = -i,,].
An analogous meaning can also be assigned to the imperative operator. There are two
differences between it and desire predicates: first, the imperative operator does not quantify
over the beliefs of an attitude holder but over the worlds in the context set; second, the
imperative operator triggers additional presuppositions that axe responsible for its perfor-
mativity. For brevity, we write these presuppositions simply as an authority requirement (cf.
Schwager 2005: for a more thorough discussion of performativity).
(39) [ IMP ]9'c(p,w) is defined only if (i) cs(c) n p / 0 and cs(c) n p / cs and (ii) the
speaker sp(c) is an authority in c. If defined, [ IMP ]9'(p,w) =1 iff
Vw' E cs(c): SIM(w', cs(c)np) >sp(c),w SIM(w', cs(c)Np)
Desire predicates are non-monotonic
The semantics described above is non-monotonic. For example, it predicts the non-inferences
in (40) and (41). We focus on (40) in the following since it is the more relevant non-inference
pattern for our purposes - it shows non-upward-entailingness of desire predicates.
(40) a. I hope to make two videos of that quality
b. I hope to make one video of that quality
(41) a. I hope to make one video of that quality
b. * I hope to make two videos of that quality
The two sentences in (40) have the assertive meanings in (42).
(42) a. If defined, [ I hope to make 2 videos ]9'C = 1 iff Vw' e Dox(iw):
SIM(w', Dox(i,w)n[ I make 2 videos ]9'C)
N,, SIM(w', Dox(i,w)n[ I make 0 or !1 videos ]9'c)
b. If defined, [ I hope to make 1 video 9,c - 1 iff Vw' E Dox(iw):
SIM(w', Dox(i,w)n[ I make 1 video ]9'c)
>-i,W SIM(w', Dox(i,w)n[ I make O videos ]9'c)
Assume that it holds that (i) I prefer making two videos of that quality to making no or
exactly one video of that quality and that (ii) it is not the case that I prefer making exactly
one video of that quality to making no videos of that quality. Clearly, (42-a) is true in the
described scenario due to (i). (42-b) is false due to (ii): it holds that the nearest belief worlds
in which I make exactly one video of that quality and the nearest belief worlds in which I
make (at least) one video of that quality to the anchor worlds in which I make exactly one
video of that quality coincide. And since we know due to (ii) that they are not all preferred
to the nearest belief worlds in which I make no videos of that quality, it is false that all the
nearest belief worlds in which I make (at least) one video are preferred to those in which I
make no videos, i.e. it is not the case that I want to make one video.
3.2.3 Consistency and plausibility of the scalar presuppositon
The scalar presupposition triggered by weak even in the scope of desire predicates and
the imperative operator is consistent if even scopes above the respective operators. It is
plausible in contexts in which it holds that the relevant stronger alternatives are better than
the relevant weaker alternatives (if there are preferences that distinguish between them).
Consistency
The sentence in (43-a) has the LF in (43-b): even scopes above the desire predicate. The
scalar presupposition that it triggers in its derived position is given in (43-d).
(43) a. I hope to make even ONE video of that quality
b. [even C1] [k I 7 hope [{evenGr} PRO7 to make oneF video ...
c. C1 C { that I hope to make n videos of that quality I n E N>0 }
d. 3q E C1 : that I hope to make one video of that quality <c q
Since it holds that none of the alternatives in the domain of scoped even entails the prejacent
of even (44), the scalar presupposition is consistent, i.e. it is compatible with (30). This is in
line with the prediction discussed in the preceding chapters: a weak even may be acceptable
in the scope of a non-upward-entailing operator (45).
(44) for all n E N> 1 : that I hope to make n videos of that quality :#> that I hope to make
one video of that quality
(45) A prediction of the scope-theoretic approach to even
A sentence with a weak even may be acceptable if even is at surface structure in the
scope of a (Strawson) downward-monotone operator or a non-monotone operator,
i.e. in the scope of a non-upward-monotone operator
Notice that the prediction in (45) describes a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the
felicity of a weak even. Since the scalar presupposition described in (43-d) is not trivial, it
is expected to be satisfied only in particular contexts.
Plausibility: Non-factive desire predicates
In the following we determine the contexts in which the presupposition in (43-d) is plausi-
ble. We do this by checking what has to hold in a context for a particular counterfactual
conditional relation to obtain between the prejacent of even and the alternatives. We then
argue that if such a relation obtains among the alternatives, their likelihoods comply with
the condition described in (43-d).
Since desire predicates are non-monotone operators, no entailment obtains among the
propositions in the domain of even in (43). However, there are two salient types of contexts
in which a particular kind of conditional relation does obtain among them: (i) contexts in
which if there are preferences that distinguish making a certain number of videos of that
quality and making another number of videos of that quality, then these prerences are such
that making the greater number of videos is better than making the lower number of videos;
and (ii) contexts in which if there are preferences that distinguish making a certain number
of videos and making another number of videos of that quality, then these preferences are
such that making the lower number of videos is better than making the greater number of
videos.' 8 In the type of contexts in (i), the implication obtains that if the prejacent of even
in (43) is true - that I hope to make one video of that quality - and there are preferences
that distinguish between making one video of that quality and, say, making two videos of
that quality, then it holds that if I take it to be possible that I make two videos of that
quality, then I hope to make two videos of that quality. In the type of contexts in (ii), the
reverse implication obtains: if it is true that, say, I hope to make two videos of that quality
and there are preferences that distinguish between making two videos of that quality and
making one video of that quality, then I hope to make one video of that quality.
The first type of context is the intuitively more natural one. In the context it holds that
if there are relevant preferences between, say, making two videos of that quality and making
one video of that quality, then these preferences are such that the former is better than the
latter. According to a natural understanding of preferences, this means that it holds that I
prefer making two videos of that quality to making exactly one video of that quality. The
prejacent together with the assumption about my preferences Strawson entail the alternative
that I would like to make two videos of that quality:
(46) a. I hope to make one video of that quality
b. There are preferences that distinguish between making one video and making
two videos of that quality & they are such that making two videos of that
quality is better than making exactly one video of that quality
c. -+ I hope to make two videos of that quality
The relation in (46) is roughly paraphrased by the conditional in (47): the antecedent con-
tains the prejacent and the presupposition of the respective alternative, while the consequent
contains the alternative.' 9 If either the prejacent or the presupposition of the alternative is
false in the context, the conditional is counterfactual. In any case, it is evaluated as true in
the context at hand. Furthermore, since we are assuming that hope denotes a non-monotone
function, the conditional in (48) is false in the described context: one cannot conclude from
hoping that a better alternative obtains that one is hoping that worse alternative obtains.
(47) If I hope to make one video of that quality and I take it to be possible that I will
make two videos of that quality, then I hope to make two videos of that quality /
(48) If I hope to make two videos of that quality and take it to be possible that I make
exactly one video of that quality, then I hope to make one video of that quality #
Together the two conditionals suffice to establish the plausibility of the scalar presupposition
in (43-d) in the respective context: they are indicative of a scale on which the prejacent of
18The conditionalization in (i) and (ii) to there being distinguishing preferences is necessary. Namely, in
the contexts in which making more videos of that quality is preferred to making less videos of that quality
simpliciter, it trivially holds that all the alternatives in the domain of even that are defined are true. This
would make the utterance of (43) redundant. On the other hand, in the contexts in which making less videos
of that quality is preferred to making more videos of that quality it trivially holds that all the alternatives
in the domain of even are false or undefined (Irene Heim p.c.).
19 We leave out the distinguishability condition in the following for brevity and assume that, say, making
two videos is such that the preferences of the attitude holder in the context distinguish it from making
(exactly) one video.
even in (43) is less likely than at least one alternative. Namely, the proposition that I hope
to make one video of that quality together with the assumption that the relevant alternative
is defined contextually entails that the relevant alternative is true - say, that I hope to make
two videos of that quality; the opposite is not the case. Consequently, if the likelihood
function accompanying even is conditioned on such a context, it will assign the proposition
that I hope to make one video a lower likelihood than the proposition that I hope to make
two videos.
If the context is such that if there are preferences distinguishing between, say, making
two videos of that quality and making one video of that quality, then these preferences are
such that the latter is better than the former (e.g. I abhor fame or the quality of the videos
is bad), the reverse inference pattern from the one in (46) obtains and accordingly reverse
conditional relations. These are described in (49) and (50). The scalar presupposition in
(43-d) is not satisfied in such a context.
(49) If I hope to make one video of that quality and I take it to be possible that I will
make two videos of that quality, then I hope to make two videos of that quality #
(50) If I hope to make two videos of that quality and take it to be possible that I make
(exactly) one video of that quality, then I hope to make one video of that quality /7
Finally, there are (i) contexts in which people are taken to be indifferent between making
more and making less videos of that quality and (ii) contexts in which it is open what people's
preferences are. In both types of contexts, no contextual inferences along the lines of (49)
and (50) hold. In both cases, there is nothing in the content of the sentence or the context
of its use that scalar reasoning could latch on. Thus, the scalar presupposition is perceived
as deviant or an appropriate preference relation is accommodated - that if there are relevant
preferences, stronger alternatives are preferred to weaker alternatives:
(51) John hopes to catch even ONE wug
~- John prefers catching two wugs to catching exactly one wug
Plausibility: Factive desire predicates and imperatives
As suggested by Kadmon & Landman (1993), weak even is licit in the scope of factive de-
sire predicates like glad in the first type of contexts described above - that is, contexts in
which the attitude holder prefers pragmatically stronger to pragmatically weaker alterna-
tives. Kadmon & Landman (1993) have characterized the contexts in which this and other
conditions hold as "settle for less" contexts. Their full description is given in the subsequent
quote where (1) is the pertinent component of the characterization for our discussion.
(52) a. A: Couldn't you get any tickets better than this!?
b. I'm glad we even got THESE tickets!
(1) What I really want is better tickets. (2) We didn't get better tickets. (3) We
got these tickets, which I wouldn't normally be glad about. (4) I settle for less,
and I'm glad about what I have. (Kadmon & Landman 1993:385)
We predict that weak even under factive desire predicates is felicitous in such "settle for
less" contexts:20 the scalar particle even scopes above the non-monotone operator glad and
triggers in its derived position a consistent scalar presupposition (53-d).
(53) a. I am glad we even got THESE tickets
b. [even C1] [p I am glad [{even-Gr} we got theseF tickets]]
c. C1 g { that I am glad that we got tickets x | x is a salient group of tickets }
d. ]q C C1 : that I am glad that we got these tickets <c q
The scalar presupposition is satisfied since "what I really want is better tickets," i.e. the
context is such that I prefer to get tickets that are higher on a salient scale than these tickets.
In such a context, the conditional in (54) holds. Accordingly, the scalar presupposition is
verified by the proposition that I desire for us to get those better tickets (that I am glad we
got those better tickets).
(54) If I am glad that I got these tickets, then if I would get tickets that are higher on
the salient scale, I would be glad that I got those tickets
The imperatives are subject to the same reasoning: even scopes at LF above the non-
monotone operator IMP, which has a comparable meaning to other desire predicates but
triggers additional presuppositions. In its derived position even triggers a consistent scalar
presupposition sketched in (55-d) where we represent the meaning of the imperative with
wantIMP. The scalar presupposition is satisfied in a context in which the speaker prefers the
hearer performing a harder task to the hearer performing an easier task. In such a context
the conditional in (56) is true; this is indicative of there being an alternative that is more
likely than the prejacent - that I want you to show me two political parties that care for the
people.
(55) a. Show me even ONE political party that cares for the people
b. [even C1] [g IMP [Feven-Gr} you show me oneF party that cares]]
c. C1 C { that I wantIMP you to show me n parties that care I n E N>o }
d. 3q e C1 : that I wantiMp you to show me n parties that care <c q
(56) If I wantiMp you to show me one party that cares, I take it to be possible that you
show me two parties, and I am an authority, then I want you to show me two parties
3.2.4 Extra inference about probability
Desire statements containing weak even have been shown to have plausible meanings in con-
texts in which the attitude holder prefers stronger alternatives to the sentential complement
of the desire predicate to weaker alternatives. However, contexts in which desire statements
with weak even are used exhibit a further interesting property - they are biased. The bias
they exhibit is described in (19), repeated below.
20The characterization "settle for less" simply stands for being glad about a proposition obtaining that is
presupposed to be less preferred than its alternatives.
(19) Low probability bias
A context satisfies the low probability bias with respect to a set of alternatives and
an individual if none of the alternatives is expected to come true by the individual
We suggest that the bias in (19) follows from the intricate interaction of (i) the scalar
presupposition triggered by weak even, which conditions the desire statements with weak
even to be used only in contexts in which stronger alternatives are preferred to weaker
alternatives and (ii) the implicit assumption that the attitude holder is a value maximizer.
Since desires are inextricably linked with the acts that the attitude holder performs to bring
about these desires, having a weaker desire will effectively result in pursuit of outcomes
corresponding to the weak desire 2 ' whose utility is lower than the utility of outcomes one
would pursue if one had a stronger desire. For a value maximizer, this is only legitimate if
the expected value of the former outcomes is not lower than that of the latter outcomes. This
is only possible if the probability of the latter is sufficiently lower than that of the former.
This explains the low probability bias.
3.2.5 Beliefs, intentions and commands
We have seen that in addition to DE and appropriate non-monotone environments, weak
even may trigger a consistent and plausible presupposition in imperatives and under certain
attitude predicates. However, there are also attitude predicates under which weak even may
not occur. We will discuss three salient classes of such predicates. The first class of predicates
that do not license weak even contains doxastic attitude predicates like believe and know:
(57) Doxastic and epistemic attitude predicates
a. #Mary believes John found even ONE party that cares for the people
b. #John knows that Mary got even ONE cent for every case that the police have
messed up
The second class is formed by the attitude predicates like intend and plan:
(58) #Mary intends to find even ONE party that cares for the people
The third class involves directive predicates like command and order (59). However, directive
predicates do not form a uniform class with respect to their ability to license weak even.
Namely, as we have seen, the predicates challenge, dare and urge do allow for felicitous
occurrences of weak even in their scope (60).
(59) Directive attitude predicates (class 1)
# Mary ordered/commanded John to find even ONE party that cares for the people
(60) Directive attitude predicates (class 2)
a. Mary challenged John to find even ONE party that cares for the people
b. I urge you to plant even ONE seed of this tuber
2 1These outcomes can simplistically be treated as simply the desired proposition (or propositions entailing
it) obtaining, e.g. that I make exactly 1 video of that quality, that I make exactly 1 or exactly 2 videos etc.
We discuss the (in)felicity of weak even in the scope of the predicates described in (57)-(60)
in turn. We argue that in (57) even triggers an inconsistent presupposition, while in all other
cases except (60) it triggers an implausible presupposition.
Beliefs
Weak even is illicit in the scope of doxastic and epistemic predicates (61). This is expected
on the approach to attitude predicates entertained in this section: desire but not doxas-
tic/epistemic attitude predicates have a preference-based negation-related semantics. The
semantics of doxastic/epistemic attitude predicates is upward-entailing (cf. Hintikka 1962).
(61) #1 believe/know that John made even ONE video of that quality
The sentence in (61) has the two possible structures in (62). In both structures, even triggers
an inconsistent scalar presupposition - a scalar presupposition that is in violation of (30),
repeated below.
(62) a. [I believe [[even C1] John made oneF video of that quality]]
b. [even C 1] [I believe John made oneF video of that quality]
(30) Scalarity and entailment
If a proposition p entails a proposition q, q cannot be less likely than p
The inconsistency of the scalar presupposition of (61-a) is familiar from the examples of
weak even in unembedded environments: since the prejacent of even is entailed by all of its
alternatives (63-c), there cannot be an alternative that is less likely than it.
(63) Scalar presupposition of (62-a)
a. C1 C { that John made n videos of that quality I n E N>0}
b. 3q e C1 : that John made one video of that quality <c q
c. for all n E N>1 : that John made one video of that quality
<= that John made n videos of that quality
A similar state of affairs obtains if even scopes above the attitude predicate: since the
predicate is upward-monotone, the prejacent of scoped even in (62-b) is logically weakest
among its alternatives, as described in (64-c), and thus cannot be less likely than any of
them. Since even triggers illicit presuppositions in both parses of (61), the sentence does not
have a felicitous interpretation and weak even is not licensed.
(64) Scalar presupposition of (62-b)
a. C1 C { that I believe that John made n videos of that quality I n E N>o}
b. 3q E C1 : that I believe that John made one video of that quality <c q
c. for all n E N>1 : Vw' E Dox(I,w): John made one video of that quality in w'
<= Vw' E Dox(I,w): John made n videos of that quality in w'
The same reasoning applies to occurrences of weak even in the scope of doxastic/epistemic
modal auxiliaries like must and might. Unlike desire predicates, these operators have an
upward-monotone semantics similar to believe and thus scoping even above them cannot
rescue the occurrence of weak even.
(65) a. #John must/might have made even ONE video of that quality
b. #[even C1 ] [must/might [John made oneF video of that quality]]
However, as we have noted in the introductory section, weak even is also infelicitous under
(performative) deontic modal auxiliaries. There are two ways of explaining this: first, it
is possible that it is only priority attitude predicate that have a non-monotone semantics
and that modal auxiliaries of all flavors denote upward-entailing functions (Kratzer 1991);
second, the infelicity of weak even under deontic modals might be subsumed by whatever
explains their non-occurrence under predicates like intend and command.
(66) a. #You must/may make even ONE video of that quality
b. #[even C1] [must/mayperf [you make oneF video of that quality]]
Intentions and commands
Weak even may not occur under the attitude predicate intend, even though the predicate
arguably falls into the same class of attitude predicates as would like and glad."
(67) a. #I intend to make even ONE video of that quality
b. #[even C1 ] [ I 7 intend [leven-Gr} PRO7 to make oneF video ...]]
c. C1 C { that I intend to make n videos of that quality I n c N>o}
d. -3q E C1: that I intend to make one video of that quality <, q
As it was accentuated above, movement of even that associates with a weak predicate across
a non-monotone operator is only a necessary condition for it to trigger an acceptable pre-
supposition - it is not a sufficient condition. Namely, the presupposition that it triggers
in its derived position may still be false in the given context, causing the sentence to be
pragmatically deviant. We argue that this is the case in (67).
Desire and intention are distinct concepts (Bratman 1987 and others). For example,
it is possible to have desires without having corresponding intentions to realize them and
vice versa. Another differences is that the latter involve more freedom of choice - in fact,
"intention stems from choice" (Holton 2009:58). Although intentions may be influenced by
desires and beliefs of the agent, they are not determined by them - an agent may choose
to perform an action prior to making a judgment about what the best action is and she
22Although it has to be noted that there is a assortment of philosophical proposals that argue that intention
is a species of belief (or even belief simpliciter) (Grice 1971, Harman 1976, Velleman 2007, Setiya 2007: and
others). The main reason why we assume that the meaning of intend parallels that of want rather than that
of believe is that presupposition projection in its scope behaves like presupposition projection with want.
21There is also a difference between desire predicates and intend with respect to gradability - only the
former are gradable.
(i) a. I hope to visit France more than I hope to visit Spain
b. #I intend to visit France more than I intend to visit Spain
may even choose an action that is not best according to her beliefs and desires. We put
forward that this property of intention is the main reason for the infelicity of the scalar
presupposition in (67-d).
We have seen that the scalar presupposition of weak even under desire predicates was
satisfied in contexts in which the attitude holder was taken to prefer stronger alternatives
to weaker alternatives. In such contexts, conditionals along the lines of (47) are true, which
is indicative of there being a likelihood scale according to which the desire statement in the
antecedent is ranked higher than the desire statement in the consequent of the conditional.
(47) If I hope to make one video of that quality and I take it to be possible that I will
make two videos of that quality, then I hope to make two videos of that quality
The same reasoning does not hold for intend. This is suggested by the perceived falseness
of the conditional in (68) in natural contexts, incl. in contexts in which it is taken for granted
that I prefer to make two videos of that quality to making exactly one video of that quality.
(68) If I intend to make one video of that quality and take it to be possible that I make
two videos of that quality, then I intend to make two videos of that quality #
As gestured above, this is arguably due to the choice component of intention: if I choose
to perform a certain action (= intend to perform an action), nothing warrants that I would
choose to perform a certain alternative action (= intend to perform an alternative action)
if conditions were appropriately different (with respect to this see also the discussion of
stability of intention in Bratman 1987). Accordingly, there is nothing in the context on what
we can latch our evaluation of the plausibility of the respective scalar presupposition.
Commands and challenges
Weak even is unacceptable under directive predicates command and order but it is acceptable
under challenge, dare and defy. We assume that all of these predicates have a non-monotone
semantics similar to desire predicates.
(69) a. #John commanded/ordered Peter to make even ONE video of that quality
b. John challenged/dared Peter to make even ONE video of that quality
We propose that the reason that underlies the infelicity of weak even under intend also
underlies its infelicity under command, order: after even scopes out of its base position, as
sketched in (70-b), it triggers a consistent but implausible scalar presupposition (70-d).
(70) a. #John commanded Peter to make even ONE video of that quality
b. [even C 1] [z John commanded Peter to make oneF video ...]
c. C1 C {that John commanded Peter to make n videos of that quality | n E N>0}
d. 3q e C1 : that John commanded Peter to make one video of that quality <c q
Similar to cases with intend, no non-trivial conditional relation can be established between
the prejacent in (70) - that John commanded Peter to make one video of that quality - and
its alternatives. This holds even for contexts in which John prefers Peter making two videos
of that quality to making exactly one video of that quality.
(71) If John commanded Peter to make one video of that quality and he took it to be
possible that Peter would make two videos of that quality, then he commanded Peter
to make two videos of that quality #
Challenge, dare and defy exhibit a different behavior in appropriate contexts. Again, even
scopes above the respective operators at LF (72-b) where it triggers a consistent presupposi-
tion (72-d). Now, the meaning of challenge has a constitutive characteristic that command
lacks: the challenged task is supposed to be hard. It then naturally holds that more diffi-
cult tasks qualify as more reasonable challenges. This is what the evaluation of the scalar
presupposition in (72) can latch on - it is less likely that someone is challenged to do the
easiest task rather than a harder task. Analogous reasoning applies to urge.
(72) a. John challenged Peter to make even ONE video of that quality
b. [even C1 ] [t John challenged Peter to make oneF video ...]
c. C1 c { that John challenged Peter to make n videos of that quality I n c Nyo }
d. ]q E Ci: that John challenged Peter to make one video of that quality <, q
3.2.6 Three issues
There are three issues facing the approach sketched above. The first two issues concern the
behavior of even in desire statements. The third issue is more general in nature and concerns
the question whether desire predicates are indeed non-monotonic. This last issue is discussed
in greater depth in the appendix.
Exclusive associates
The first puzzle relates to certain inferences induced by a weak even in the scope of de-
sire predicates. They relate to the interpretation of the sentential complement of the desire
predicate. In the cases that we have studied so far, the assertive meaning of the sentential
complement of a desire predicate containing a weak even is indistinguishable from the as-
sertive meaning of its counterpart without even. Accordingly, we have entailment relations
along the lines of (73).
(73) a. Mary hopes to make even ONE video of that quality
b. => Mary hopes to make one video of that quality
However, when the sister of even in its base position is such that its alternatives are mutually
exclusive, no such entailments obtain, as indicated in (74) and' (75).
(74) a. Mary hopes that her daughter will win even a BRONZE medal
b. = Mary hopes that her daughter will win at least a bronze medal
c. Mary hopes that her daughter will win a bronze medal
(75) a. I hope to be even just an ASSISTANT professor when I retire
b. = I hope to be at least an assistant professor when I retire
c. # I hope to be an assistant professor when I retire
The sentence in (74-a) appears to convey that Mary hopes that her daughter will be among
medal winners. This is distinct from the meaning conveyed by (74-c): that Mary hopes that
her daughter will win a bronze medal, which might be interpreted as a less motherly stance.
The same holds for (75): (75-c) conveys a certain lack of ambition that (75-a) does not.
The negation-related semantics of hope predicts the sentence in (74-a) to have the assertive
meaning in (76), which corresponds to the meaning of (74-c).
(76) Aw. Vw' E Dox(Mary, w): SIM(w', Dox(Mary, w) n that Sue wins a bronze)
>Mary,w SIM(w', Dox(Mary, w) n that Sue wins no or a silver or a gold medal)
The issue can be resolved if we assume that there is an appropriate covert existential
or disjunctive operator in the sentential complements of the desire predicates in (74-a) and
(75-a). The operator quantifies over the alternatives determined by the focus structure of
its sister and asserts that its propositional argument or a less likely alternative is true. An
example of a structure containing such an operator, which we call AT LEAST and define in
(77) (cf. Schwarz 2005), is given in (78-a); its meaning is sketched in (78-b).
(77) [ AT LEAST ]9'c(:c, C, p, w) = 1 iff Er E C [ ( r e p ) / ( r(w)=
(78) a. [AT LEAST Co] [Sue won a bronzeF medal]
b. [ (78-a) ]19c(w) = 1 iff 3q e { that Sue won an x medal | x is bronze, silver or
gold } [ q(w) = 1 ] iff Sue won a bronze or a silver or a gold medal in w
Applied to our examples, we get structures along the lines of (79-a) where AT LEAST is in
the scope of the desire predicate, while even moves above it. The sentential complement
of the desire predicate has the meaning in (79-b) - that Sue won a medal - where Sue is
Mary's daughter. The prejacent of even and the assertion of the sentence in (79-a) is given
in (79-c): it corresponds to the intuitive paraphrase of the sentence. This effectively reduces
the sentences in (74)/(75) to other examples discussed in this chapter. The consistency
and plausibility of the scalar presupposition that even triggers in (79-a) - that there is an
alternative that is more likely than that Mary hopes that Sue will win a medal - are explained
along the same lines as above.
(79) a. [even C1] [yp Mary hopes [xp [AT LEAST Co] her daughter will win a
bronzeF medal]
b. [ XP ]9'c(w) = 1 iff Sue wins a bronze or a silver or a gold medal in w
c. [YP ]9,'(w) = 1 iff Mary hopes that Sue will win a bronze or a silver or a gold
medal in w
Scope asymmetry
The second puzzle for the non-monotonic approach to desire is more resilient. It relates to
an asymmetry between (a) sentences where even associates with a weak predicate and is at
surface structure in the scope of a desire predicate and (b) sentences where even associates
with a weak predicate and is at surface structure above the desire predicate. The former
sentences are felicitous, while the latter sentences are pragmatically deviant:
(80) a. Mary hopes to make even ONE video of that quality
b. #Mary even hopes to make ONE video of that quality
This asymmetry is unexpected on the approach developed above. Namely, both sentences
are assigned the same LF (81-a), which triggers a consistent scalar presupposition (81-b).
This presupposition is plausible in contexts where it is taken for granted that if there are
relevant preferences, people prefer stronger alternatives to weaker alternatives.
(81) a. [even C 1] [Mary hopes to make oneF video of that quality]
b. 3q E { that I hope to make n videos of that quality I n e N>o }:
that I hope to make one video of that quality <, q
Monotonicity of desire predicates
The third and final puzzle for the approach developed in this section is independent of weak
even and relates to inference patterns that desire predicates give rise to. We have seen that
Heim's negation-related analysis of desire predicates treats these as non-monotone operators.
However, a careful reader might have noticed that we have not provided any examples that
would support this assumption. The reason for this is that it is difficult to come up with
convincing examples where non-monotonicity of the predicates would come to light." For
example, the entailment described in (82) appears to be valid.
(82) a. John hopes to make more than five videos of that quality
b. -> John hopes to make more than one video of that quality
Furthermore, von Fintel (1999) observed that sequences along the lines of (83) appear to be
contradictory: this is unexpected if the two clauses denote logically independent propositions,
as predicted by the negation-related analysis discussed above.
(83) a. #John wants a free flight on the Concorde but he doesn't want a flight on the
Concorde
b. #John wants a flight on the Concorde but he doesn't want a free flight on the
Concorde
These issues are discussed at greater length in the appendix where it is shown, following
mainly von Fintel (1999), that there appear to be no independent grounds that would mo-
tivate choosing a non-monotone analysis of desire predicates over a more standard upward-
monotone modal analysis. Although one could treat the fact that desire predicates license
weak even in their scope as an argument for their non-monotonicity, this would rob the
discussion above of some of its explanatory value.
24There is one pattern that is an exception and that does seem to argue for non-monotonicity: the failure
of disjunctive weakening under desire predicates (i). However, as is discussed in the appendix, the negation
related analysis cannot explain (i) and its kin; non-innocuous assumptions have to be made to derive it.
(i) I want to send this letter > I want to send this letter or burn it
3.3 Monotonic desire
If desire predicates and the imperative operator are upward-entailing, the occurrence of weak
even in their scope is unexpected. We argue that weak even is licit in these environments
because a strengthening mechanism can apply in grammar that rescues it.
3.3.1 Overview of the proposal
A restatement of the puzzle
The puzzle in its barest form is the following: if weak even triggers an inconsistent presup-
position in a positive episodic sentence (84), why does embedding this sentence under an
upward-entailing desire predicate or an imperative operator rescue the sentence?
(84) [ even 19'c(C, [ I find oneF party that cares g9C) is defined only if 3q E { that
I find n parties that care I n E N>o }: that I find one party that cares <c q
Since desire predicates are upward-entailing, the answer to this question cannot simply be
that even may scope above the desire predicate. Namely, the domain of even in its de-
rived position still contains only alternatives that entail the prejacent of even, causing its
scalar presupposition to be illicit. Namely, the scalar presupposition in (85) contradicts the
principle in (30), repeated below.
(85) [ even ]9'c(C, [ I hope to find oneF party that cares ]C9') is defined only if 3q
E { that I hope to find n parties that care I n e N>o }: that I hope to find one party
that cares <c q
(30) Scalarity and entailment
If a proposition p entails a proposition q, q cannot be less likely than p
The goal
We propose that even with a weak prejacent can indeed be licit under a desire predicate
because even can move above the desire predicate. However, the domain of alternatives over
which scoped even quantifies is not the one given in (85) but rather the one in (86), wherein
the prejacent of even is the first proposition in the set.
(86) { that I hope to find one party that cares & I am okay with finding exactly one
party that cares, that I hope to find two parties that care & I am okay with finding
exactly two parties that care, ... }
If the domain of even in its derived position is the one given in (86), then even triggers the
scalar presupposition in (87). This scalar presupposition is consistent since the alternatives
in the domain of even are mutually exclusive and so in principle any likelihood relation may
hold of them. Furthermore, it is true in contexts in which it is more likely for an individual
to hope to find more parties that care for the people than to hope to find less parties - i.e.
in contexts in which people tend to 'hope for the best.'
(87) [ even ]9'c(C, [ I hope to find oneF party that cares ]19'C, w) is defined only if
-q E {that I hope to find n parties that care & I am okay with finding exactly n
parties that cares I n c N>o}: that I hope to find one party that cares & I am okay
with finding exactly one party <c q.
If defined, [ even ]9'c(C, [ I hope to find oneF party that cares ]9'c, w) - 1 iff
I hope to find one party that cares & I am okay with finding exactly one party in w
The means
The main question is how do we get the domain of scoped even to be the one in (86). We
propose that this is due to a strengthening in grammar, which is achieved by inserting a
covert exhaustification operator EXH above the respective desire predicate and having it
associate with the focused element.
(88) [EXH C 1] [I hope [[even C2] PRO to find oneF party that cares]]
A simplistic characterization of EXH utilized in this chapter is given in (89) (see the following
chapter for a more involved characterization). It roughly corresponds to only: it takes a set
of alternatives and a proposition as its arguments and asserts that the proposition is true
and that all the alternatives that are not entailed by it are false. The set of alternatives over
which EXH quantifies corresponds in our case to the focus meaning of its sister.
(89) [ EXH 9'c(C, p, w) = 1 iff p(w) = 1 A Vq E C [ p Z q A q(w) = 0 ]
Accordingly, movement of even above the modal and the exhaustification operator, as
sketched in (90-a), results in its prejacent denoting the proposition described in (90-b).
The alternatives in the domain of even are described in (90-c). Clearly, the prejacent given
in (90-b) corresponds to the asserted proposition in (88), while the alternatives in (90-c)
correspond to the alternatives described in (86), as desired.
(90) a. [even C2] [EXH C1] [I hope to find oneF party that cares]
b. that I hope to find one party that cares & it is not the case that I hope to find
two parties that care (- that I hope to find one party that cares & I am okay
with finding exactly one party in w)
c. { that I hope to find n parties that cares & I am okay with finding exactly n
parties in w I n c N>o }
Extra inference about probability
The occurrences of even with a weak prejacent under desire predicates and in imperatives
trigger bias. Similar to what we have done in section 3.2.4, we propose that this bias follows
from the strengthened interpretation of these sentences (91). The desires of the attitude
holder are linked to his pursuits. So, having a weaker desire (= being okay with the weakest
alternative) will result in pursuit of outcomes that correspond to the weaker desire and that
have a lower utility for the attitude holder than the outcomes corresponding to a stronger
desire. This is legitimate only if their expected value is not lower than the expected value
of the outcomes one would pursue if he had a stronger desire. This is the case only if the
likelihood of the latter outcomes is sufficiently low.
(91) [ even ]9'c(C, [ I hope to find oneF party that cares ]9'C, w) =1 iff I hope to
find one party that cares & I am okay with finding exactly one party in w
Restricting overgeneration?
Weak even has a restricted distribution, as we have observed in the introductory chap-
ters. If a grammatical strengthening mechanism is assumed to rescue certain occurrences
of weak even, it has to be explained why it cannot rescue some other occurrences of weak
even. For example, it needs to be explained why weak even cannot occur under epistemic
modals, under intend, under nominal quantifiers, and in simple positive sentences. In all
of these environments strengthening in the scope of even would allow it to trigger a scalar
presupposition compatible with (30).
(92) a. #[even C] [EXH Imodalepist [T ... {even-G} ... XPF ---
b. #[even C] [EXH [intend [ ... {e-e--G}. ... XPF - ]]
c. #[even C] [EXH [everyone/someone [1 ... {even-G} ... XPF ---
d. #[even C] [EXH [T ... XPF ---
3.3.2 Modal semantics
Before proceeding, we briefly introduce the analysis of desire predicates adopted in the fol-
lowing. Desire predicates have a modal semantics that is relativized to two conversational
backgrounds (von Fintel 1999). The first conversational background - the modal base -
delivers a set of doxastically accessible worlds of the attitude holder, while the second con-
versational background - the ordering source - provides the propositions that are used in
ordering this set. The ordering of worlds proceeds in the following manner: The ordering
source g assigns the agent i and the evaluation world w a set of propositions g(i,w). These
propositions are used to define a partial ordering among worlds along the lines of (93); a
strict partial order is derived in the standard way.
(93) a. w' g(i,,) w" df for all p E g(i,w): if w" e p, then w' c p
b. w' <g(i,,) w" =df w' g(i,,) w" and -,(w" g(i,,) w')
The output ordering source corresponds to the set of desires that the agent has at the
evaluation world (94-a). For perspicuity, we assume that among doxastically accessible
worlds one can always find a set of worlds that are not worse (with respect to the given
ordering source) than other doxastically accesible worlds (limit assumption). These worlds
constitute the set of best worlds according to the desires of the agent, which we will simply
call desire-best worlds (94-b). The desire statement a hopes p then states that all the desire-
best worlds for a in w, which are determined by the doxastic modal base f and the bouletic
ordering source g, are such that p is true in them (94-c). The definedness condition of desire
predicates is that their propositional argument is independent from the beliefs of the attitude
holder (see the discussion in the preceding section).
(94) a. g(i,w) = {p p is a desire of i in w}
b. BEST(X,Y) {w I w E X and there is no w' c X such that w' <y w}
c. If defined, [ hope ]9'c(f, g, p, i, w) = Vw' E BEST(Of(i,w), g(i,w)) [ p(w') = 1
The semantics of the imperative operator is analogous to (94-c), though its presuppositions
are different: besides the independence presupposition, it also triggers an authority presup-
position responsible for its performative nature (cf. Schwager 2005).
In this approach, desire predicates clearly denote upward-monotone functions. This is
demonstrated in (95): if I hope to make two videos, then all my desire-best worlds are such
that I make two videos in them (95-b); it follows that all my desire-best worlds are such that
I make one video in them (95-c) and, thus, I hope to make one video (95-d).
(95) a. If defined, [ I hope to make two videos ]9,'
b. = { w Vw' E BEST(nf(i,w), g(i,w)) [ [ I make two videos ]9'c(w') = 1 ] }
c. C { w Vw' E BEST(ff(i,w), g(i,w)) [ [ I make one video ]9'c(w') 1 1 }
d. = [ I hope to make one video 19,c
3.3.3 Consistency and plausibility of the scalar presupposition
Consistency
Our running example in this section will be the sentence in (96-a), which may have i.a.
the LFs in (96-bc). Neither of these LFs results in a felicitous interpretation: the scalar
presupposition triggered by even is inconsistent. Namely, the prejacent of even in both
(96-b) and (96-c) is entailed by all of the alternatives and, consequently, cannot be less likely
than them - the scalar presuppositions violate the principle in (30).
(96) a. I hope to find even ONE party that cares for the people
b. [I hope [even C4] [I find oneF party that cares]]
c. [even C4] [I hope [I find oneF party that cares]]
However, the sentence in (96-a) has another parse, given in (97): there is an intervening EXH
operator between scoped even and the desire predicate. EXH associates with the focused
element. We compute the meaning of the structure stepwise; we pay special attention to the
domains of the two alternative-sensitive operators, even and EXH.
(97) [even C 4] EXH C2 [I 9 hope [PRO9 to find oneF party]]
First: The domain of EXH in (97) consists of the focus alternatives to the sister of EXH. The
assertive meaning of the sister of EXH is computed in (98) where f and g are the modal base
and the ordering source, respectively.25 (98) also introduces the following shorthand: 'OIone'
stands for the proposition that I hope to find one party that cares and 'O!one' stands for
the proposition that I am okay with finding exactly one party. The focus alternatives to the
sister of EXH are given in (99).
25We have left the conversational background variables out of our syntactic representations for perspicuity
reasons. We also ignore the independence presupposition of hope.
(98) [ I 9 hope [PRO9 to find oneF party ]9' -
Aw. Vw' E BEST(Of(i,w), g(I,w)) [ [ I find one party ]9,'(w') = 1 ] [lone
(99) C2 = F(I 9 hope [PRO9 to find oneF party) = {[one, Ltwo, Othree, ...}
Second: EXH strengthens the proposition in (98) as in (100). We get the meaning that I
hope to find one party that cares and that it is not the case that I hope to find two parties
that care. This is equivalent to the proposition that I hope to find one party that cares and
that I am okay with finding exactly one party that cares. The focus alternatives to the sister
of scoped even in (97) and thus its domain are given in (101).
(100) [ [EXH C2] [I 9 hope [PRO9 to find oneF party] ]g'"c [ EXH ]gc({[lone, [ltwo,
othree, ... }, [one) = [one A -[ltwo = [one A O!one
(101) C4 = F([EXH C 2] [I 9 hope [PRO9 to find oneF party]]) = {[one A O!one,
[ltwo A O!two, othree A O!three ...}
The meaning of the structure in (97) is computed in (102). It triggers the scalar presuppo-
sition that there is an alternative that is more likely than that I hope to find one party that
cares and I am okay with finding exactly one party.
(102) [ (97) ]9c(w) is defined only if - E { [lone A O!one, Otwo A O!two, ... }: [one A
O!one <c q. If defined, [ (102-a) ]9'c(w) = 1 iff I hope to find one party that cares
& I am okay with finding exactly one party in w
The scalar presupposition of the sentence is consistent since the alternatives over which even
quantifies are mutually exclusive (103). That is, it is compatible with the principle in (30).
The question is now in what contexts is the scalar presupposition plausible.
(103) Vp, q G { [one A O!one, [ltwo A O!two, [lthree A O!three, ...}: p c -q
Plausibility
The presupposition of even in (102) is consistent but it is not trivial - it is not satisfied in
all contexts and by all likelihood orderings. As we will see, the question in what contexts
it is satisfied effectively reduces to the question in what contexts it is less likely that I am
okay with finding exactly one party that cares for the people than, say, that I am okay with
finding exactly two parties that care for the people. Such an ordering obtains in contexts in
which it is taken for granted that finding exactly two parties or more that care for the people
is more desirable than finding exactly one party that cares for the people, i.e. in contexts in
which it is taken for granted that I would be happier if I found exactly two or more parties
that care than if I found exactly one party.
(104) Satisfying contexts
It holds that for one to find exactly n parties that care for the people is more
desirable than for one to find exactly n-1 parties that care for the people
(104) describes a very natural disposition. And it is clear why in such a context it is less
likely that one is okay with finding exactly one party that cares than that one is okay with
finding exactly two parties - namely the conditional relation in (105) obtains but not its
reverse in (106).
(105) If I am okay with finding exactly one party that cares and I take it to be possible
that I find exactly two parties that care, then I am okay with finding exactly two
parties that care /
(106) If I am okay with finding exactly two parties that care and I take it to be possible
that I find exactly one party that care, then I am okay with finding exactly one
party that cares #
We can build on this in our derivation of the correctness of (102). Namely, besides (105),
the conditional relations in (107) also obtain in the context at hand:
(107) If I hope to find one party that cares and I take it to be possible that I find two
parties that care, then I hope to find two parties that care /
Taken together, (105)-(107) strongly suggest that the correctness of the scalar presupposition
in (102), repeated below, in the described context: if it holds that stronger alternatives are
better than weaker alternatives, then it is less likely that one hopes for a weaker alternative
and is okay with only it obtaining than that one hopes for a stronger alternative and is okay
with only it obtaining.
(102) 3q E { Zone A O!one, OLtwo A O!two, ... }: Zone A O!one <, q
If the context were different and, say, it was taken for granted that finding exactly
one party that cares is more desirable than, say, finding exactly two parties that care, the
conditional relation in (108) but not its reverse would obtain; the scalar presupposition would
be implausible.
(108) If I am okay with finding exactly one parties that care and I take it to be possible
that I find exactly one party that care, then I am okay with finding exactly one
party that cares
If it was open in the context what the preference relation is between the two propositions,
the plausibility of the scalar presupposition could not be determined and the sentence would
either be deviant or an appropriate preference relation would be accommodated.
Comparison with (Kadmon & Landman 1993)
The above discussion arguably identified the same conditions for the plausibility of the
scalar presupposition triggered by weak even in desire statements that have been identified
as necessary conditions for the felicity of stressed any in the scope of glad by Kadmon &
Landman (1993). In their discussion of the occurrence of stressed any in the scope of glad,
they introduce the notions of "narrow wish" and "wide wish" as in (109) and (110) (Kadmon
& Landman 1993:387):
(109) a. I'm glad that a linguist likes me
b. Wide wish: I want a linguist to like me
(110) a. I'm glad that a phonologist likes me
b. Narrow wish: I want a phonologist to like me
Let us assume that the domain of anyone in (111) consists of linguists and that its alternative
is a domain that consists of phonologists.
(111) I'm glad that ANYONE likes me
They point out that stressed anyone is licensed under glad in (111) in contexts in which
"the 'real wish' is identified with the 'narrow wish' [(110) ]," which "establishes a particular
relation between the 'narrow wish' and the 'wide wish': it determines that the 'narrow
wish' is PREFERRED relative to the 'wide wish' " (Kadmon & Landman 1993:387). It
consequently holds that
if I am glad about the satisfaction of the 'wide wish', then GIVEN THAT I
WOULD PREFER TO HAVE THE 'NARROW WISH' SATISFIED, if the 'nar-
row wish' were to be satisfied I would surely be glad about that.
They conclude that this suffices for the licensing of anyone in (111). We return to this in the
final section of the chapter, for now we just translate Kadmon and Landman's observations
into our terminology. First: the identification of the 'narrow wish' with the 'real wish' in
(110) expresses that a phonologist liking me is more desirable than other linguists liking me
(112). This parallels our condition in (104) and also arguably underlies the turn of phrase
that the 'narrow wish' is preferred relative to the 'wide wish.'
(112) It holds that for a phonologist to like me is more desirable than for a non-phonologist
linguist to like me
Second: the counterfactual conditional relation that they discuss in the quote corresponds
to (105) and (107) in our discussion, which are evaluated as true in the contexts in which
(104) is satisfied. The problem with Kadmon and Landman relying on the single conditional
in the quote is that the reverse of the conditional is also true (113) - at least if we assume
that glad is upward-monotone. Accordingly, unless one adopts a non-monotone semantics of
glad, the cited conditional does not actually achieve what it is meant to achieve - support
the idea that embedding stressed any under glad results in "strengthening" (cf. also the
discussion of (101) and (102) in Kadmon & Landman 1993:388 and the final section of this
chapter).
(113) If I am glad about the satisfaction of the 'narrow wish', then I am glad about the
satisfaction of the 'wide wish'
Exclusive associates
An issue emerges with examples in which the alternatives to the sister of even at surface
structure are mutually exclusive. As we have discussed in section 3.2.6, the (a)-sentences in
the following examples entail the (b)-sentences rather than the (c)-sentences.
(74) a. Mary hopes that her daughter will win even a BRONZE medal
b. -> Mary hopes that her daughter will win at least a bronze medal
c. * Mary hopes hthat her daughter will win a bronze medal
(75) a. I hope to be even just an ASSISTANT professor when I retire
b. -> I hope to be at least an assistant professor when I retire
c. * I hope to be an assistant professor when I retire
As it stands, the above account makes the opposite prediction. This is illustrated in (114):
Since the focus alternatives in the domain of EXH are mutually exclusive, EXH is effectively
redundant. The meaning that is assigned to the structure in (114-a) is given in (114-d) and
does not correspond to the intuitions about the sentence, even though the scalar presuppo-
sition is consistent and plausible in contexts in which winning shinier medals is preferred to
winning the bronze medal.
(114) a. [even C 4] [EXH C 2] [I hope her daughter wins a bronzeF medal]
b. C2 ={ obronze, Esilver, ogold }
c. C4 ={ Ebronze, osilver, [Ogold }
d. [ (114-a) ]9'c(w) is defined only if ]q c { Ebronze, Osilver, Elgold }: lbronze
<c q. If defined, [ (114-a) ]9'c(w) - 1 iff I hope her daughter win a bronze
medal in w
We propose to resolve the issue as in section 3.2.6: there is a covert existential or disjunctive
operator in the sentential complement of the (a)-sentences in (74) and (75). The operator
quantifies over the alternatives determined by the focus structure of its complement and
asserts that its propositional argument or a less likely alternative is true.
(115) [ AT LEAST ]9gc( , C, p , w) = 1 iff 3r E C [ ( r <c p ) A ( r(w)=1)
The (a)-sentences in (74) and (75) thus have a structure along the lines of (116-a) where
three particles associate with the focused element: even, EXH and AT LEAST.
(116) a. [even C 2] [EXH C 1] [Mary hopes [xp [AT LEAST Co] her daughter will
win a bronzeF medal]]
b. Co ={bronze, silver, gold}
c. [ XP ] 9'c = bronze V silver V gold
d. C1 = {O(bronze V silver V gold), E(silver V gold), Ligold}
e. C2 = {Io (bronze V silver V gold) A Obronze, oI(silver V gold) A Osilver, oEgold}
The meaning of the structure is computed in (117). It corresponds to the intuitions reported
for (74) and (75) above. Furthermore, the scalar presupposition is consistent since the
alternatives in the domain of even are mutually exclusive. It is plausible in contexts in
which winning a shinier medal is more desirable than winning a bronze medal.
(117) 1 (117-a) ]9 'c(w) is defined only if 3q c { O(bronze V silver V gold) A Obronze,
o(silver V gold) A Osilver, Dgold }: o(bronze V silver V gold) A Obronze <c q.
If defined, [ (117-a) ]9'c(w) = 1 iff Mary hopes that her daughter will win a medal
& she is okay with her winning a bronze medal in w
3.3.4 Extra inference about probability
This brief subsection reproduces the discussion in section 3.2.4: Desires are inextricably
linked with the acts that the attitude holder performs to bring about these desires. Thus,
having a weaker desire will effectively result in pursuit of the outcomes corresponding to the
weak desire whose utility is lower than the utility of the outcomes one would pursue if one
had a stronger desire - a consequence of the scalar presupposition triggered by weak even.
For a value maximizer, this is only legitimate if the expected value of the former outcomes
is not lower than that of the latter outcomes. This is only possible if the probability of the
latter is sufficiently lower than that of the former. The low probability bias follows.
3.3.5 Beliefs, intentions and commands
Weak even is not licensed (i) under epistemic attitude predicates like believe and know, (ii)
under attitude predicates like intend and plan, and (iii) under certain directive predicates.
The relevant examples with infelicitous weak even are given in (118)-(120).
(118) Doxastic and epistemic attitude predicates
a. #Mary believes John found even ONE party that cares for the people
b. #John knows that Mary got even ONE cent for every case that the police have
messed up
(119) #Mary intends to find even ONE party that cares for the people
(120) Directive attitude predicates (class 1)
# Mary ordered/commanded John to find even ONE party that cares for the people
(121) Directive attitude predicates (class 2)
a. Mary challenged John to find even ONE party that cares for the people
b. I urge you to plant even ONE seed of this tuber
The data in (118)-(120) is at first sight problematic for our account because the same
mechanism that we have applied to rescue structures where weak even is embedded under
desire predicates like wish, would like and glad could be applied to (118)-(120). Namely, the
crucial component of our account was that we assigned sentences like (122-a) the structure in
(122-b) where the scalar operator moves above the desire predicate wish and an intervening
exhaustification operator. Consequently, the prejacent of even is assigned the meaning in
(122-c) which does not stand in an entailment relation to its alternatives, e.g. (122-d). This
is sufficient for the scalar presupposition triggered by even to be consistent.
(122) a. I wish I had even one cent for every case that the police have messed up
b. [even C 1] [EXH Co] [I wish I had oneF cent for every case that ...]
c. I wish I had one cent for every case that the police have messed up & I am
okay with exactly one cent for every case that the police have messed up
d. I wish I had two cents for every case that the police have messed up & I am
okay with exactly two cents for every case that the police have messed up
The application of the same process does not seem to suffice in the cases of (118)-(120).
That is, in contrast to desire sentences, an exhaustification of doxastic and epistemic sen-
tences, sentences with intend and class 1 directive sentences is not enough for the scalar
presuppositions of those sentences to be acceptable.
(123) a. #John believes that Mary got even ONE cent for every case the police have
messed up
b. [even C1] [EXH Co] [John believes that Mary got oneF cent for every
case that the police have messed up]
c. John believes that Mary got one cent for every case that the police have messed
up & John believes that Mary might have got exactly one cent for every case
that the police have messed up
d. John believes that Mary got two cents for every case that the police have
messed up & John believes that Mary might have got exactly two cents for
every case that the police have messed up
As we have accentuated above, compatibility with (30) is a necessary condition for the scalar
presupposition triggered by even to be acceptable. However, it is not a sufficient condition -
the scalar presupposition must also be plausible in the respective context. We suggest in the
following that the scalar presuppositions triggered by even in (118)-(120) are implausible.
Beliefs
The scalar presupposition of even in desire statements was shown to be licit due to the fact
that it is natural to prefer stronger alternatives to weaker alternatives. In such contexts,
appropriate conditional relations can be established that support the presupposed likelihood
relation. When we shift from priority to doxastic or epistemic modality, parallel conditions
on the context fail to obtain. That is, in no natural context may we conclude from someone
believing that it may be the case that only the weakest alternative is true that they also
believe that it may be the case that only a stronger alternative is true. Furthermore, in
no natural context may we conclude from someone believing that a weak alternative is true
to them also believing that a stronger alternative is true. Thus, belief has no constitutive
property that would allow us to evaluate the scalar presupposition triggered by even in
(123-b), given in (124), as correct.
(124) [ (123-b) ]' is defined only if -q e C1 :
John believes that Mary got one cent for every case that the police have messed
up & John believes that Mary might have got exactly one cent for every case
that the police have messed up <c q
Intentions and commands
Similar considerations apply to intend and command. Namely, intend and command also do
not license the type of conditional considerations that we utilized in arguing for the correct-
ness of scalar presuppositions with desire statements. Furthermore, as we have indicated in
section (66), there is no aspect of the meaning of these predicates that scalar reasoning could
latch on that would support the scalar presupposition triggered by weak even. Accordingly,
weak even is pragmatically deviant under intend and command.
This changes with challenge. The reason for this is that it has a component of meaning
that can be utilized in scalar reasoning: it requires the challenged task to be hard. Since it
naturally holds that more difficult tasks qualify as more reasonable challenges, it may very
well be less likely that someone is challenged to do the easiest task rather than a harder task.
3.3.6 Two puzzles about overgeneration
Covert exhaustification may apply in the absence of intensional operators. Accordingly, it
could be used to rescue weak even in non-intensional sentences - in simple episodic sentences
and under nominal quantifiers. We describe the issues in the following but leave them open
for later investigation.
Simple episodic sentences
The sentence in (125) should be rescuable by covert exhaustification. Namely, it could be
parsed as in (126-a). The scalar presupposition in (126-b) is consequently compatible with
(30). Furthermore, it may very well be the case that it is least likely that John read exactly
one book. That is, the presupposition in (126-b) is plausible in certain contexts. However,
the sentence in (125) is judged to be deviant even in such contexts.
(125) #John read even ONE book
(126) a. [even C1] [EXH C0] [ John read oneF book]
b. [ (126-a) ]g,' is defined only if 3q E { that John read exactly n books | N>o }:
that John read exactly one book <c q
Nominal quantifiers
The second type of quantificational environment in which it might be expected that exhausti-
fication of the associate of even might yield a licit interpretation involves argument positions
of upward-monotone nominal quantifiers. However, as indicated in (127), such quantifiers
do not allow even with weak prejacents in their scope.
(127) Upward-monotone quantifiers
a. #Everyone got even ONE cent for every case that the police have messed up
b. #Someone got even ONE cent for every case that the police have messed up
(128) a. #Everyone got even ONE cent
b. [even C2] [EXH C1] [everyone [jeven0-G2 ti got oneF cent]]
3.4 Negative polarity items
This section extends our account of weak even in the scope of desire predicates and im-
peratives to occurrences of NPIs in these environments. As we have done in chapter 2, we
treat NPIs as being potentially licensed by a covert even. Since this effectively reduces the
licensing requirements of respective NPIs to those of weak even, it allows us to explain their
context-dependence in desire statements.
3.4.1 A statement of the puzzle
Similar to occurrences of NPIs under non-monotone quantifiers, the occurrences of NPIs in
the scope of desire predicates and in imperatives, illustrated in (129), are unexpected on the
semantic characterization of NPI licensing conditions in (130). Namely, desire predicates are
either non-monotonic operators (see section 3.2) or they are upward-monotonic operators
(see section 3.3) - in any case, they are not (Strawson) downward-entailing.
(129) a. I am glad that ANYONE likes me (Kadmon & Landman 1993)
b. Find me a politician that EVER cared for us AT ALL
c. He wished ANYONE AT ALL would look at him with that same love and
sweetness
(130) NPI licensing condition
Some NPIs (any, ever) are only grammatical if they are in the scope of a Strawson
DE operator. Other NPIs (in weeks) are only grammatical if they are in the scope
of an anti-additive operator
A possible response to the data in (129) is to redefine the licensing conditions of NPIs. At
least two approaches have been proposed that assume licensing conditions that are different
from those in (130): the first approach requires NPIs to occur under non-upward-entailing
operators (Progovac 1994:279), while the second approach requires NPIs to occur under non-
veridical operators where non-veridicality is defined as in (131) (e.g. Giannakidou 1998).
(131) Non-veridicality
A propositional operator F is veridical iff Fp entails p
Such responses leave one crucial aspect of the data in (129) unexplained: their context-
dependence. For example, Kadmon & Landman (1993:388) point out that (131-a) is only
felicitous in contexts in which the attitude holder has a definite preference for a certain
subset of people in the domain of anyone to like him. In this respect, the sentences in
(129) resemble the occurrences of weak even in the scope of desire predicates that we have
discussed above.
3.4.2 Derivation: licensing by EVEN
As we have done for NPIs occurring under non-monotone operators in chapter 2, we propose
that NPIs in (129) are licensed by a covert even. That is, any and ever are licensed under
desire predicate if and only if there is a covert even in the structure that associates with
their domains and that triggers a scalar presupposition that is satisfied in the context.
Background assumptions on NPI licensing
We briefly recapitulate the core assumptions about NPI licensing that we adopt and that
we have discussed in greater detail in chapter 2. First: Any and ever have the meanings
of regular nominal and adverbial indefinites. Second: We assume that they have inherently
focused domains (cf. Krifka 1995, Chierchia 2010 for a more sophisticated analysis). For
example, the meaning of anyone is given in (132-a); its alternatives are in (132-b).
(132) a. [ [any DFJ one g,c AP(,et). Aws. 3x [ D(x) A person(x) A P(x,w) ]
b. F([any DFJ one) ={ AP. Aw. Ex [ D'(x) A person(x) A P(x,w) I I D' G D }
Third: Alternatives induced by any and ever must be exhaustified, i.e. an appropriate
alternative-sensitive operator must associate with the focused domains of any and ever. The
NPIs are consequently 'licensed' if the inferences triggered by the respective alternative-
sensitive operator are licit. One such alternative-sensitive operator is a covert even, which
we represent with EVEN. Its meaning is identical to the meaning of even:
(133) I EVEN ]g,c(C, p, w) is defined only if 1q E C [ p <]c q].
If defined, [ EVEN ]gI9c(C p, W) - 1 iff p(w) 1
Derivation: consistency
If the sentence in (134-a) is parsed without an exhaustification operator, EVEN triggers a
presupposition that violates the condition in (30), regardless of whether it is generated in
the embedded or in the matrix clause.2 6 For example, if EVEN is located in the matrix
clause, the alternatives over which it quantifies are those given in (134-c). All of them entail
the prejacent (134-d) and so it cannot be the case that one of them is more likely than the
prejacent - the scalar presupposition triggered by EVEN is incorrect.
(134) a. He wished ANYONE AT ALL would look at him
b. [EVEN C 1] [he wished anyoneDr would look at him]
c. {that he wished that there would be an x in D' that looked at him I D' C D}
d. Vq E (134-c): q => that he wished that there would be an x in D that looked
at him
An insertion of the exhaustification operator is thus necessary, just as it was with weak
even. The relevant parse of (134-a) is given in (135-a) where EVEN scopes above EXH and
the attitude predicate and associates with the domain of the NPI. For simplicity, we assume
that the domain of anyone consists of three individuals: a, b, c. This means that the domain
of EXH is the one given in (135-b).
(135) a. [EVEN C 1] [EXH Co] [he wished [anyoneDF would look at him]
26We rely in the following on the modal approach to desire predicates, though this is not crucial.
b. Co ={that he wished that there would be an x in D' that looked at him I D'
C {a,b,c}}
The meaning of the exhaustified clause in (135-a) is that the prejacent of EXH is true and
that all the alternatives that are not identical with it are false (136). Namely, none of the
alternatives except the prejacent itself is entailed by the prejacent.
(136) that he wished that there would be an x in {a,b,c} that looked at him & VD' C {a,
b, c}: -,(that he wished that there would be an x in D' that looked at him)
This meaning is identical with (137) - this is the so-called free choice interpretation of any
in the scope of a universal modal (cf. Fox 2007 for disjunction under universal modals). This
is then the assertive meaning of (135-a), which is intuitively correct.
(137) that he wished that there would be an x in {a,b,c} that looked at him
& that he would be okay if a looked at him
& that he would be okay if b looked at him
& that he would be okay if c looked at him
The domain of EVEN in (135-a) is described in (138). All of the propositions in (138) are
mutually exclusive.
(138) { that he wished that there would be an x in D' that looked at him & Vx c D': he
would be okay if x looked at him I D' C {a,b,c} }
Accordingly, the scalar presupposition that EVEN in (135-a) triggers, given in (139), is com-
patible with the condition in (30): since all the alternatives are mutually exclusive, there
may very well be one alternative that is more likely than the prejacent.
(139) [ (135-a) ]J9' is defined only if ]q E (138):
that he wished that there would be an x in {a,b,c} that looked at him & Vx E
{a,b,c}: he would be okay if x looked at him <,c q
Derivation: plausibility
The scalar presupposition in (139) is satisfied in contexts in which there exists a subset D' of
{a,b,c} that is such that the attitude holder would find it better to be looked at by anyone in
D- "the desirable observers" - than by anyone in {a,b,c}-D' - "the undesirable observers."
Namely, it is more likely (a) that the attitude holder would wish that someone from the
"desirable observers" would look at him and that for every "desirable observer" he would
be okay with them looking at him than (b) that he would wish that someone from {a,b,c}
- which includes the "undesirable observers" - would look at him and that for everyone in
{a,b,c} he would be okay with them looking at him. For example, assume that the domain of
anyone in (135-a) contains a group of really important people and that the attitude holder
prefers to be looked at by important people than by unimportant people. It is more likely
(a) that he would wish to be looked at by the really important people and be okay with
anyone of the really important people looking at him than (b) that he would wish to be
looked at by unimportant or important people and be okay with anyone of the important
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and unimportant people looking at him. Thus, the scalar presupposition in (139) is satisfied
in such a context. On the other hand, if the attitude holder is indifferent between being
looked at by a, b or c, the scalar presupposition in (139) cannot be evaluated as correct.
Derivation: factive desire predicates
An analogous derivation applies to Kadmon and Landman's examples of NPIs under factive
desire predicates. For example, the sentence in (140-a) has the structure in (140-b). It
triggers the two presuppositions in (141) - a factive presupposition due to glad (140-i) and a
scalar presupposition due to EVEN (140-ii). The latter is consistent and plausible in contexts
in which one prefers to be liked by some subset D' of people in the domain D of anyone.
This parallels the observations by Kadmon and Landman.
(140) a. I am glad that ANYONE likes me
b. [EVEN C 1] [EXH Co] [I'm glad anyoneDF likes me]
(141) f (140-b) ]I9,(w) is defined only if
(i) (I believe that) someone likes me in w,
(ii) -q e { that I am glad that an x in D' likes me & Vx E D': I am okay with x
liking me I D' C D }: that I am glad that an x in D likes me & Vx E D: I am
okay with x liking me <, q
However, we make a slightly different prediction with respect to what alternatives in
fact have to obtain for (140) to be felicitous than what Kadmon and Landman say is the
case. More to the point, they say that (140) conveys "the message that my 'real wish' is not
satisfied" (Kadmon & Landman 1993:387), the 'real wish' being in our case that someone
from D' likes me. We predict that this does not have to be the case - it is compatible with
(141-i) that someone from D' likes me. However, we do make a weaker prediction that it
is unlikely that someone from D' likes me, which is derived as in the preceding section (low
probability bias). This prediction seems to be borne out in light of the following data:
(142) a. I'm glad that ANYONE, let alone the greatest player, is doing something to
help out those who were greatly harmed by the shutdown
b. I was being sincere, your Italian is good and I was just happy that someone,
anyone (let alone you!) is bringing to light medieval, dialectical Italian"
c. Considering that none of us were even supposed to get this we should be happy
that we have anything, let alone an app that streams this well28
A final remark concerning Kadmon and Landman's proposal relates to the semantics
of glad that they must adopt for their account of the distribution of (stressed) any to go
through. As we have indicated in section 3.3.3, Kadmon and Landman attempt to show
that in an appropriate context strengthening is satisfied if we use any under glad. The
2 7http://www.richardthompson-music.com/...
28 http://androidforums.com/...
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core ingredient of their derivation that purports to show this is the following counterfactual
(Kadmon & Landman 1993:387):
if I am glad about the satisfaction of the 'wide wish' [= proposition denoted
by the embedded clause with any], then GIVEN THAT I WOULD PREFER
TO HAVE THE 'NARROW WISH' SATISFIED, if the 'narrow wish' were to
be satisfied I would surely be glad about that [= the relevant alternative to the
embedded clause with any].
However, since they define strengthening as in (143) (Kadmon & Landman 1993:369), the
truth of the above conditional does not guarantee strengthening if glad is upward-entailing
- it only guarantees that widening under glad does not weaken the statement in appropriate
contexts. To keep (143) and their account of any under glad, Kadmon and Landman must
assume that glad is non-monotone.
(143) Any is licensed only if the widening that it induces creates a stronger statement
Derivation: restricted distribution
Finally, the restriction of NPIs to desire statements and imperatives (and DE and non-
monotone environments) follows in our system from the same grounds that were responsible
for the infelicity of weak even in other environments, as discussed in section 3.3.5: although
the scalar presupposition triggered by EVEN is consistent, it is not plausible with epistemics,
intend and under certain directive predicates.
(144) a. #I believe that ANYONE likes me
b. #Mary intends to find a politician that EVER cared for us AT ALL
(145) a. I challenge ANYONE AT ALL to defeat me at tetris
b. #Mary commanded me to find a politician that EVER cared for us AT ALL
3.4.3 Conclusion
We have derived the distribution, context-dependence and semantic import of stressed NPIs
in desire statements and imperatives from the assumption that they are licensed by a covert
even (Krifka 1995). This assumption effectively reduced the licensing requirements of NPIs
in desire statements and imperatives to those of weak even.
We have pointed out in the first and second chapter that there are two "recalcitrant
arenas" of NPI licensing that are not subsumed by the classical characterization that NPIs are
licensed in Strawson DE environments - licensing by non-monotone quantifiers and licensing
by desire predicates. We have shown that the heavily context-dependent felicity of NPIs in
these two types of environments can be given a uniform explanation by assuming that the
distribution of NPIs may be governed by a covert even.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we looked at occurrences of weak even in desire statements as well as in
imperatives and under certain modals. There are two prominent approaches to semantics
of desire. On the first approach, which has been propounded by Heim (1992) and others,
desire predicates are non-monotone operators. This approach has the welcome consequence
of allowing us to, without further ado, subsume weak even in desire statements (and impera-
tives, on certain assumptions) under the prediction from the introductory chapter, repeated
in (146). Furthermore, the approach provides for a straightforward explanation of why weak
even is restricted to only non-doxastic modal environments - doxastic modalities have an
upward-entailing semantics.
(146) A prediction of the scope-theoretic approach to even
A sentence with a weak even may be acceptable if even is at surface structure in the
scope of a (Strawson) downward-monotone operator or a non-monotone operator,
i.e. in the scope of a non-upward-monotone operator
However, the greatest strength of the approach for our purposes turns out to also be its
greatest weakness. As we discuss in detail in the appendix, desire predicates do appear to
behave like upward-entailing operators. In response to this, we provided an explanation of
the phenomena in a more standard modal analysis. We proposed that weak even is rescued in
modal environments by the insertion of an exhaustification operator above the modals. We
have argued that its restricted distribution can to a great extent be explained by showing
that the scalar presupposition in many other environments cannot be evaluated as true.
However, some issues persist - in particular, the question of what prevents exhaustification
from rescuing weak even in positive episodic sentences.
Finally, in parallel to our strategy in chapter 2, we extended the analysis of weak even
in desire statements and imperatives to ill-understood occurrences of NPIs in these environ-
ments by assuming that their licensing is governed by a covert even. We showed that the
strong correlation between the behavior of weak even and NPIs in these environments - e.g.
they exhibit the same kind of context-dependence - can be given a uniform explanation.
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CHAPTER 4
Concessive scalar particles
There is an assortment of challenges that polarity items like any and ever pose for linguistic
theory. The two most prominent ones have been, on the one hand, finding an adequate
description of their distribution (Ladusaw 1979, von Fintel 1999 and others) and, on the
other hand, providing an explanation of this distribution (Krifka 1995, Chierchia 2006 and
others). A further challenge has been accounting for the variation in the distribution of
different polarity items. For example, certain polarity items have been claimed to occur only
in downward-entailing (DE) contexts - e.g. ever - while others may additionally occur in
modal contexts and, with some qualifications, in positive episodic sentences - e.g. any.
Analogous challenges are posed to linguistic theory by the different distributions of scalar
particles, which to great extent mirror what we find in the domain of polarity items. For
example, certain scalar particles (or collocations of particles) have been claimed to occur only
in DE contexts - e.g. auch nur in German (Guerzoni 2003) - while others are distributed
more freely - e.g. mdme in French.
This chapter tackles a class of expressions that have been characterized as concessive
scalar additive particles (Giannakidou 2007, Alonso-Ovalle 2009, Lahiri 2010). The repre-
sentatives of this class are magari in Slovenian, esto ke in Greek (Giannakidou 2007), and
aunque sea and siquiera in Spanish (Alonso-Ovalle 2009, Lahiri 2010). We will use the
expression magari* as a blanket concessive scalar additive particle.
Magari * has a restricted distribution: it occurs in a variety of DE contexts, in questions,
as well as under desire predicates, priority' modals and in imperatives. It associates with a
weak element in its immediate scope. The three definitive semantic characteristics of magari *
are (i) that it triggers a scalar inference comparable to that triggered by weak even, (ii) that
it often appears to trigger an additive inference and (iii) that it is in certain enviromnents
glossed with at least, which is taken to reflect its so-called concessive nature.
'Priority modals include deontic, bouletic and teleological modals (Portner 2009 for classification).
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We account for the distribution and semantic import of magari* by treating it as being
morphologically complex: it consists of a scalar component EVEN and an existential com-
ponent AT LEAST. The distribution of magari* is governed by the inferences that these
two components give rise to. In positive episodic environments, magari* is marked because
an inconsistent meaning is generated. In DE environments, magari* may be licit if EVEN
scopes above the DE operator, stranding AT LEAST in its base position. Finally, in modal
environments, magari* may be licit if EVEN scopes above the modal and the stranded AT
LEAST gets a free choice interpretation.
The semantic import of magari* supervenes on the semantic contributions of its compo-
nents: (i) the scalar inference is triggered by EVEN, while (ii) the apparent additive inference
is conditioned by AT LEAST; (iii) the so-called concessive flavor that magari* exhibits in cer-
tain environments echoes the free choice interpretation of AT LEAST in those environments
and the scalar inference triggered by EVEN.
4.1 Distribution
There are three main types of environments in which magari * may occur: DE environments,
modal environments and questions (Giannakidou 2007, Alonso-Ovalle 2009, Lahiri 2010). In
all of these environments, magari* associates with a weak element in its immediate scope. It
is glossed with even or at least in English; the two glosses vary depending on the embedding
operator. We ignore some minor differences in the distribution of magari* across languages
- e.g. aunque sea in Spanish may only occur in subjunctive environments, arguably due to
its subjunctive morphology (Lahiri 2010).
4.1.1 Positive episodic environments
Magari* is infelicitous in upward-entailing (UE) episodic environments. It does not make a
difference if the associate of magari* is interpreted as the lowest or as the highest element on
a pragmatic scale (1). In this respect it crucially differs from English even, which may in UE
contexts associate with an element that is highest on a pragmatic scale. This is illustrated
by the felicitous gloss in (1).
(1) *Janez je prebral magari Sintaktidne strukture
Janez aux read magari Syntactic Structures
'John read even Syntactic Structures'
Re-interpreting the sentence as expressing epistemic uncertainty does not improve its felicity.
This holds even in cases where magari* is in the scope of disjunction, which has been claimed
to be able to rescue certain polarity items in episodic environments, e.g. vreun in Romanian
(Falaus 2011).
(2) *Janez je prebral LGB ali pa magari Sintaktidne strukture
Janez aux read LGB or prt magari Syntactic Structures
'John read LGB or even Syntactic Structures'
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4.1.2 Downward-entailing environments
Magari* occurs in a variety of (Strawson) DE environments. Most prominently, it is licensed
in the restrictor of the universal quantifier and in the antecedent clause of the conditional.
This is illustrated by the examples in (3) where the focused associates of magari are bronze
and the weak predicate one. (4) contains sentences showing that magari is licensed under
without and doubt.2 In all DE environments, magari* is glossed with even.
(3) a. Vsak student, ki je resil magari ENO samo nalogo, je zdelal izpit
every student who aux solved magari one alone exercise has passed exam
'Every student that solved even one single exercise passed the exam'
b. Ce Peter osvoji magari BRONASTO medaljo, bo postal junak
if Peter wins magari bronze medal will become hero
'If Peter wins even (just) the bronze medal, he will become a hero'
(4) a. Janez je koneal letnik brez da bi resil magari ENO nalogo
Janez aux finished year without that aux solve magari one exercise
'John finished the school year without solving even one exercise'
b. Janez dvomi, da bo Peter odgovoril na magari ENO vprasanje
Janez doubts that aux Peter answer on magari one question
'John doubts that Peter will answer even one question'
Lahiri (2010) notes that magari* - aunque sea in Spanish - in conditionals and under
universal quantifiers is subject to two constraints which he describes along the following lines:
the antecedent and restrictor clauses in which magari* is generated must be pragmatically
weaker than its alternatives, while the matrix clause has to be pragmatically stronger than its
alternatives. For example, although the matrix clause in (5-b) is pragmatically stronger than
its alternatives, the antecedent clause is not pragmatically weaker. On the other hand, (5-a)
satisfies both conditions: the matrix clause is pragmatically strong, while the antecedent
clause is pragmatically weak.
(5) a. Si lees aunque sea UN libro, vas a aprobar
if you read magari* one book, you will pass
b. #Si lees aunque sea CINCO libros, vas a suspender el examen
if you read magari* five books you will fail the exam
c. #Si lees aunque sea UN libro, vas a suspender el examen
if you read magari* one book, you will fail the exam
d. #Si lees aunque sea CINCO libros, vas a aprobar
if you read magari* five books you will pass
2It has been observed that magari* might have a slightly narrower distribution in DE contexts than
some NPIs. More to the point, its distribution has been claimed to resemble that of Krifka's (1995) 'strong
NPIs' (cf. Alonso-Ovalle 2009). We leave the weighing of different licensing DE environments of magari*
for another occasion, esp. because there seems to be cross-speaker variation, as has also been observed with
respect to 'strong NPIs' by Krifka (1995).
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Finally, it should be mentioned that magari* is not licensed under clausemate negation,
unless the negation is in a DE context (there is some cross-linguistic variation in this respect).
This flip-flop behavior resembles that of positive polarity items and is illustrated in (6).
(6) a. #Peter ni osvojil magari BRONASTE medalje
Peter not win magari bronze medal
'Peter didn't win even a bronze medal'
b. Janez dvomi, da Peter ni osvojil magari BRONASTE medalje
Janez doubts that Peter not win magari bronze medal
'John doubts that Peter didn't win even a bronze medal'
4.1.3 Interrogatives
Magari* occurs in interrogative clauses. As in DE environments, magari* associates with a
pragmatically weak element and is glossed with even. Furthermore, it triggers negative bias:
the speaker who utters (7) expects a negative answer to the question. In this respect, the
behavior of magari* in questions parallels the behavior of weak even.
(7) Je Janez resil magari ENO nalogo?
aux John solve magari one exercise?
'Did John solve even one exercise?'
4.1.4 Modal environments
Magari* may occur in imperatives, under bouletic attitude predicates and under priority
modals. An example of magari in an imperative is given in (8) where it is glossed with at
least. The associate of magari is interpreted as being low on the pragmatic scale.
(8) Preberi magari SINTAKTICNE STRUKTURE
read.imp magari Syntactic Structures
'Read at least Syntactic Structures'
The imperative in (8) may be uttered in a context in which it is known that the hearer will
be able to read only one book. And the hearer can comply with the imperative by reading,
3 To the extent that magari* is felicitous under negation, the scalar particle needs to bear focal stress and
has a so-called anti-indiscriminative 'not just any' type of interpretation (cf. Horn 2005). An example of a
felicitous discourse of this sort is given in (i).
(i) Peter didn't read MAGARI* Syntactic Structures. He read PRECISELY Syntactic Structures
4 Magari* is not subject to the Immediate Scope Constraint (cf. Linebarger 1980). This is illustrated by
the contrast in (i).
(i) a. *If every student did any of his assignments, the professor will be happy
b. Ce je vsak student resil magari ENO svojo nalogo, potem bo prfoks vesel
if aux every student solve magari one exercise then aux prof happy
'If every student solved even one exercise, then the professor will be happy'
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say, only Lectures on Government and Binding. The command does not imply that one must
read Syntactic Structures and possibly something in addition to that.
Magari* is also licensed under desire predicates like want, wish and hope but is infelici-
tous under doxastic/epistemic embedding predicates like think and know. The associate of
magari* is low on the pragmatic scale and it is glossed with at least.
(9) a. Janez si zeli, da bi Peter osvojil magari BRONASTO medaljo
John self want that aux Peter win magari bronze medal
'John wishes that Peter would win at least a bronze medal'
b. *Janez je mislil, da je Peter osvojil magari BRONASTO medaljo
John aux think that aux Peter won magari bronze medal
'John thought that Peter won at least a bronze medal'
Finally, two examples with magari* under existential and universal modals are in (10).
The modals that allow for an embedded magari* have a priority flavor (bouletic, deontic,
teleological); magari* is not licensed under epistemic modals. Under an existential modal,
magari* is glossed with even, while under a universal modal it is glossed with at least.
(10) a. Za potni list mi Janez lahko poslje magari POSKENIRANO sliko
for passport me John can send magari scanned photo
'To get a passport, John may send me even a scanned photo'
b. Za potni list mi mora Janez poslati magari POSKENIRANO sliko
for passport me must John send magari scanned photo
'To get a passport, John needs to send me at least a scanned photo'
Magari* in modal environments is accompanied by distinctive entailments, which we illus-
trate in (11) and (12). We will argue that these play a role in determining its glosses with
even and at least in English under existential and universal modals, respectively.
(11) (9-a) =e John wants Peter to win a medal and he is okay with Peter winning bronze
and he is okay with Peter winning silver, and he is okay with Peter winning gold
(12) a. (11-a) =* John may send me a photo and he may send me a scanned photo, and
he may send me an original photo
b. (11-b) =e John must send me a photo and he may send me a scanned photo,
and he may send me an original photo
To summarize: Magari * is licensed in three types of environments: in DE environments,
in questions, and in modal environments. It is glossed with even in DE environments, in
questions and under existential modals; it is glossed with at least in imperatives, under
universal modals and under attitude predicates. In all of these environments, the associate
of magari* is a low element on the respective pragmatic scale.
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4.2 Proposal
We propose that magari* is morphologically complex. It spells out two components: a scalar
component and an existential component. It is acceptable only if the inferences triggered by
these two components are consistent and satisfied in the context. We show that this may be
the case if they are separated by a DE operator or the trace of whether in interrogatives. Fi-
nally, magari* is acceptable in certain modal environments because its existential component
can receive a free choice interpretation, much like some other existential quantifiers.
4.2.1 Ingredients
The distribution of magari* is regulated by the two focus-sensitive operators that it spells
out - EVEN and AT LEAST. They associate with the same focused element.5 Thus, a clause
containing magari* has a base-generated structure along the lines of (13-b).
(13) a. ... Peter read magari* ONE book
b. ... [EVEN C1] [AT LEAST Co] [Peter read oneF book]
EVEN triggers the scalar presupposition that its prejacent is less likely than a relevant
alternative; it is otherwise truth-conditionally vacuous. A simple illustration of the semantic
contribution of EVEN is given in (15) where the domain of EVEN, C1 , consists of the focus
alternatives to its sister. We assume that EVEN may scope out of its base-generated position.
(14) [ EVEN ]g9 c = AC. Ap: 3q E C [ p <c q q. Aw. p(w) = 1
(15) [ [EVEN C 1] Peter kissed MaryF g9c(w) is defined only if 3q e { that Peter kissed
x | x is a relevant individual }: that Peter kissed Mary <c q.
If defined, [ [EVEN C 1] P. kissed MaryF gc(w) - 1 iff Peter kissed Mary in w
AT LEAST has a weak existential meaning (cf. Schwarz 2005): it takes a set of alternatives,
C, as its first argument and a proposition, p, as its second argument. It imposes a condition
on its second argument that it must be more likely than all of the alternatives in its first
argument (cf. Guerzoni 2003, Lahiri 2010). The assertive meaning of AT LEAST is that there
is an alternative in its first argument, C, that is true and that is at most as likely as its
second argument, p. Obviously, this alternative may be the second argument, p, itself.
(16) [ AT LEAST J]gc = AC. Ap: VqEC [p=q -+ q <c p]. Aw. 3q6C [q 4!c p A q(w) 11
The meaning of a structure containing AT LEAST is computed in (17). The domain of AT
LEAST is the same as that of EVEN in (15) - it is the focus meaning of the sister of AT
LEAST. The sentence presupposes that it is most likely that Peter kissed Mary. If the
relevant people are Mary, Sue and Polly, the assertive meaning of the sentence is that Peter
kissed (at least) one of them. As always, the import of the existential quantifier corresponds
to that of disjunction; we utilize primarily the disjunctive notation in the following.
5For perspicuity, we remain vague about multiple focus association. In our representations we simplisti-
cally utilize a single F-marking and assume that two focus particles may associate with it (cf. Krifka 1991,
Wold 1996, Beck 2006 for discussion of selective focus association).
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(17) [ [AT LEAST C 1] Peter kissed MaryF gC(w) is defined only if Vq G { that Peter
kiss x | x is a relevant person }: q -/ that Peter kissed Mary -+ q <c, that Peter
kissed Mary. If defined, [ [AT LEAST C1] Peter kissed MaryF ]Jc(w) = 1 iff 3q
E { that Peter kissed x | x is a relevant individual } [q(w) = 1] iff Peter kissed Mary
or Sue or Polly in w
4.2.2 Positive episodic environments
We have seen that magari* is not licensed in positive episodic environments, regardless of
whether its associate is the lowest or the highest element on the scale. This is represented
in (18), which contains slightly rearranged glosses of Slovenian examples. We are assuming
throughout this section that the speaker is entertaining the ranking according to which Peter
winning a bronze medal is most likely (least remarkable) and Peter winning a gold medal is
least likely (most remarkable).
(18) a. #[EVEN C 2] [AT LEAST C1] [Peter won a goldF medal]
b. #[EVEN C 2] [AT LEAST C1 ] [Peter won a bronzeF medal]
The markedness of the structures in (18) is a consequence of the inferences triggered by the
two particles. We begin by looking at the structure in (18-a) where the associate of the two
particles is pragmatically strong. In this structure, AT LEAST triggers an incorrect scalar
presupposition. Namely, it triggers the presupposition that Peter winning a gold medal is
the most likely among the alternatives (19-c);6 this contradicts our assumptions about the
context. Since the sentence inherits this presupposition, it is undefined in the context.7
(19) a. [ZP [EVEN C 2] [xP [AT LEAST C1] [Peter won a goldF medal]
b. C1 = {bronze, silver, gold}
c. [[XP ]9,c is defined only if Vq c {bronze, silver, gold}: q -/ gold -+ q <c gold
(= only if bronze, silver <ic gold)
6 Shorthand convention: 'gold' stands for the proposition that Peter won gold etc.
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could be explained by AT LEAST being semantically vacuous in that structure (a strategy pursued in Crni6
2011). That is, the structure in (18-a) would have a contextually equivalent meaning as the structure in (i).
(i) [EVEN C21 [Peter won a goldF medal]
The relevant principle is informally stated in (ii) and is a general economy condition that can be seen in
action elsewhere in grammar. For example, it arguably underlies the markedness of the sentences in (iii)
(remember: in tennis you cannot win more than three sets).
(ii) The principle of non-vacuity
The meaning of a lexical item used in the discourse must affect the meaning of its host sentence
(either its truth-conditions or its presuppositions)
(iii) a. #At least EVERY boy came to the party
b. #Roger Federer won three sets or more
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The meaning of the structure in (18-b) is infelicitous because of the presupposition trig-
gered by EVEN. The prejacent of EVEN in this structure is that Peter won a bronze or a
silver or a gold medal. This is computed in (20-c): AT LEAST quantifies over the alternatives
that Peter won a bronze medal, that he won a silver medal etc, given in (20-b), and outputs
the proposition that one of these alternatives is true (20-c).
(20) a. #[Zp [EVEN C2 1 IXP [AT LEAST C 1] [Peter won a bronzeF medal]]]
b. C1 ={bronze, silver, gold}
c. [ XP 19,c is defined only if Vq e {bronze, silver, gold}: q # bronze -+ q<cbronze.
If defined, [ XP j9,' = bronze V silver V gold
The domain of EVEN in (18-b) consists of the propositions in (21).8 For illustration, EVEN
associates with bronze; an alternative to it is the predicate silver; accordingly, one of the
8An important and possibly non-innocuous simplification is made in (21): instead of the focus alternatives
of the sister of EVEN, which are all partial propositions, we only include their assertive components in the
domain of EVEN. We do this because otherwise we would face the difficulty of evaluating propositions all
of which except one are unsatisfiable (as discussed in Crnio 2011). Namely, as we have seen in (19), the
meaning of the sister of EVEN in (21) is defined only in contexts in which winning bronze is most likely.
Its focus alternatives are not defined in such contexts; they are defined only in contexts in which winning
silver or gold, respectively, is most likely. Notice that a similar state of affairs obtains with other examples
containing scalar particles in the scope of other co-associating scalar particles:
(i) a. Even if John is merely/just/only a LIEUTENANT, he deserves your respect
b. Beide schienen nur kdrperlich anwesend gewesen zu sein, er bezweifelte sogar, dass sie
both seemed only physically present been to be he doubted even, that they
auch nur EIN Wort Simpsons gehdrt hatten
even one word of Simpson heard have
It has been suggested that the comparison of likelihoods of relevant alternatives invoked by EVEN involves the
comparison of likelihoods of solely their assertive components (e.g. Wilkinson 1996). Our simplificantion is
in the spirit of this suggestion. There are many different ways of implementing this suggestion. For example,
it can be implemented (i) by adopting a two-dimensional approach to meaning (Karttunen & Peters 1979,
Dekker 2008) and (ii) by assuming that the domain of a focus-sensitive operator consists of syntactic forms
that are derived from its sister by replacing the associate with appropriate expressions of the same type (cf.
Fox & Katzir 2011). Thus, the alternatives to the sentence Peter wins a bronzeF medal are those in (ii):
(ii) F(Peter wins a bronzeF medal) = {Peter wins a bronze medal, Peter wins a silver medal,
Peter wins a gold medal}
The modified meaning of AT LEAST iS given in (iii). (iii-a) describes its assertive component: its import is
that of a propositional existential quantifier; (iii-b) describes its presuppositional component: its import is
that the assertive meaning of its sister is less likely than the assertive meanings of its alternatives.
(iii) a. [ [AT LEAST Ci] XP ]9 1C = Aw. 3q E Ci [ [ q ]9 ,c <c [ XP ]9'e A [ q Igc(w)=1
b. [ [AT LEAST Ci] XP ]'9C = Vq E Ci [ [ q ]9'C <c XP ]9,r ]
An example of the meaning of a structure containing AT LEAST is given in (iv): (iv-a) describes its assertive
meaning - that Peter wins bronze or silver or gold - while (iv-b) describes its presuppositional meaning -
that Peter wins bronze is most likely.
(iv) a. [ [AT LEAST C1 ] [Peter wins bronzeF 1, = Aw. Peter wins a medal in w
b. [ [AT LEAST C1 ] [Peter wins bronzeF ,c = silver, gold <c bronze
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alternatives in (21-a) is that there is an alternative to Peter winning silver that is at most as
likely as it and true (= (silver V gold)). The scalar presupposition triggered by AT LEAST is
in (21-b-i): it is most likely that Peter won bronze; it is correct. The scalar presupposition
triggered by EVEN is in (21-b-ii). This presupposition is incorrect.
(21) a. C2 = {(bronze V silver V gold), (silver V gold), gold}
b. [ ZP ]J''c is defined only if
(i) silver, gold <c bronze,
(ii) 3q E C2 : (bronze V silver V gold) <c q.
If defined, [ ZP 19'" = bronze V silver V gold
Namely, the presupposition in (22-b-ii) states that there is a relevant alternative that is more
likely than the proposition that Peter won a bronze or silver or gold medal. This cannot be
the case since all the alternatives in the domain of EVEN - esp. that Peter won silver or gold,
that Peter won gold - entail the prejacent. And if a proposition entails another proposition,
it cannot be less likely than it:
-(22) Saaiyadetimn
Ifpqpsition p entails a proposition'.q,'q c'annot 'be less likely than' P,
To summarize: We have shown that magari* is illicit in positive episodic sentences
because its components trigger false presuppositions. If the associate of the two particles is
a weak element, the scalar presupposition triggered by EVEN will be false; if the associate
of the two particles is not a weak element, the scalar presupposition triggered by AT LEAST
will be false.
The modified meaning of EVEN is defined in (v): its assertive meaning is an identity function (v-a), while its
presupposition is that the assertive meaning of its sister is less likely than the assertive meaning of at least
one of its alternatives.
(v) a. [ [EVEN Cil XP ]9'" = [ XP ]9'c
b. [ [EVEN Ci] XP ],'" = 3q E Ci [ [ XP ]9'" <c [ q ]9'c ]
With these ingredients in hand, we illustrate the import of co-associating EVEN and AT LEAST on the
schematic structure in (vi-a). The domain of EVEN is given in (vi-b).
(vi) a. [EVEN C2) [neg [AT LEAST C 1] [Peter wins bronzeF]]
b. C2 = {[neg [AT LEAST C1] [Peter wins bronzeF)], [neg [AT LEAST C 1] [Peter wins
silverF)], [neg [AT LEAST C1 ] [Peter wins goldF]
The assertive meaning of the structure is in (vii-a), while its presupposition is in (vii-b). Both of the meanings
consistent and intuitively correct, as will be discussed in the main text.
(vii) a. [(vi-a) ]'" - f[ neg ][,c([ [AT LEAST C1] [Peter wins bronzeFl 19,c) = -,(bronzeVs.Vg.)
b. [(vi-a) ]9'c = [silver, gold <c bronze] A [Bq E C2 : -,(bronze V silver V gold) <c [ q lg,c
In the main text we continue to employ the more conservative approach to the semantics of EVEN, though
we implicitly assume that the comparison of likelihoods of the respective alternatives involves comparison of
assertive meanings, possibly along the lines described in this footnote.
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4.2.3 Downward-entailing environments
Magari* is licensed in a variety of DE environments. Following Lahiri's (1998) work on
Hindi NPIs, we account for this by allowing EVEN to take scope above the respective DE
operator where it subsequently triggers a consistent scalar presupposition.
(23) [EVEN C 2] OPDE [E--N-O2J [AT LEAST C1 ] [Peter won a bronzeF medal]]
In (24) we derive the consistent inferences of a conditional sentence containing magari*.
EVEN scopes out of the embedded clause at LF in (23). Its sister at LF denotes the proposi-
tion in (24-b). The scalar presupposition triggered by AT LEAST is correct: it is more likely
that Peter wins a bronze medal than that he wins a silver or a gold medal. This meaning is
inherited by the sentence.
(24) a. [EVEN C2][XP[if [AT LEAST C1 ] Peter wins bronzeF][he becomes a hero]]
b. [ XP ]['' is defined only if silver, gold <,c bronze. If defined, [ XP ]9'' = Aw.
Vw' E B(w) [(bronze V silver V gold)(w') -+ hero(w')] = that if Peter wins a
medal he will become a hero
The domain of EVEN in (24-a) consists of the alternatives in (25-a). It triggers the presup-
position in (25). Since the prejacent of EVEN, computed in (24-b), entails all the alternatives
in the domain of EVEN, it may very well be less likely than one of them, e.g. that if Peter
wins gold he will become a hero.
(25) a. C2 = {that if Peter wins a medal he will become a hero, that if Peter wins silver
or gold he will become a hero, that if Peter wins gold he will become a hero}
b. [ (24-a) ]2'c is defined only if -q E C2 : that if Peter wins a medal he will become
a hero < q
Thus, we have explained why magari* is felicitous in (24-a): EVEN scopes above the DE
operator where it triggers a correct presupposition; AT LEAST stays in situ and triggers a
correct presupposition as well.
The final issue relates to Lahiri's observations about magari * in conditionals. As we have
seen in (5), magari* is felicitous only in antecedents of conditionals in which the antecedent
is pragmatically weak and the matrix clause is pragmatically strong:
(26) a. [EVEN C2] [if [[AT LEAST C 1] you read oneF book]][you will pass]
b. #[EVEN C2 ] [if [[AT LEAST C1] you read fiveF books]][you will fail]
c. #[EVEN C 2] [if [[AT LEAST C1] you read oneF book [you will fail]]
d. #[EVEN C 2] [if [[AT LEAST C 1] you read fiveF books])[you will pass]]
(26-bd) are ruled out because AT LEAST triggers a scalar presupposition that is false: it is
not the case that it is most likely that you read five books, e.g. it is more likely that you
read one book.' On the other hand, the two presuppositions that (26-a) triggers are correct:
9 The sentence in (i-a) could instead of (26-d) be assigned the structure where EVEN stays in situ and AT
LEAST moves (i-b). The scalar presuppositions of EVEN and AT LEAST would in this case be satisfied: the
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the presupposition triggered by AT LEAST is that it is most likely that you read one book
(compared to reading two books etc.), while the presupposition triggered by EVEN is that
there is an alternative that is more likely than that if you read one book, you will pass the
exam; an alternative that verifies this presupposition is that if you read three books you
will pass the exam. Finally, the presupposition triggered by AT LEAST in (26-c) is that it is
most likely that you read one book (compared to reading two books etc.) - this is correct.
However, the presupposition triggered by EVEN is problematic. Although it is satisfiable -
the prejacent is the logically strongest alternative and is thus at most as likely as the other
alternatives - it is arguably false. Namely, it naturally holds that the more you read, the less
likely it is that you will fail. Accordingly, the likelihood of the proposition that if you read
one book you will fail cannot be noticeably lower than the likelihood of the proposition that
if you read more than one book you will fail. This explains the infelicity of (26-c). If the
context were different, the presupposition of EVEN in (26-c) might be felicitous. This would
be the case if reading many books were detrimental to achieving good results in exams.
To summarize: Magari * is licensed in DE environments because its EVEN component may
outscope a DE operator while its AT LEAST component remains in situ. EVEN consequently
triggers a scalar presupposition that is compliant with (22) and may be satisfied in the
context. If it is satisfied, the occurrence of magari* is acceptable (cf. Lahiri 1998 for even-
NPIs in Hindi).10
4.2.4 Interrogatives
Magari* may occur in interrogative clauses. In them it triggers negative bias - the speaker
expects a negative answer. This behavior parallels the behavior of weak even.
(27) a. Did you read magari* one paper? (- negative bias)
b. Did you read even one paper? (- negative bias)
In our system, questions with magari* are negatively biased for the same reason that ques-
tions with weak even are negatively biased: the only LF of an interrogative clause with
presupposition of AT LEAST is that there is an alternative that is more likely than that you read five books -
this is correct (say, that you read one book); the presupposition of EVEN is that it is most likely that if you
read five books you will pass - this is correct as well. Thus, if the sentence in (i-a) could have the structure
in (i-b), it would falsely be predicted to be licit and convey that if you read five books, you will pass the
exam (the existential import of AT LEAST is vacuous in (i-b)).
(i) a. Si lees aunque sea CINCO libros, vas a aprobar
'If you read magari* five books, you will pass the exam'
b. [AT LEAST C2] [[if [[EVEN C1) AT +B-*sP- G you read fiveF books]][you will pass]]
However, the structure in (i-a) is arguably ruled out on independent grounds that govern the distribution
of multiple focus operators. Namely, the structure in which one focus particle moves across another (co-
associating) focus particle violates superiority. If two focus operators are attracted by the same target, only
the higher of the two can move - this iS EVEN in the case at hand.
10We have not explained the fact that magari* does not to occur under (unembedded) clausemate negation.
This is an instance of a more general pattern that we also find with certain nominal free choice items (cf.
Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002 for irgendein). We come back to this in the following chapter.
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magari* that has a licit interpretation - i.e. that denotes a set containing a defined answer
- denotes a set of answers in which only the negative answer is defined (Guerzoni 2004). We
illustrate this for the question in (27-a).
The question in (27-a) has the two possible structures in (28): in (28-a) EVEN stays in
situ, while in (28-b) EVEN scopes above the trace of whether.
(28) a. [whether [8(,t)(,t)[t 8 , , [EVEN C2 ] [AT LEAST C1] [you read oneF paper]
b. [whether [8 [EVEN C21 [t8 [AT LEAST Ci] [you read oneF paper]
If we simplify Guerzoni's semantics and assume that the meaning of whether is the one in
(29), we derive the meanings for the two structures described in (30) and (32), which we
discuss in turn.
(29) [ whether ]9' =- Af((st)(st))(st). {f(Ap.p), f(Ap.-ip)}
The LF in (28-a) denotes the set of propositions in (30). These propositions are defined only
in contexts in which (31) holds, which is the scalar presupposition triggered by EVEN. The
presupposition is clearly in violation of (22). Namely, since the propositions that you read
n papers, where n > 1, entail the proposition that you read one paper, none of them can be
less likely than it. Thus, the LF has an undefined meaning, i.e. it denotes a set of undefined
propositions.
(30) [ (30-a) ]19,c
[ whether ]19c(Af.f([ [EVEN C1] [AT LEAST C 1] [you read oneF paper] ]J9'c)){ [EVEN C1] [AT LEAST C1] [you read oneF paper] ]9,
, [EVEN C1] [AT LEAST C1] [you read oneF paper] ]9'c}
(31) Eq E {that you read n papers I n E N>o}: that you read one paper <c q
The LF in (28-b) denotes the set of answers in (32). The presupposition of the first
answer is the same as that of the answers in (30), given in (31), and thus illicit. The second
answer in (32) triggers the presupposition in (33). This presupposition is licit: the prejacent
of EVEN entails all the alternatives and may very well be less likely than one of them. Thus,
the only defined answer in the meanings of the two structures in (28) is the second answer
in (32). Since it is a negative answer, the negative bias of the question is explained.
(32) [ (28-b) ]9'c =
[ whether ]9'c(Af.[ EVEN C1 ]9'c(f( [AT LEAST C1 ] [you read oneF p-] jgjc)))
([[EVEN C1] [AT LEAST C1] [you read oneF paper] ]9,c,
[ EVEN Ci gc,[ [AT LEAST C1] [you read oneF paper] ]9'c}
(33) 3q E {that you didn't read n papers I ncN>o}: that you didn't read one paper <c q
To summarize: Appropriating Guerzoni's (2004) approach to weak even in questions,
we have derived the bias triggered by magari*, which is decomposed into co-associating
EVEN and AT LEAST, from the fact that in questions and elsewhere the associate of EVEN is
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obligatorily a weak element - this is a requirement imposed by AT LEAST. Accordingly, the
only LF of a question that denotes a set that contains a defined answer denotes a set whose
only defined answer is negative. This explains the bias.
4.2.5 Modal environments
The puzzle
The final class of environments in which magari* is licensed are modal environments, more
precisely, imperatives, bouletic attitude predicates and bouletic/teleological modals. These
environments generally license upward-entailing (UE) inferences, i.e. they behave similar to
UE environments discussed in section 4.2.2. This is illustrated in (34) with overtly modalized
sentences.
(34) a. You must call your mother tonight = You must call your mother
b. [call-tonight, (call-tonight -+ call) o [call
That these environments license magari* is thus at first sight unexpected. Namely, if EVEN
stays in situ in such an environment, it triggers an inconsistent presupposition. And the
same holds if it scopes above the respective modal. For illustration, the imperative sentence
may have the structure in (35-b) and trigger the scalar presuppositions in (35-cd). Although
the presupposition triggered by AT LEAST in (35-c) is correct, the scalar presupposition
triggered by EVEN (35-d) is incorrect: it clashes with the fact that the prejacent is entailed
by all the alternatives (35-e) and is thus at least as likely as them.
(35) a. Win magari* a BRONZE medal
b. [EVEN C 2] [IMP [[AT LEAST Co] you win a bronzeFl]
c. Vq E {bronze, silver, gold}: qfbronze -4 q <c bronze
d. 3q E { (bronze VsilverVgold),E (silverVgold), Egold}: El (bronzeVsilverVgold)<1cq
e. E (bronzeVsilverVgold) '- El (silverVgold) <- Egold
Preview of the derivation
We propose that the domain of quantification of EVEN in (35-b) is different than stated in
(35-d). Namely, it instead contains the mutually exclusive alternatives in (36).
(36) a. El (bronze V silver V gold) A Obronze A Osilver A Ogold
b. D (silver V gold) A Osilver A Ogold
c. ogold
Accordingly, the scalar presupposition it triggers, given in (37), complies with (22). The
presupposition is satisfied in contexts in which the speaker considers winning, say, a gold
medal as preferable to winning other medals. The imperative conveys that you must win
a medal and that any medal will be okay. This corresponds to the intuitions about the
sentence in (35-a).
(37) 3q C {(36-a), (36-b), (36-c)}: nO(bronzeVsilverVgold)AObronzeA silverAOgold <3, q
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The derivation of the felicity of magari * under modals proceeds in 4 steps: (Step 1) we
motivate that (36-a) is a reading that existential quantifiers like AT LEAST may have under
modals - the reading is called free choice; we also provide a tool for deriving it. (Step 2) uses
what we garnered under Step 1 to explain magari* under imperatives. (Step 3) introduces
and derives free choice under existential modals. (Step 4) applies what we garnered under
Step 3 to explain magari* underr existential modals.
(Step 1) Free choice & universal modals
Although imperatives, desire predicates and modals are upward-entailing, it is known that
they do not license all weakening inferences. Most famously, they are subject to the so-called
Ross's paradox - they do not license disjunctive weakening inferences:
(38) a. Send this letter! =# Send this letter or burn it!
b. I want to send this letter =# I want to send this letter or burn it
We follow Aloni (2007) in treating this apparent failure of weakening as a consequence of free
choice. We illustrate this without loss of generality on the basis of imperatives that contain
embedded disjunction.
There are different approaches to free choice disjunction (e.g. Zimmermann 2000, Geurts
2005, Fox 2007 and others). We propose that free choice is derived in grammar by an ex-
haustification operator EXH associating with disjunction or, equivalently, a domain of an
existential quantifier (Fox 2007, Chierchia 2010)." The insertion of an exhaustification op-
erator plays an important role elsewhere in the grammar, e.g. in deriving scalar implicatures:
(39) John ate cake or soup ~- John didn't eat cake and soup
According to Fox (2007), this implicature is generated if the sentence is assigned the structure
in (40-b). The alternatives in the domain of EXH, given in (40-c), are determined by the
scalar item with which EXH associates (cf. Sauerland 2004 for disjunction).
(40) a. John ate cake or soup
b. [EXH C1] [John ate cake or soup]
c. C, = {cake V soup, cake, soup, cake A soup}
The meaning of EXH is defined in (41): it takes a proposition p and a set of alternatives
C as its argument and returns the proposition that p is the only true alternative in C that
is "innocently excludable." An alternative to a proposition is innocently excludable iff it is
included in every way of negating as many alternatives to the proposition as possible without
contradicting the proposition (we refer to Fox 2007 for discussion and concrete computations
of innocently excludable alternatives).
"Adoption of Fox's (2007) mechanism for deriving the free choice effect is not crucial for our analysis. A
different account may be employed as well (e.g. Zimmermann 2000, Aloni 2007). However, it is important
that EVEN may scope above whatever is responsible for the free choice effect, i.e. free choice effects must be
generated in the grammar.
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(41) a. T EXH ]g,c - AC(st)t. AP(st)- Aws. p(w) = 1 A Vq E IE(Cp) [ -q(w) - 1 ]
b. IE(C,p) = n{A'cA | A' is a maximal set in A s.t. A'-' U {p} is consistent}
c. A' = { ,p | p E A }
In the case of (40), the innocently excludable alternative is the one given in (42-a) - that
John ate cake and soup. The meaning of EXH applied to its arguments is given in (42-b):
the prejacent of EXH is true - that John ate cake or soup - and the innocently excludable
alternative is false - that John didn't eat cake and soup.
(42) a. IE(C 1, cake V soup) = {cake A soup}
b. [ EXH ]pqc(C1, cake V soup) = (cake V soup) A -(cake A soup)
When a disjunction is in the scope of an imperative operator or any other universal modal,
a greater number of alternatives is innocently excludable. This is illustrated in (43).
(43) a. Send this letter or burn it!
b. [EXH C 1] [IMP [you send this letter or burn it]]
c. C1= {l(send V burn), Osend, ELburn, l(sendAburn)}
d. IE(C1,l(send V burn)) = {lsend, Elburn, E(sendAburn)}
The meaning of (43-b) is computed in (44): it conveys that you must send the letter or burn
it but you don't have to send it and you don't have to burn it and, trivially, you don't have
to send it and burn - i.e. all innocently excludable alternatives are false.
(44) [ EXH g,c(C1, O(send V burn)) = -(sendVburn)A~,ElsendA -EburnALl(sendAburn)
This meaning is equivalent with the proposition in (45-a), verbalized in (45-b): namely if all
the best accessible worlds are such that you send or burn the letter in them and not all of
them are such that you send the letter in them and not all of them are such that you burn
the letter in them, it holds that in some of them you send the letter and in some of them
you burn the letter. This is the free choice inference.
(45) a. [I(sendVburn) A Osend A Oburn
b. You must send this letter or burn it
& you may send this letter & you may burn this letter
The apparent failure of disjunctive weakening in (38) can now be explained if we assume
that there is a preference to exhaustify disjunction in the scope of the imperative operator, i.e.
that there is a preference for free choice interpretation of disjunction in modal environments.
Namely, that you must send this letter clearly does not entail that you may send this letter
and that you may burn it.
(Step 2) Magari* under universal modals
We are now in a position to account for the felicity of magari* in imperatives and other
environments involving universal modal quantification (desire predicates, overt modal sen-
tences). As we have pointed out above, magari* is predicted to be infelicitous in these
contexts: if EVEN stays in situ (46-a), it triggers a scalar presupposition that violates (22);
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if EVEN scopes above the imperative operator (46-c), the same state of affairs obtains due
to the upward-monotonicity of IMP - the prejacent of scoped EVEN is entailed by all of its
alternatives.
(46) a. Win magari* a BRONZE medal!
b. [IMP [[EVEN C2] [ AT LEAST Co] you win a bronzeF]
c. [EVEN C2] [IMP [JVEN-Gj2 [ AT LEAST Co] you win a bronzeF]
However, since AT LEAST is an existential quantifier, it can get a free choice interpretation in
sentences like (46-a). This reading is generated if an exhaustification operator that associates
with the domain of AT LEAST is inserted above the imperative operator." The relevant
structure is in (47).
(47) [EVEN C2] [xpl [EXH C 1] IMP [[ AT LEAST C0  you win a bronzeF]
The alternatives in the domain of the exhaustive operator in (47) are given in (48-a). All
of them are innocently excludable with respect to the prejacent of EXH. Consequently, the
meaning of the exhaustified imperative is the one given in (48-b): you must win a medal and
any medal will do - a free choice reading of AT LEAST. The presupposition triggered by AT
LEAST is ex hypothesi correct: it is more likely that you win bronze than other medals.
(48) a. C1 = {E(bronzeVsilverVgold), El (bronzeVgold), El (silverVgold), El (bronzeVsilver),
Ebronze, osilver, Llgold}
b. [ XP 19,' is defined only if silver, gold <c bronze. If defined, [ XP ]1g"c
El (bronzeVsilverVgold) A Vq E C1 [EI] (bronzeVsilverVgold) Z q -+ q is false] =
El (bronzeVsilverVgold) A Obronze A Osilver A Ogold
The alternatives over which EVEN quantifies in (47) are given in (49); they are mutually
exclusive. This means that the scalar presupposition triggered by EVEN will comply with
(22), i.e. none of the alternatives except the prejacent entail the prejacent.
(49) C2 = { E(bronzeVsilverVgold) A Obronze A Osilver A Ogold,
EO(silverVgold) A Osilver A Ogold, EOgold }
The meaning of (47) is computed in (50). The non-presuppositional content of imperative
is that you must win a medal and that winning any medal will be okay; this has been
computed in (48). Furthermore, (47) triggers two presuppositions: the scalar presupposition
triggered by AT LEAST, computed in (48) and repeated in (50-i), is clearly correct; the scalar
presupposition triggered by EVEN, given in (50-ii), is correct in only particular contexts -
in contexts where the speaker prefers, say, the hearer winning gold to the hearer winning
bronze or silver.
12It is conceivable that EXH would associate with bronze in (46). Although an appropriate though slightly
weaker reading would be derived in the case at hand, the suggested association would run into trouble in
existential modal sentences where an unattested reading would be predicted. The obligatory association of
EXH with the domain of AT LEAST can be achieved by stipulating that the domain of AT LEAST itself requires
exhaustification. This idea has predecessors in the discussion of polarity items (Krifka 1995, Chierchia 2006,
2010). This leaves our predictions about the meaning of magari* in DE environments unaffected.
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(50) [ (47) ]9,'(w) is defined only if
(i) silver, gold <c bronze,
(ii) Eq E C2 : o(bronze V silver V gold) A ObronzeAosilverAOgold <c q.
If defined, [ (47) ]9 'c(w) = 1 iff you must win bronze or silver or gold and you may
win bronze and you may win silver and you may win gold in w
The derivation of the felicity of magari* under desire predicates and certain universal modals
proceeds in parallel: a free choice interpretation of the embedded AT LEAST is generated;
EVEN scopes above the respective predicates and the free choice generating exhausification
operator; in its derived position it may trigger a licit presupposition.
(Step 3) Free choice & existential modals
The same reasoning sketched above for imperatives (and other universal modals) applies also
to existential modals, which are also known to provide for free choice readings of existential
(disjunctive) operators in their scope, as is illustrated in (51).
(51) You may have cake or soup - You may have cake and you may have soup
In the framework adopted here, this reading is achieved by recursive exhaustification of the
domain of the existential quantifier. The structure that is assigned to the disjunctive modal
sentence in (51) that generates the free choice inference is in (52).
(52) [EXH C 2] IXp [EXH C 1] [may [you have cake or soup]]
The lower exhaustive operator quantifies over the alternatives described in (53-a). Only
one of these alternatives is innocently excludable with respect to the prejacent of EXH.
Accordingly, the output of the lower EXH in (52-a) is the proposition in (53-c): that you may
have cake or soup and you may not have both cake and soup. Notice that this does not yet
correspond to the free choice reading of the disjunction (51).
(53) a. C1 = {O(cake V soup), Ocake, Osoup, O(cakeAsoup)}
b. IE(C 1, O(cake V soup)) = {0(cake V soup)}
c. I XP J9'c - O(cakeVsoup) A -,0(cakeVsoup)
The domain of the higher exhaustive operator is given in (54-a). All of the alternatives in
(54-a) are innocently excludable alternatives with respect to the prejacent (54-b).
(54) a. C2 - {KO(cakeVsoup)A-0(cakeAsoup), OcakeA-,0soup, OsoupA-Ocake, O(cakeAsoup)}
b. IE(C 2 , > (cakeVsoup) A-, 0 (cake Vsoup)) =
{cakeA-0osoup, OsoupA-,iOcake, O(cakeAsoup)}
The structure in (52) has the meaning in (55): the prejacent of EXH is true, while all the
innocently excludable alternatives are false. Thus, it conveys that you may have cake or
soup and you may have cake and you may have soup (and you may not have both).
(55) [ (52) ]9'4 - O(cake V soup) A -i0(cake A soup) A -,(O cakeA--,0soup) A -,(OsoupA-,O0cake)
= O(cake V soup) A Ocake A Osoup A -,0(cake A soup)
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(Step 4) Magari* under existential modals
At first sight, magari* is predicted to be infelicitous under existential modals: if EVEN stays
in situ (56-b), it triggers a scalar presupposition that violates (22); if EVEN scopes above the
existential modal (56-c), the same state of affairs obtains due to the upward-monotonicity
of the modal - the prejacent of scoped EVEN is entailed by all of its alternatives.
(56) a. You may win magari* a BRONZE medal (to qualify for the Hall of Fame)
b. [may [[EVEN C2] [AT LEAST Co] you win a bronzeF]
c. [EVEN C2] [may [fEVJW-z [AT LEAST Co] you win a bronzeF]
However, the sentence in (56-a) may also have an LF along the lines of (57-b) where EVEN
scopes above the existential modal and two exhaustification operators that associate with
the domain of AT LEAST, while AT LEAST remains in the scope of the modal.
(57) a. You may win magari a BRONZE medal (to qualify for the Hall of Fame)
b. [EVEN C3] [EXH C 2] [EXH Ci] may [[AT LEAST Co] you win bronzeF]
The prejacent of EVEN and thus the assertive meaning of (57) is in (58-a), which is computed
analogously to disjunctive cases discussed in Section 3. It is that you may win any medal
to qualify for the Hall of Fame. The alternatives over which EVEN quantifies are given in
(58-b).
(58) a. [ [EXH C2] [EXH C1) may [[AT LEAST Co] you win bronzeF] Jg,c = Obronze
A Osilver A Ogold
b. C3 = { (Obronze A Osilver A Ogold), (Osilver A Ogold), Ogold }
The sentence also triggers two presuppositions. The scalar presupposition triggered by AT
LEAST, given in (59-i) is ex hypothesi correct: it is most likely that you will win a bronze
medal. The scalar presupposition triggered by EVEN is in (59-ii). It is compatible with (22)
since the prejacent entails all the alternatives. It is also plausible: it is more likely that, say,
winning gold may get you in the Hall of Fame than winning any medal.
(59) [ (59-b) ]19c(w) is defined only if
(i) silver, gold <c bronze
(ii) 3q E C3 : (Obronze A Osilver A Ogold) <c q.
If defined, [ (59-b) ]9'c(w) = 1 iff you may win bronze and you may win silver and
you may win gold (to qualify for the Hall of Fame) in w
To summarize: We have shown that magari* triggers consistent inferences in modal
environments because (i) AT LEAST may be assigned a free choice interpretation and (ii) EVEN
may scope to a position above the operators that generate this free choice interpretation. In
its scoped position, the prejacent of EVEN is not entailed by any of the alternatives and may
thus be less likely than some (or all) of them.13
13 If desire predicates and certain modals were non-monotone (Heim 1992 for desire predicates), the account
of the felicity of the occurrences of magari* in their scope would not require covert exhaustification. The
scalar presupposition would be satisfiable since all the alternatives would be logically independent. It would
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4.2.6 Different glosses
We have seen that magari* can be glossed either with at least or with even, depending on
the environment in which it is located. The gloss with at least is found in imperatives, under
desire predicates and under priority universal modals - under universal modals in short.
(60) I wish I had won magari* a BRONZE medal
'I wish I had won at least a bronze medal'
Our proposal naturally explains this gloss and it also allows us to describe more rigorously
what is meant with the characterization of magari* as a 'concessive' operator. First: That
magari* in these sentences should have a gloss with at least follows from the free choice
readings that we derive for the existential quantifier AT LEAST in the scope of the universal
modal. This is repeated in (61): the sentence in (60-a) has the structure in (61-a) and the
assertive meaning in (61-b).
(61) a. [EVEN C2] [EXH C 1] [I wish [[AT LEAST Co] I had won a bronzeF medal]]
b. 0 (bronze V silver V gold) A Obronze A Osilver A Ogold
The meaning of the imperative in (61-b) corresponds to what has been suggested to be the
meaning of the corresponding universal modal sentence containing at least instead of even
(e.g. Geurts & Nouwen 2007). This is given in (62). Thus, the assertive import of magari*
in (61) matches that of at least in (62), which we argue is the reason for it being glossed
with at least.
(62) a. I wish I had won at least a BRONZE medal
b. E (bronze V silver V gold) A Obronze A Osilver A Ogold
Second: Three factors conspire to yield the so-called concessive flavor of magari * under
universal modals - the presupposition triggered by AT LEAST, the obligatory free choice
effect, and the presupposition triggered by EVEN. According to the first two factors, the
propositional argument of the imperative operator, desire predicate etc. is the most likely
among its alternatives and already it is considered desirable by the attitude holder. A
consequence of the last factor is that the less likely alternatives are more desirable. This
yields concessivity: although the attitude holder prefers less likely alternatives, she finds all
the alternatives acceptable, even the most likely (and least desirable) alternative.
also be correct in contexts in which individuals prefer to win shinier medals.
(i) a. I wish I won magari* a bronze medal
b. [EVEN C 1] [I wish [[AT LEAST Co] I won a bronzeF medall
c. [ (i-b) ]9 'c(w) is defined only if (i) silver, gold <c bronze and (ii) 3q E { that I wish I won
bronze or silver or gold, that I wish I won silver or gold, that I wish I won gold }: that I wish
I won a bronze or silver or gold medal <c q. If defined, [ (i-b) 19'c(w) = 1 iff that I wish I won
bronze or silver or gold in w
The assertive import of the sentence, however, is weaker than what we have derived in our modal account.
Namely, (i-a) does not entail that I am okay with winning any particular medal. This could be derived as a
scalar implicature.
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Under existential modals and in DE environments magari* is glossed with even. As with
universal modals, we have argued that in these cases EVEN takes scope above the modal and
the free choice generating operators. This is repeated in (63-b); the meaning of the structure
is repeated in (64).
(63) a. To qualify for the hall of fame, you may win magari* a BRONZE medal
b. [EVEN C 3] [EXH C 2] [EXH C 1] [may [ AT LEAST Co] [ you win bronzeF]]
(64) [ (64-b) ]9,c is defined only if (i) silver, gold <c bronze and (ii) 3q E C3 : (Obronze
A Osilver A Ogold) <c q. If defined, [ (64-b) ]g,c = Obronze A Osilver A Ogold
Jointly, the assertive meaning and the scalar presuppositions in (64) correspond to the import
of even in such sentences. Namely, even is commonly assumed to trigger two inferences: (i)
a scalar inference and (ii) an additive inference (= there are alternatives other than the
prejacent that are true). For example, (65) conveys that winning other medals besides
bronze also qualifies you for the Hall of Fame.
(65) It's even the case that you may win a BRONZE medal to qualify
Appropriately, the meaning in (64) licenses both inferences: (i) the scalar inference is re-
flected by the presuppositions in (64-i-ii), while (ii) the additive inference simply corresponds
to the assertion in (64) (= free choice inference). This explains the gloss of magari* with
even in existential modal environments.
The exact same state of affairs obtains in case magari* is generated in a DE environment.
We illustrate this on an example where magari* occurs in the restrictor of the universal
quantifier in (66).
(66) a. Everyone who won magari* a BRONZE medal qualified for the hall of fame
b. [EVEN C1] [everyone [1 [AT LEAST Co] t1won bronzeF medal]] [qualified]
EVEN in (66-b) quantifies over the alternatives in (67-a). The meaning of (66-b) is in (67-b).
(67) a. C1= { that everyone who won bronze or silver or gold qualified, that everyone
who won silver or gold qualified, that everyone who won gold qualified }
b. 1 (67-b) ]g,' is defined only if (i) silver, gold <c bronze and (ii) 3q E C1 :
that everyone who won bronze or silver or gold qualified <,, q. If defined,
(67-b) ]9'c(w) = 1 iff everyone who won bronze or silver or gold qualified
It holds that the prejacent of EVEN entails all the relevant alternatives:
(68) (everyone who won bronze or silver or gold qualified) => (everyone who won silver
qualified) & (everyone who won gold qualified)
Together, the scalar presuppositions described in (67-b) and the entailments in (68) corre-
spond to the two inferences associated with even. This explains the gloss of magari* with
even in DE environments.
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4.2.7 Restricting overgeneration
The core ingredient of our derivation of the felicity of magari* in modal environments has
been the assumption that the existential component of magari* gets a free choice interpreta-
tion under desire predicates, priority modals and in imperatives. However, free choice effects
can be observed in other environments as well, e.g. under nominal quantifiers and epistemic
modals:
(69) a. Everyone had cake or soup - Someone had cake & someone had soup
b. John believes that Mary ate cake or soup - According to John, Mary might
have eaten cake & Mary might have eaten soup
The approach to free choice that we have adopted above correctly predicts the inferences
in (69) to be possible. For example, the structure in (70-a) is assigned the meaning in
(70-d): the exhaustification operator quantifies over the alternatives in (70-b); it triggers the
inference that not everyone had cake and that not everyone had soup; if the prejacent of
EXH is true, this means that someone had cake and that someone had soup.
(70) a. [EXH Co] [everyone had cake or soup]
b. Co ={that everyone had cake or soup, that everyone had cake, that everyone
had soup, that everyone had cake and soup}
c. IE(Co, that everyone had cake or soup) ={that everyone had cake, that every-
one had soup, that everyone had cake and soup}
d. [ EXH ]9,c(Co, that everyone had cake or soup) = that everyone had cake or
soup & that someone had cake & that someone had soup
This is problematic for our account of magari*: magari * is marked in the scope of nominal
quantifiers in positive episodic sentences, as illustrated for Slovenian in (71-a), as well as
under epistemic attitude predicates, as illustrated in (71-b). Since free choice appears to be
possible in these environments, the infelicity of the sentences is puzzling.
(71) a. ??Vsak od nas je v karieri osvojil magari BRONASTO medaljo
everyone of us aux in career win magari bronze medal
b. ??Janez misli, da je Peter osvojil magari BRONASTO medaljo
John thinks that aux Peter win magari bronze medal
We propose that the sentences are infelicitous due to implausible scalar presuppositions.
The sentence in (71-a) has the structure in (72-a): EXH is generated above the universal
quantifier and associates with the domain of AT LEAST, while EVEN moves above both EXH
and the universal quantifier. The sentence has the free choice interpretation computed in
(72): if defined, it conveys that everyone of us won a medal in their career and some of us
won a bronze, some of us won a silver and some of us won a gold medal.
(72) a. [EVEN C6] [EXH C7] [[everyone 1 [[AT LEAST C9] ti win bronzeFl
b. If defined, [ (72-a) ]Jc = that everyone won a medal and for each medal in
{bronze, silver, gold} someone won it
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The scalar presuppositions triggered by AT LEAST and EVEN are consistent. The former
presupposition is that it is most likely for one to win a bronze medal (73-i). The latter
presupposition is that there is an alternative that is more likely than that everyone won a
medal and for every medal, someone won it (73-ii).
(73) [(73-a) 19,' is defined only if
(i) VX E C8 : that x won silver, that x won gold <c that x won bronze
(ii) 3q E {that everyone won a medal from D and for each medal in D someone wins
it I D E {{bronze, silver, gold}, {silver, gold}, {gold} }}: that everyone won a
medal and for each medal in {bronze, silver, gold} someone won it <c q
The presupposition in (73-ii) is implausible in light of (73-i). For it to be true, it would
have to hold in the context that although it is most likely for everyone that they won a
bronze medal, it is more likely that, say, everyone won a medal and there were silver and
gold medal winners but no bronze medal winner than that everyone won a medal and there
were bronze, silver and gold medal winners. Although this is not contradictory, it is false in
natural contexts.
A parallel explanation can be provided for the infelicity of magari* under doxastic at-
titude predicates. The structure of (71-b) is given in (74-a): EXH is generated above the
modal and associates with the domain of AT LEAST to generate the free choice reading of
AT LEAST; EVEN moves from its base position and takes scope above EXH; its domain of
quantification is given in (74-b). The sentence triggers two presuppositions: the presuppo-
sition triggered by AT LEAST is that it is most likely that Peter won a bronze medal, while
the presupposition triggered by EVEN is that there is an alternative that is more likely than
that John thinks that Peter won a medal and that he might have won any medal.
(74) a. [EVEN C 2] [EXH C 1] John thinks [[ AT LEAST Co] Peter win a bronzeF]
b. C2 ={ EO(bronzeVsilverVgold) A Obronze A Osilver A Ogold,
El(silverVgold) A Osilver A Ogold, Elgold }
c. [[(74-a) ]9'c is defined only if (i) silver, gold <c bronze and (ii) ]q E C2 :
El (bronzeVsilverVgold) A Obronze A Osilver A Ogold <c q.
If defined, [ (47) ]9'c(w) = 1 iff John thinks Peter won a medal and that he
might have won bronze and that he might have won silver and that he might
have won gold in w
Unlike in the case of desire predicates where the analogous presupposition is licit due to the
plausibility that less likely alternatives are more desirable (and thus more likely to be true
in the best desire worlds), there is nothing inherent in doxastic modality that would make
the resolution of in (74-b-ii) plausible in natural contexts.
To summarize: The core ingredient of our account of the distribution of magari* has been
the assumption that the existential component of magari* may get a free choice interpreta-
tion in modal environments; this allows the scoped scalar component of magari* to trigger
a scalar presupposition compatible with (22). Since the approach to free choice adopted
above allows for free choice readings of disjunction and existential quantifiers in the scope
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of nominal quantifiers and doxastic/epistemic modality, the account predicts that magari*
may be licensed in the scope of nominal quantifiers and doxastic/epistemic modals. We have
suggested that the reason why magari* appears not to be licensed in these environments lies
in the implausible scalar presupposition triggered by its scalar component.
4.3 Previous approaches
This section briefly discusses the three previous approaches to magari* and some of the issues
that they face. First: Giannakidou (2007) and Alonso-Ovalle (2009) assign magari* - esto
ke in Greek, siquiera in Spanish - the assertive meaning in (75). That is, magari* is truth-
conditionally vacuous, though it makes a semantic contribution at the level of presupposition.
(75) If defined, [ magari* ]9'c(C, p, w) = 1 iff p(w) =1
The characterization in (75) faces a problem in deriving the correct inferences for sentences
in which magari* occurs in the surface scope of universal modal operators. For example, the
sentence in (76-a) is assigned the structure in (76-b) where magari * stays in situ at LF. The
interpretation of (76-b) is in (76-c) - that you must win a bronze medal. This prediction is
wrong: the imperative rather conveys (76-d) - that you must win a medal and any medal
will do. Thus, any account that treats magari* as having a vacuous assertive meaning will
fail to explain the behavior of magari* under universal modals. Notice that nothing would
change if magari* were to scope above the imperative operator - its import would still be
predicted to be the one in (76-c).
(76) a. Win magari* a BRONZE medal!
b. IMP [magari* C] [you win a bronzeF medal]
c. Predicted: Obronze
d. Fact: E(bronze V silver V gold) A Obronze A Osilver A Ogold
As we have seen in the preceding section, our system correctly predicts that (76-a) has the
interpretation in (76-d). This is due to the interaction of two factors: (i) we proposed that
magari* has an existential component and (ii) this existential component gets a free choice
interpretation in modal environments (otherwise the sentence would have an illicit scalar
presupposition).
Furthermore, Giannakidou (2007:68) assigns esto ke a scalar and a negative additive
presupposition. The negative additive presupposition is given in (77) and mirrors the pre-
supposition of Rooth's (1985) negative polarity even.
(77) [ magari* ]9'C(C, p, w) is defined only if ]q E C [ q f p A q(w) =0
In the example above, the predicted presupposition is incorrect: the structure in (76-b) is
predicted to trigger the presupposition that you don't win silver or you don't win gold (78).
This presupposition is false: the propositions that you win silver and that you win gold are
both compatible with the contexts in which (76-a) can be used. This is reflected in (76-d)
where both winning silver and winning gold are conveyed to be live options.
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(78) [ (76-b) ]gc(w) is defined only if 3q e {that you win x I x is silver, gold}: q(w) -
0, only if you don't win silver or you don't win gold in w
Second: Lahiri (2010) proposes an ambiguity analysis of magari* in which he assigns
distinct meanings to magari* in DE and to magari* in modal environments. We focus on
his treatment of magari * in modal contexts in the following. He proposes that in modal con-
texts magari* decomposes into two components, SOLO and EVEN'. These components have
vacuous assertive meanings and trigger the presuppositions given in (79) (Lahiri 2010:23).
The difference between EVEN and EVEN' is that EVEN' takes an additional propositional
argument and compares likelihoods of conditional sentences where the prejacent while the
alternatives constitute their respective antecedents and the additional propositional argu-
ment constitutes the consequent.
(79) a. [ SOLO ]9,c(C, p, w) is defined only if Vq E C [p # q -+ q <c pl.
If defined, I SOLO' ]9gc(C, p W) 1 iff p(w) 1
b. [ EVEN' ]19,c(C, q, p, w) is defined only if Vr c C [p f r -+ (if p then q) <, (if
r then q)]. If defined, [ EVEN' 19c(C, p, W) 1 if p(w) 1
The imperative in (80-a) is assigned the structure in (80-b) where EVEN' scopes above the
imperative operator. The first propositional argument of the scoped EVEN' is resolved to the
proposition that you qualify for the Hall of Fame. The scalar presupposition triggered by
SOLO is given in (80-d): that you win a bronze medal is most likely; the scalar presupposition
triggered by EVEN' is given in (80-e): that if you win a bronze medal, you qualify for the
Hall of Fame is least likely. These presuppositions are intuitively correct.
(80) a. Win magari* a bronze medal
b. [EVEN' C3 q 2] [IMP [SOLO' C1] [you win a bronzeF medal]]
c. q2= that you qualify for the Hall of Fame
d. that you win silver, that you win gold <c that you win bronze
e. if you win bronze, you qualify for the hall of fame
<c if you win silver, you qualify for the hall of fame,
if you win gold, you qualify for the hall of fame
The main problem for this analysis is that it disassociates the scalar component of magari * in
modal environments from the more standard characterizations of scalar particles, including
the scalar component that magari* spells out in DE environments. In the same vein, it is
not clear what regulates the distribution of EVEN', i.e. why magari* spells out EVEN' only
in modal environments. Finally, the free choice meaning that (80-a) conveys, described in
(76-d) is not predicted by the account, though it could potentially be derived by pragmatic
reasoning.
To summarize: The main problem for the previous approaches to magari* is to account
for its occurrence and import in modal environments. We have shown that they either have
difficulty in deriving the correct import of magari* in modal environments or they have
difficulty in explaining why the import that they derive is restricted to modal environments
and is not observed in, say, positive episodic environments.
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4.4 Conclusion
There is a class of expressions - so-called concessive scalar additive particles - that convey a
scalar meaning and occur solely in DE, interrogative and modal environments. Its represen-
tatives are esto ke in Greek, aunque sea, siquiera in Spanish, and magari in Slovenian. An
analysis of these expressions must, on the one hand, account for their semantic contribution
and, on the other hand, explain their distribution. We proposed that this is achieved if con-
cessive scalar additive particles are treated as being morphologically complex - in particular,
we proposed that they spell out two particles, EVEN and AT LEAST.
The inferences triggered by the two components of magari* were shown to yield consistent
and correct meanings in DE environments if EVEN moved above the DE operator. Without
employing additional maneuvers, the inferences triggered by the two components in positive
episodic sentences and modal environments are incorrect. However, a rescue strategy is
available in the latter environments that is absent in the former: AT LEAST may get a
free choice interpretation. Consequently, EVEN that scopes above the modal and the free-
choice generating operators may trigger a correct scalar presupposition and the respective
sentences are licit. Finally, we have shown how the glosses of magari* with even and at
least in different environments depend on the interaction of its two components with their
respective environments.
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CHAPTER 5
Scalar particles and competition
Even may associate both with strong and weak elements in its immediate surface scope. In
the latter case it must move above an appropriate operator at LF for the sentence to be
licit. We call the former occurrences of even 'strong even' and the occurrences of the latter
even 'weak even.' Not all scalax particles exhibit such a degree of freedom. For example,
certain scalar particles can associate only with a weak element in their immediate surface
scope, while others can only associate with a strong element. To capture this and other
facets of cross-linguistic variation of scalar particles, we propose - first - that besides the
scalar component that corresponds to even as defined above, some scalar particles spell out
a further scalar component and - second - that the distribution of a scalar particle is not
determined in isolation of what other scalar particles there are in the language.
5.1 Five types of scalar particles
We outline the cross-linguistic variation of scalar particles. The variation is along two di-
mensions: (i) whether the minimal clause in which the scalar particle is generated is stronger
or weaker than its alternatives and if it must be weak (ii) whether the scalar particle occurs
under clausemate negation. Two implicational relations are established.
5.1.1 The typology
Strength of the minimal clause. There is a great variety in the distribution of different
particles and collocations of particles that have traditionally been classified as scalar particles,
both within and across languages (Gast & van der Auwera 2011 for a recent overview).
Scalar particles can initially be grouped into three main classes, depending on whether they
associate with weak or strong elements in their immediate surface scope. First class: The
most indiscriminate class includes meme in French and even in English - they can associate
both with weak and strong elements. If they associate with a weak element, they must be
appropriately embedded. This is illustrated in (1) and (2).
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(1) a. John read even SEVEN/*ONE books
b. SS & LF: [even [John read sevenF/oneF books]]
(2) a. Mary didn't read even ONE book
b. SS: [not [even [Mary read oneF books]]
c. LF: [even [not [Mary read oneF books]]]
Second class: sogar in German, perfino in Italian and celo in Slovenian fall into the class
of scalar particles that may surface only as strong scalar particles. This is illustrated with
sogar in (3) and (4): superficially it is as if sogar cannot scope out of its base position.
(3) a. Hans has sogar SIEBEN Biicher gelesen
Hans had sogar seven books read
b. SS & LF: [sogar [John read sevenF books]]
(4) a. *Hans hat nicht sogar EIN Buch gelesen
Hans had not sogar one books read
b. SS & LF: [not [sogar [John read oneF book]]
Third class: auch nur, einmal in German, so much as in English and niti in Slovenian fall
into the class of scalar particles that may surface only as weak scalar particles. They must be
appropriately embedded, similar to weak even. This is illustrated in (5) and (6): superficially
it is as if einmal must scope out of its base position and above an appropriate operator. For
now, we simplistically assume that it is the scalar particle itself that moves at LF.
(5) a. *Hans hat einmal SIEBEN/EIN Biicher/Buch gelesen
Hans had sogar seven/one books read
b. SS & LF: [einmal [John read sevenF books]]
(6) a. Hans hat nicht einmal EIN Buch gelesen
Hans had not einmal one books read
b. SS: [not [einmal [John read oneF book]]
c. LF: [einmal [not [John read oneF book]]
The three classes of scalar particles described above are summarized in (7).
(7) Three types of scalar particles
a. Scalar particles that may be weak or strong (even, mme)
b. Scalar particles that may only be strong (sogar, perfino)
c. Scalar particles that may only be weak (auch nur, so much as)
When it comes to scalar particles that are only strong, the implicational relation in (8) can
be abduced from the data discussed by Gast & van der Auwera (2011), e.g. in German and
Italian sogar and perfino may only be strong, while auch nur and anche solo may only be
weak. The relation is not a bi-implication: e.g. in English so much as may only be weak
but there is no scalar particle that is only strong.
(8) Implicational relation for strong scalar particles
There is a scalar particle that is only strong in the language
=> There is a scalar particle that is only weak in the language
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Occurrence under negation. Gast & van der Auwera (2011) further split up the class
of scalar particles that may only be weak into three subclasses. First subclass: Some scalar
particles like so much as may occur both in the immediate scope of negation and in other DE
or non-upward-entailing environments. This is illustrated in (9) which exemplifies an occur-
rence of so much as in the antecedent of a conditional, which is a Strawson-DE environments,
and under clausemate negation.
(9) a. If you so much as read ONE book, you'll pass the exam
b. John didn't so much as read ONE book
Second subclass: Some scalar particles like einmal in German and niti in Slovenian may
only occur in the immediate scope of negation. In (10), we illustrate that niti is illicit in the
antecedent clause of a conditional.
(10) a. *Ce si prebral niti ENO knjigo, bos zdelal
if aux read niti one book, aux pass
b. Janez ni prebral niti ENE knjige
John not read niti one book
Third subclass: Some scalar particles like auch nur in German may not occur in the immedi-
ate scope of negation, though it does occur in other DE environments or non-upward-entailing
environments. This is illustrated in (11): auch nur is felicitous in the antecedent clause of
the conditional but not under clausemate negation.
(11) a. Wenn du auch nur EIN Buch gelesen hast, wirst du bestehen
if you auch nur one book read has will you pass
b. *Hans hat nicht auch nur EIN buch gelesen
Hans has not auch nur one book read
The three classes of scalar particles that may only be weak are summarized in (12).
(12) Three classes of scalar particles that may only be weak
a. Weak scalar particles that may but do not have to occur in the immediate scope
of negation (so much as)
b. Weak scalar particles that may only occur in the immediate scope of negation
(niti, einmal)
c. Weak scalar particles that may not occur in the immediate scope of negation
(auch nur)
At least for languages with negative concord or n-indefinites (e.g. Slovenian, German, Greek),
the implicational relation in (13) appears to hold for weak scalar particles.
(13) Implicational relation for weak scalar particles
There is a scalar particle that may only be weak and that only occurs in the imme-
diate scope of negation in the language =* No other weak scalar particle that may
only be weak occurs in the immediate scope of negation in the language
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5.1.2 Overview of the chapter
Outline of the proposal
The crux of our proposal is that variation in scalar particles is variation in morphology. All
scalar particles share the scalar component that requires its sister to denote a proposition
that is less likely than a relevant alternative. We represent this component with EVEN. There
is another component to scalar particles, which is however not shared by all scalar particles:
a scalar component that requires its sister to denote a proposition that is most likely among
the alternatives (cf. Guerzoni 2003, Lahiri 2010). Following Lahiri (2010), we represent this
component with SOLO. Scalar particles may thus spell out the base-generated configurations
of co-associating components in (14).1
(14) a. [EVEN]
b. [EVEN] [SOLO]
Three main classes of scalar particles. In a language like German, sogar spells out
(14-a), while auch nur spells out (14-b). However, this does not suffice to account for the
peculiar restrictions on the associates of sogar and auch nur. For example, sogar could occur
in a weak minimal clause where EVEN would scope out. We block this by assuming that
sogar and auch nur form a scale and compete for insertion (cf. Amsili & Beyssade 2010 on
aussi 'also' in French):
(15) a. (sogar, auch nur)
b. ([EVEN], [EVEN] [SOLO])
The competition is governed by the rule that you should make your sentence presuppose
as much as possible (Maximize Presupposition). On the one hand, this necessitates sogar
to only be base-generated as adjoined to clauses denoting strong propositions: if the clause
denoted a weak proposition, auch nur would have to be inserted since this would lead to
a stronger global presupposition of the sentence. On the other hand, auch nur may only
be adjoined to clauses denoting weak propositions: if it were adjoined to a strong clause it
would either trigger an incorrect presupposition or SOLO would have to move above EVEN
which we show to be ruled out by an independent condition on focus association.
The combinations in (14) allow us to differentiate three classes of scalar particles: scalar
particles that spell out only (14-a) (sogar), scalar particles that spell out only (14-b) (auch
nur), and scalar particles that may spell out either (even). This leaves two further classes of
scalar particles unaccounted for - classes that differ with respect to occurrence restrictions
under clausemate negation.
Two further classes of scalar particles. Two further classes of scalar particles can be
differentiated: weak scalar particles that occur only in the immediate scope of negation
(einmal in German, niti in Slovenian) and weak scalar particles that may not occur in
'As in the previous chapter, we remain vague about multiple focus association. We call two focus-sensitive
operators co-associating iff they associate with the same focused element. If we were to assume that focus can
only be an associate of one focus particle, we would have to have multiple indexed foci in our representation
and their indexation would be subject to independent principles (cf. Krifka 1991, Beck 2006).
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the immediate scope of negation (auch nur). These two classes emerge if there is another
configuration in the language that scalar particles may spell out (16): a configuration in
which one of the element bears an uninterpretable negative feature.
(16) [EVEN] [SOLOI[uNEG]
Scalar particles that spell out this configuration (einmal, niti) are also compete with other
scalar particles, in particular with those that spell out (14-b) (auch nur, tudi):
(17) ([EVEN] [SOLO], [EVEN] [SOLO][uNEG])
It holds that (16) may be spelled out only under clausemate negation where its feature
can be checked. Elsewhere Condition then dictates that (14-b) may not be spelled out
under clausemate negation but only in other DE or non-upward-entailing environments. The
summary of the variation of scalar particles is in (18): in (18-a) there are scalar particles that
either may surface as strong (even) or must surface as strong (sogar); in (18-b) there are
scalar particles that either may surface as weak (even) or may surface as weak in non-negative
environments (so much as) or must surface as weak in non-negative environments (auch nur;
in (18-c) there are scalar particles that must surface as weak in negative environments (niti).
(18) a. [EVEN] +4 even, meme, tudi; sogar
b. [EVEN] [SOLO] + even, meme, tudi; so much as; auch nur
c. [EVEN] [SOLO][uNEG] M+ niti, oute, einmal
Structure of the chapter
Section 2 introduces two key ingredients that make up weak scalar particles. The first
ingredient is a scalar particle that requires its sister to denote a proposition that is less
likely than a relevant alternative, while the second ingredients requires its sister to denote
a proposition that is more likely than all of its alternatives. Furthermore, we propose that
scalar particles form scales and compete for insertion. The competition is regulated primarily
by the principle that you should use alternatives that have stronger presuppositions if these
presuppositions are satisfied in the context. Another independent principle is operative in
grammar that plays a role in restricting the distribution of scalar particles: Attract Closest.
Together these two principles allow us to correctly differentiate three main classes of scalar
particles.
Section 3 looks at the relationship between weak scalar particles and negation in Slovenian,
Greek, German and Italian. We argue that the obligatory occurrence of some and obligatory
non-occurrence of other scalar particles in the immediate scope of negation should be ex-
plained in terms of an Elsewhere Condition. In languages with negative concord (Slovenian,
Greek, Italian), this parallels other cases of competition between n-words and non-n-words.
In languages without negative concord (German), this parallels the competition between
n-indefinites and regular or negative polarity indefinites.
Section 4 brings the disparate pieces together and presents a parametric framework in
which the distribution of scalar particles is derived. Only two morphological parameters are
required: (i) whether the scalar particles spells out one or two scalar components and (ii)
whether it has a negative feature.
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5.2 Decomposition
This section first describes the constitutive components of scalar particles that may only
associate with a weak element in their immediate surface scope. Subsequently, we argue
that the distribution of strong scalar particles can be derived only if we do not treat the
distributions of scalar particles as being independent of each other. Rather, we propose that
the variation in the distribution of scalar particles partly depends on them competing for
insertion.
5.2.1 Obligatorily weak scalar particles
Decomposition
We propose that obligatorily weak scalar particles spell out two scalar components. The
first component corresponds to even in preceding chapters, while the second component is
its reverse - i.e. its presupposition is the negation of the presupposition triggered by the
first component. We represent the first component with EVEN and the second component
with SOLO, which we model after solo in Lahiri (2010) (cf. also Guerzoni 2003 on auch nur).
The meaning of EVEN is given in (19): its sole semantic contribution is that it triggers a
presupposition that its prejacent is more likely than a relevant alternative in its domain.
(19) [ EVEN ]9gc(C, p, w) is defined only if 3q c C [ p <c q].
If defined, [ EVEN ]9gc(C p, w) 1 if p(w) 1
The second component is defined in (20): it takes a set of alternatives, C, as its first argument
and a proposition, p, as its second argument and it presupposes that the proposition p is
most likely among the alternatives.
(20) [ SOLO ]gc(C, p, w) is defined only if Vq c C [ qAp -+ q <, p].
If defined, [ SOLO jgc(C, p, W) - 1 iff p(w) 1
Structures containing SOLO have meanings along the lines of (21). The only contribution
of SOLO is to trigger the presupposition that its sister denotes the most likely among its
alternatives.
(21) [ [SOLO C1] Peter kissed MaryF9,c(w) is defined only if Vq G { that Peter kissed
x I x is a relevant individual }: q # that Peter kissed Mary -+ q <c that Peter kissed
Mary. If defined, [ [SOLO C 1] Peter kissed MaryF 9 gc(w) = 1 iff Peter kissed
Mary in w
Thus, obligatorily weak scalar particles like auch nur spell out the combination of the two
focus-sensitive operators in (22). The presuppositions of EVEN and SOLO clash in their
base position and so one of them has to scope above an appropriate non-upward-entailing
operator; this explains their non-occurrence in positive episodic sentences.
(22) [EVEN] [SOLO] ++ auch nur
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Some examples of non-upward-entailing operators under which obligatorily weak scalar par-
ticle like auch nur may occur are given in (23)-(25): in (23) auch nur is embedded under
a downward-entailing operator; in (24) it is embedded under a non-monotone quantifier; in
(25) it is embedded under desire predicates. If the respective associates of auch nur were
replaced with strong elements in these examples, the sentences would be infelicitous.2
(23) Ich bezweifle, dass du auch nur EIN Buch gelesen hast
I doubt that you auch nur one book read has
'I doubt that you have read even one book'
(24) Zeig mir auch nur EINE Partei, die sich wirklich ums Volk kiimmert
show me auch nur one party that self really for people care
'Show me even one party that cares for the people!'
(25) a. Man wiinscht sich auch nur einen Politiker dieses Kalibers in Deutschland
one wishes oneself even one politician of this calibre in Germany
'One wishes that there would exists even one politician of this class in Germany'
b. Ich hoffe auch nur 20% von deiner Begeisterung, die du ihm geschenkt
I hope even 20% of your enthusiasm that you him given
hast, bei ihm wach halten zu k6nnen
have with him sustain to be able
'I hope to be able to make him retain even 20% of his excitement'
c. Ich will auch nur eine einzige authentische Studie sehen, die nachweislich
I want even one single authentic study see that controllably
und empirisch einen kausalen Zusammenhang zwischen Spielen und
and empirically a causal connection between games and
(zunehmender!) Gewaltbereitschaft zeigt
growing violent tendendency shows
'I want to see even one empirical study that shows that there is a connection
between violence and games'
The sentence in (23) has the structure in (26): auch nur spells out (22) where the scalar
component EVEN moves above the downward-entailing predicate doubt at LF, while SOLO
stays in situ.
(26) [EVEN C 1 ] [I doubt that [f{qve-Gr} [SOLO Co] you read oneF book]]
The structure in (26) gives rise to the presuppositions in (27-b): the presupposition in
(27-b-i) is that it is most likely that you read one book and is triggered by AT LEAST;
the presupposition in (27-b-ii) is that it is less likely that I doubt that you read one book
than, say, that I doubt that you read two books. The two presuppositions are correct. The
analysis of the sentences in (25) and (26) proceeds along the lines discussed in chapter 2 and
3, respectively.
(27) [ (27-a) ]j9c(w) is defined only if
(i) Vq E { that you read n books I n e N>o }: q <c that you read one book
2 http://www.handelsblatt.com/..., http://www.inahallermann.de/..., http://www.focus.de/...
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(ii) 3q E { that I doubt that you read n books I n E N>0 }: that I doubt that you
read one book <,c q.
If defined, [ (27-a) ]9,(w) = 1 iff I doubt that you read one book in w
As it stands, the assumption that auch nur spells out the configuration in (22) does not
explain the fact that auch nur may associate only with a weak element in its immediate
surface scope: it falsely predicts that if appropriately embedded, auch nur should also be
able to associate with a strong element in its immediate scope. For example, the infelicitous
sentence in (28-a) where auch nur associates with a strong element in its immediate surface
scope could be assigned the structure in (28-b) where SOLO scopes out of its base position
and EVEN stays in situ.
(28) a. #Ich bezweifle, dass du auch nur SIEBEN Biicher gelesen hast
I doubt that you auch nur seven book read has
b. [SOLO Co] [I doubt that [[EVEN C 1] (SOi,-Gu you read sevenF books]]
The scalar presuppositions triggered by the two focus-sensitive operators in (28-b) are correct.
They are given in (29): SOLO presupposes that it is most likely that I doubt that you read
seven books (29-i), while EVEN presupposes that there is a relevant alternative that is more
likely than that you read seven books (29-ii); the assertive meaning of the sentence is that I
doubt that you read seven books. All of these inferences are consistent and may very well
be true in the context.
(29) [ (29-b) ]9,c is defined only if
(i) ~q E { that you read n books I n c N>o }: that you read seven book <c q
(ii) Vq E { that I doubt that you read n books I n c N>0 }: q <c that I doubt that
you read seven books.
If defined, [ (29-a) ]9,(w) = 1 iff I doubt that you read seven books in w
Thus, the structure in (28-b) has to be ruled out on grounds other than having inconsistent
entailments. We propose that it is ruled out because in it a focus-sensitive operator moves
across a co-associating focus-sensitive operator - the structure in (28-b) violates superiority.
That is, if there are two (co-associating) focus-sensitive operators in the structure, one in the
c-command domain of the other, only the higher of the two may move. Slightly differently,
focus particles in (28-b) are attracted by the same target and so their movement is subject
to Attract Closest (30) (Chomusky 1995:280,295).
(30) Attract Closest
a: can raise to target K only if there is no legitimate operation Move # targeting K,
where # is closer to K
5.2.2 Obligatorily strong scalar particles
There are scalar particles that may only be base-generated adjoined to a clause denoting a
strong proposition. An example of such a particle is sogar in German. We propose that these
particles spell out only one of the scalar components that obligatorily weak scalar particles
spell out - namely EVEN.
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(31) [EVEN] ++ sogar
On its own, the morphological rule in (31) does not derive the restricted distribution of
sogar. Namely, the infelicitous sentence in (32-a) can be assigned the LF in (32-b) where
EVEN scopes above doubt. In its scoped position EVEN triggers a correct presupposition
(32-c) and so the sentence should be licit.
(32) a. #Ich bezweifle dass du sogar EIN Buch gelesen hat
b. [EVEN C 3] [I doubt [{VBN-3} you read oneF book]
c. Iq c { that I doubt that you read n books | n E N>o }: that I doubt that Hans
read one book <, q
However, this reasoning ignores the conception of scalar particles as forming scales and
competing for insertion (cf. Amsili & Beyssade 2010 for aussi 'also' in French). In particular,
sogar forms a scale with auch nur:
(33) a. (sogar, auch nur)
b. ([EVEN], [EVEN] [SOLO])
The competition for insertion is governed by the principle of presupposition maximization
that requires you to make your contribution presuppose as much as possible as long as the
presupposition is satisfied (cf. Heim 1991 and others). In the case at hand, the principle
adjudicates between the following alternative structures:
(34) a. X [EVEN C3] [I doubt [1VP3N-34 you read oneF book]]
b. / [EVEN C3 ] [I doubt [[ADD C 2] [SOLO Co] you read oneF book]]
c. => Ich bezweifie dass du auch nur EIN Buch gelesen hat
In (34-a), sogar is inserted; EVEN scopes above doubt at LF. The structure presupposes that
there is an alternative that is more likely than that I doubt that you read one book. In (34-b),
auch nur is inserted; EVEN scopes above doubt at LF while SOLO stays in situ. The structure
presupposes that there is an alternative that is more likely than that I doubt that you read
one book and that it is most likely than that you read one book. The presuppositions of
both (34-a) and (34-b) are satisfied in natural contexts and, furthermore, their assertive
import is the same - that I doubt that you read one book. Accordingly, the structures
denote contextually equivalent propositions. The principle of presupposition maximization
dictates that the structure in (34-b) should be used. This explains why sogar may not
be base-generated as adjoined to a clause that denotes a weak proposition: the respective
structure would violate the principle of presupposition maximization.
5.2.3 Summary
We derived the distribution of obligatorily weak scalar particles from the assumption that
they spell out two mutually inconsistent scalar components and a principle that effectively
precludes movement of focus particles across co-associating focus particles. The crucial
ingredient in our derivation of the distribution of obligatorily strong scalar particles has been
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the assumption that they compete for insertion with the obligatorily weak particles. This
competition account sheds light on the implicational relation described in the introductory
section, repeated below: for there to be a strong scalar particle in the language, there has
to be a scalar particle in the language that triggers stronger global presuppositions if base-
generated as adjoined to a weak clause - i.e. there has to be a weak scalar particle in the
language. If there is no such particle, nothing would prevent the other particles from being
base-generated as adjoined to weak clauses.
(35) Implicational relation for strong scalar particles
There is a scalar particle that is only strong in the language
= There is a scalar particle that is only weak in the language
Finally, there are scalar particles that may spell out both of the two configurations described
above, e.g. even and meme. The summary of the morphological rules for some of the scalar
particles discussed so far is given in (36).
(36) a. [EVEN] *-* sogar, even
b. [EVEN] [SOLO] ++ auch nur, even
5.3 Scalar particles and negation
Obligatorily weak scalar particles often exhibit a peculiar distribution in the scope of nega-
tion, which is left unexplained by having them spell out [EVEN][SOLO]. On the one hand,
some weak scalar particles may only occur in the immediate scope of negation. Two pro-
totypical examples are the n-word scalar additive niti in Slovenian and einmal in German.
On the other hand, some weak scalar particles may not occur in the immediate scope of
negation. Two prototypical examples are tudi 'also' in Slovenian3 and auch nur in German.
This pattern is not restricted solely to Slovenian and German but obtains in many other
languages that have a dedicated weak scalar additive that occurs only under clausemate
negation (e.g. Czech, Polish, Spanish).
5.3.1 N-words, N-indefinites and Elsewhere Condition
Before proceeding to account for the distribution of weak scalar particles under negation,
we describe a parallel pattern in the domain of n-words and n-indefinites in Slavic languages
and German. The distribution of different types of indefinites is often conditioned by what
other indefinites there are in the language. For example, Slavic languages have, on the one
hand, indefinites that are n-words or n-indefinites and, on the other hand, indefinites that
are not n-words but are NPIs or regular indefinites (cf. Pereltsvaig 2004). It holds that under
negation only the featurally most specific indefinites can be used - n-words; indefinites that
are NPIs but not n-words are precluded from such contexts. This is illustrated in (37) for a
Slovenian n-word indefinite nikogar, a plain indefinite nekoga and an NPI wh-indefinite koga.
3 Tudi in Slovenian may also take a strong prejacent. As indicated by the gloss, it may also act as a
non-scalar additive particle.
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(37) a. Janez ni videl nikogar
John not seen no one
b. *Janez ni videl nekoga
John not seen someone
c. *Janez ni videl koga
John not seen who
A similar pattern has been observed also for German n-indefinites: the first indefinite under
negation must be an n-indefinite. This is illustrated in (38) (Jsiger 2010:734): (38-a) contains
an n-indefinite nichts, while (38-b) contains a plain indefinite etwas.
(38) a. Er isst nichts
he eats nothing
b. *Er isst nicht etwas
he eats not something
This pattern is explained by assuming that n-indefinites and n-words have an uninterpretable
[uNEG] feature that competing indefinites lack. This formal feature plays a role solely
for morphology and does not have a semantic reflex. Elsewhere Condition then favors an
insertion of an indefinite that bears a [uNEG] feature over a semantically identical indefinite
wherever the [uNEG] feature can be checked - in the scope of a (possibly covert) clausemate
negation.4
5.3.2 Extension to scalar particles
N-word scalar particles in Slovenian (Spanish, Italian and Greek)
We propose that Elsewhere Condition is also active in restricting the distribution of weak
scalar particles. The relevant pattern is exemplified in (39) and (40) with two particles in
Slovenian: weak tudi may occur in DE and other non-upward-entailing environments that
are not negative, while niti may only occur under clausemate negation.
(39) a. Ce si prebrali tudi ENO knjigo, bos zdelal izpit
if aux read tudi one book, aux pass exam
b. #Ce si prebrali niti ENO knjigo, bog zdelal izpit
if aux read niti one book, aux pass exam
(40) a. #Janez ni prebral tudi ENE knjige
John not read tudi one book
b. Janez ni prebral niti ENE knjige
John not read niti one book
We propose that the two particles have an identical meaning - they spell out EVEN and SOLO.
However, niti additionally bears a [uNEG] feature, which is uncontroversial considering it is
4This can also be implemented in an OT approach to realization of negative features (e.g. by appropriately
ranking the constraints NEGATTR and *NEG of de Swart 2010).
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an n-word. Thus, the configuration that it spells is the one in (41). The uninterpretable neg-
ative feature must be checked locally by clausemate negation; this restricts the distribution
of niti to the scope of clausemate negation.
(41) [EVEN][SOLO][uNEG] ++ niti
This also indirectly restricts the distribution of tudi. Namely, tudi spells out the configuration
in (42) that lacks the uninterpretable negative feature. Since we are assuming that the
featurally most specific particle among niti and tudi must be used under negation, the
former is inserted. Tudi may thus only occur in non-negative environments.
(42) [EVEN][SOLO] +-* tudi
The same reasoning should in principle apply to scalar particles in other negative concord
languages (Spanish, Italian and Greek): n-word weak scalar particles (oute) and non-n-word
weak scalar particles (kan) have the same meanings but differ with respect to having an un-
interpretable negative feature. A principle that requires to insert the featurally most specific
scalar particle whenever you can dictates to insert an n-word weak scalar additive in the
immediate scope of negation and non-n-word weak scalar particles elsewhere. Interestingly,
both in Spanish and Greek, an insertion of an non-n-word weak scalar additive is possi-
ble under clausemate negation if also the n-word weak scalar additive is inserted (43) (cf.
Alonso-Ovalle 2009).
(43) Pedro no habla *(ni) siquiera chino
Pedro not speaks ni siquiera Chinese
As we will see shortly, the interaction between negation, n-words and non-n-word scalar
particles can be quite intricate in a language. More to the point, various other factors
may play a role in determining whether a weak scalar particle may occur under clausemate
negation than just the featural specifity of the respective particle.
N-word scalar additive in German?
We propose that an analysis along the lines above should also be extended to German (nicht)
einmal. As we have indicated above, regular indefinite expressions (etwas 'something,' je-
mand 'someone') and NPI indefinite expressions (je 'ever') have an intriguing distribution
in German: they may not be the first indefinite in the scope of (covert) clausemate negation
- the first indefinite must be an n-indefinite. The structure of a simple sentence containing
an n-indefinite is given in (44) where the negation is abstract (Penka & Zeijlstra 2005).
(44) a. Er isst nichts
he eats nothing
b. [OP[iNEG] [he eats [a thing][uNEG]J
We propose that nicht einmal corresponds to n-indefinites niemand, nichts and kein NP
in the nominal domain and nie in the adverbial domain, while auch nur corresponds to
non-n-indefinites. That is, nicht einmal and auch nur are semantically indistinguishable.
However, nicht einmal has an uninterpretable [uNEG] feature that auch nur lacks. Accord-
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ingly, since featurally most specific elements must be inserted in the immediate scope of
negation, auch nur does not occur there. An example of a structure containing nicht einmal
and its interpretation is given in (45): EVEN scopes above the covert negation operator,
while SOLO is stranded in its base position (45-b). SOLO triggers the scalar presupposition
in (46-d-i) - it is most likely that I read one book. EVEN triggers the scalar presupposition
in (45-d-ii) - there is an alternative that is more likely than that I did not read one book.
Both presuppositions are correct. The assertive meaning of the sentence is that I did not
read one book.
(45) a. Ich habe nicht einmal EIN Buch gelesen
I have not even one book gelesen
b. [EVEN C1] [OP[iNEG] [jEVBN-Gd[SOLO CO][uNEG] I read oneF book]]
c. [ (45-b) ]9'c(w) is defined only if
(i) Vq c {that I read n books I n E N>o}: q f that I read one book -+ q <c
that I read one book,
(ii) ]q C {that I did not read n books I n c N>o}: that I did not read one
book <c q.
If defined, [ (45-b) ]I9'c(w) = 1 iff I did not read one book in w
We now check the extent to which the proposed correspondence between indefinites and
scalar particles obtains in German - that is, whether nicht einmal and auch nur exhibit the
same behavior as their proposed counterparts niemand and jemand in the nominal domain.
In German, only the first indefinite in the immediate scope of (covert) negation may be an
n-indefinite; all other indefinites may not be n-indefinites. This is illustrated in (46) (Jdger
2010:794): only the first indefinite is an n-indefinite (niemand); all subsequent indefinites
are either plain (etwas) or NPI indefinites (je).
(46) Niemand hat {je, *nie} {etwas, *nichts} gegessen
no one has {ever, never} {something, nothing} eaten
If auch nur corresponds to non-n-indefinites, it is predicted to be licit in the presence of
another n-indefinite, e.g. nie 'never' or niemand 'no one.' This is borne out:
(47) a. Niemand hat auch nur EIN Buch gelesen
no one has even one book read
b. Ich habe nie auch nur EIN Buch gelesen
I have never even one book read
Furthermore, auch nur is predicted to be able to occur with nicht einmal in the same clause:
namely, if nicht einmal corresponds to an n-indefinite, a subsequent occurrence of auch nur,
which corresponds to non-n-indefintes, should be licit. This prediction is borne out:5
(48) a. Ich habe nicht einmal dem PETER auch nur EINE Mark gegeben
I have not even the Peter even one mark gave
5The (b)-example: http://www.deutschegrammophon.com/...
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b. Aber ich glaube, dass nicht einmal der OPERNFREMDE auch nur EINE
but I believe that not even the Opera novice even one
einzige Minute Leerlauf empfand
single minute idleness felt
The predictions are different for Slavic languages where there is no constraint against
having multiple n-words under negation and thus all indefinites (or scalar particles) under
clausemate negation have to be n-indefinites (or negative scalar particles). In accordance
with our above characterization, tudi should not be able to occur under clausemate negation
at all, even if it follows n-indefinites. This predictions is borne out:
(49) a. *Nihee ni pozdravil tudi MARIJE
no one not greeted also Mary
b. *Janez ni dal niti PETRU tudi ENE marke
John not given even Peter also one mark
Languages without n-word scalar particles
In languages where there is no scalar particle that would have a [uNEG] feature, the predic-
tion is that all weak scalar particles should be able to occur under negation. The reason is
that there is no competition between negative and non-negative scalar particles and so Else-
where Condition does not apply. An example of such a language and such scalar particles
are so much as and even in English. They may both occur under negation:
(50) a. I didn't even see PETER
b. Mary didn't so much as OPEN that dissertation
5.3.3 Summary
The limited distribution of niti in Slovenian, oute in Greek, (nicht) einmal in German and
other negative scalar particles follows from the fact that they bear a [uNEG] feature. This
feature is checked by an overt negative operator in languages like Slovenian and a covert
negative operator in German. Their non-negative counterparts, e.g. tudi in Slovenian and
auch nur in German, share the meaning of niti and nicht einmal but lack the negative
feature. They are precluded from occurring under negation by Elsewhere Condition that
dictates to use the featurally most specific competing element.
(51) a. [EVEN][SOLO] ++ tudi, auch nur
b. [EVENJ[SOLOJ[uNEGJ + niti, nicht einmal
In languages in which there are no scalar particles that bear a [uNEG] feature, the prediction
is that all weak scalar particles should be able to occur in the immediate scope of negation.
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5.4 Conclusion
This chapter looked at the cross-linguistic variation of scalar particles. Five classes of scalar
particles were identified with respect to (i) whether they may associate with weak or strong
elements in their immediate surface scope and (ii) whether the scalar additive may occur
in the immediate scope of negation (cf. Gast & van der Auwera 2011). An account of the
variation of scalar particles was provided according to which scalar particles spell out one
(or two) of the following combinations of operators:
(52) a. [EVEN] ++ sogar (Germ), celo (Slo); tudi (Slo), meme (Fra), even
b. [EVEN] [SOLO] ++ auch nur (Germ), ne fit-ce que (Fra); tudi, meme, even
c. [EVEN] [SOLO][uNEG] ++ nicht einmal (Germ), niti (Slo), ni (Spa), oute (Gre)
These combinations of operators are in competition. The best candidate is determined by
Maximize Presupposition - this forces the scalar particles that spell out (52-a) to be strong.
Another condition was shown to be relevant for the distribution of weak scalar particles:
Attract Closest. This condition restricts movement of SOLO, which is base-generated below
EVEN. Finally, if there is a scalar additive that spells out (52-c) in the language, all else
being equal, only it may occur in the immediate scope of negation.
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CHAPTER 6
Additivity
If even associates with a weak element, it may have an acceptable interpretation only if
it is embedded under an appropriate non-upward-monotone operator. If even associates
with a strong element, there is no limitation on its distribution. Although this is the most
prominent difference between the two types of occurrences of even, it is not the only one.
Another class of differences relates to their additive behavior. The goal of of this chapter
is to explore these differences and to get a better empirical understanding of the additive
inferences accompanying even. An account of additivity is provided according to which
even is morphologically complex: the scalar and the additive presupposition are triggered
by different components of even and may take distinct scopes at LF.
6.1 Introduction
This section describes some asymmetries between weak and strong even with respect to their
additive entailments in a variety of environments investigated in the preceding chapters.
6.1.1 Weak even and non-additivity
The discussion of the occurrences of weak even in downward-entailing, non-monotone and
certain modal environments in the preceding chapters revolved around the question of
whether the scalar presupposition triggered by even in those sentences is correct. The second
defining property of the scalar particle - its additivity - was left aside. This is reflected in
the meaning adopted for it:1
(1) [ even ]J4(C, p, w) is defined only if 3q c C [ p <c q].
If defined, [ even ]9,c(C, p, w) = 1 iff p(w) = 1
'Although weak even spells out in addition to (1) a scalar component SOLO, as discussed in chapter 5,
we largely ignore it in this chapter for perspicuity. Nothing would change in our discussion and derivations
if we did not ignore it.
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The behavior of weak even in non-monotone and certain modal environments appears
to warrant the choice of not encoding additivity into the lexical entry for even. Namely,
even does not appear to trigger any additive inferences in these sentences. We show this
in the remainder of the section. Weak even in non-monotone environments: The sentence
in (2-a) may be used to describe a situation in which no one in the whole world read that
dissertation, though exactly four people opened it.
(2) a. Exactly four people in the whole world have even OPENED that dissertation
b. #> Exactly four people in the whole world have read that dissertation
We have argued that the sentence in (2-a) is licit if even moves above the non-monotone
quantifier at LF (4). Thus, if additivity were encoded in the meaning of scoped even, it
would be expected that (3-a) entails (3-b) or some similar proposition, contrary to fact.
(3) [even Co] [exactly 4 people ...] 1 [even-Gd} t openedF that dissertation]
Weak even in imperatives and under desire predicates: The imperative in (4-a) imposes
no additional requirements on the hearer other than to show the speaker one political party
that cares for the people.
(4) a. Show me even ONE political party that cares for the people
b. # You must show me two or more political parties that care for the people
Weak even under factive desire predicates behaves the same way: (5-a) may be used to
describe a situation in which John came to our party exactly once.
(5) a. It's great that John came to our party even ONCE
b. '* John came to our party twice or more times
Finally, the same pattern can be observed with the occurrences of weak even in Strawson
DE environments. For example, the sentence in (6) fails to have any additive entailments:
it can be used to describe a state in which John believes that he did not do anything else
with the book except open it. This is confirmed by the felicity of the discourse in (7).
(6) a. John is sorry that he even OPENED the book
b. #> John believes that he read the book
(7) John is sorry that he even OPENED the book, though he is glad that opening it is
the only thing he did with it
The structure of (6-a) is given in (8) where even moves above the downward-entailing op-
erator at LF. As suggested by (6) and (7), it does not trigger an additive inference in its
scoped position.
(8) [even Co] [John is sorry that [feven- Gj he openedF the book]]
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6.1.2 Strong even and additivity
The facts are different if even takes surface scope above the respective embedding operators
and associates with a weak element in their scope. This is illustrated in (9): the sentence in
(9-a) presupposes that John is sorry that he read the book and, due to the factive presuppo-
sition of sorry, it consequently entails that John believes that he read the book. Accordingly,
the discourse in (10) is infelicitous.
(9) a. John is even sorry that he OPENED the book
b. => John believes that he read the book
(10) #John is even sorry that he OPENED the book, though he is glad that opening it is
the only thing he did with it
The contrast between (6)/(7) and (9)/(10) is puzzling. Namely, on our current assumptions,
the two sentences have the same LF, given in (11). Accordingly, there should not be any
difference between the sentences with respect to the inferences that they give rise to.
(11) [even Co] [John is sorry that he openedF the book]
6.1.3 Preview of the resolution
We propose that even spells out two components: a scalar component EVEN and an additive
component ADD. The former is the bearer of the scalar presupposition, while the latter is the
bearer of the additive presupposition; the two particles associate with the same focused ele-
ment. Positive episodic sentences with even have the schematic structure along the following
lines:
(12) [EVEN] [ADD] [T ... XPF
The scalar component scopes out of its base position if its associate is weak; it potentially
strands the additive component. This is schematized in (13).
(13) [EVEN] [+ OP [ [ADD] [f ... XPF -.-
The additive component is devised so that it cannot give rise to local uninformativity or
overinformativity (contradiction) (cf. Rullmann 1997). Accordingly, it does not give rise to
any additive inference when it is adjoined to a clause that denotes a weak proposition. This
property of the additive component is also responsible for why additive inferences are not
always generated with strong even (14) (cf. von Stechow 1990, Rullmann 1997 and others).
(14) Yesterday, John even danced only with SUE #> John danced (only) with other people
6.1.4 Another puzzle about weak even and additivity
The occurrences of weak even in the scope of desire predicates and in imperatives trigger
inferences along the lines of (15-c). That is, the sentences do not seem to convey the assertive
meaning that their counterparts without even convey.
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(15) a. I hope to win even a BRONZE medal
b. * I hope to win a bronze medal
c. =* I hope to win a medal & I am okay with a bronze medal
Furthermore, the occurrences of weak even in the scope of strictly downward-entailing op-
erators have additive entailments along the lines of (16-b).
(16) a. I didn't win even a BRONZE medal
b. =t I didn't win any medal
We propose that this data follows from the fact that when EVEN scopes out of its base
position, a co-associating AT LEAST operator is present in the embedded clause (cf. Schwarz
2005). This suffices to derive the desired inferences in (15) and (16).
(17) a. [EVEN] [OPD. [{E-VE-N [ADD] [AT LEAST] ... XPF
b. [EVEN] ... [OPMOD ... [{E-VE-NJ [ADD] [AT LEAST] ... XPF ---
6.2 Downward-entailing environments
6.2.1 Description of the data
If the associate of even occurs in a DE environment, different entailments come about de-
pending on whether even is on the surface above or below the DE operator. The relevant
configuration is thereby one where the associate of even is weak. Namely, if the associate of
even is strong, even must take scope below the DE operator since it would otherwise trigger
a false scalar inference. This is illustrated in (18) and (19) where understand is taken to be
the strongest element on the entailment scale (open, read, understand).
(18) I doubt that John even UNDERSTOOD the book
=- there is a more likely alternative than that John understood the book
(19) #1 even doubt that John UNDERSTOOD the book
=> there is a more likely alternative than that I doubt that J understood the book j
If the associate of even is a pragmatically weak element, both surface scopes of even are
acceptable. Now, in many cases no difference with respect to additive inferences is noticeable
between the two surface scopes of even. This is exemplified by the two sentences in (20) that
arguably have the same entailments, given in (21).
(20) a. I doubt that John even OPENED the book
b. I even doubt that John OPENED the book
(21) a. there is a more likely alternative than that I doubt that J. opened the book
b. => that I doubt that John read or understood the book
However, if the associate of even is a weak predicate and the respective operator is pre-
suppositional, e.g. sorry in (22)-(23), the two types of sentences will have distinguishable
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interpretations. As accentuated in the introduction, (22-a) does not trigger an additive in-
ference. That is, it allows for the possibility that John did not do anything with the book
except open it.
(22) a. John is sorry that he even OPENED the book
b. Additive inference:
This is different for (23): the sentence in (23-a) presupposes that John is sorry that he read
or/and understood the book and, due to the factive presupposition of sorry, this entails that
John believes that he read or/and understood the book. Thus, the sentences in (22-a) and
(23-a) trigger distinct additive inferences.
(23) a. John is even sorry that he OPENED the book
b. Additive inference: John is sorry that he read or/and understood the book
(= John believes that he read or/and understood the book
6.2.2 Previous approaches
There are three classical approaches to additive inferences triggered by weak and strong
even: the scope-theoretic approach and two versions of the ambiguity approach. The scope-
theoretic approach by Karttunen & Peters (1979) assumes that even triggers an existential
additive presupposition in (24-ii). Furthermore, even may move at LF, especially if it would
otherwise trigger an illicit scalar presupposition (cf. Lahiri 1998).
(24) [ even 9'c(C, p, w) is defined only if
(i) Vq E C [q p -4  p < q
(ii) q e C [q p A q(w) -1]
If defined, [ even ]9'c(C, p, w) = 1 iff p(w) = 1
Accordingly, this approach assigns both the sentence in (22) and the sentence in (23) the
same logical form (25-a). This is clear for the case in (23) where even c-commands sorry
already at surface structure. In the case of (22) where even is embedded in a lower clause
at surface structure, it must move above sorry at LF since it would otherwise trigger an
illicit scalar presupposition. Hence, the scope-theoretic approach of Karrtunen and Peters
has no way of deriving the different interpretations of (22) and (23) - namely, one cannot
assign different meanings to the same structure. Both sentences are predicted to trigger the
additive presupposition in (25-b).
(25) a. [even C0] [John is sorry that he openedF the book]
b. [ (25-a) ]9'c(w) is defined only if 3q e {that John is sorry that he x the book
x is read, understand}: q(w) = 1
The first version of the ambiguity approach is by Rooth (1985) and it assumes that in
Strawson DE environments evenNpl can be used, which triggers an existential presupposition
that is the opposite of that of the regular even (26-ii).
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(26) [ evenNpI gc(C, p, w) is defined only if
(i) Vq E C [q p - q < p ]
(ii) 3q E C [q p A q(w) = 0]
If defined, [ even ]9,c(C, p, w) = 1 iff p(w) = 1
Applied to our example in (22), which has the structure in (27-a), this yields the additive
presupposition that John didn't read the book or that he didn't understand the book. The
presupposition projects and we get the inference that John believes that he didn't read or
that he didn't understand the book (27-b).
(27) a. [John is sorry that [[evenNpI C0] he openedF the book]]
b. [ (27-a) ]9,c(w) is defined only if V w' E Dox(J,w) [ 3q E {that John x the book
x is read, understand} I q(w) = 0 ] ]
As argued conclusively by Wilkinson (1996), this entailment is not warranted. This is demon-
strated by the felicitous discourse in (28) that indicates that (22) may be used in a context
in which John believes that he read and understood the book, contrary to (27-b).
(28) John read the book and understood its contents and is now sorry that he even
OPENED it
The second version of the ambiguity approach is Rullmann's pragmatic treatment of
additive presupposition. It does better than Rooth's approach. He derives the lack of the
additive presupposition in (22) in the following way (Rullmann 1997:60):
[F]rom the fact that the proposition [that John opened the book] is true we
cannot conclude anything about the propositions that are less likely than [it].
[...] We can thus explain the absence of the existential presupposition in [(22)]
from the fact that the proposition expressed by the complement clause is at the
same time presupposed to be true (due to the factivity of be sorry) and more
likely than all the alternative propositions (due to the scalar presupposition of
NPI even).
In the case of (23), even is generated above sorry: its prejacent is least likely and asserted
to be true. The pragmatic reasoning then leads us to conclude that all the more likely alter-
natives are true as well. This derives the asymmetry between the two examples. However,
as with other instantiations of the ambiguity approach, Rullmann's treatment is hostage to
the requirement of explaining the distribution of evenNpI - it is not clear why evenNpI should
only be able to occur in DE and other non-upward-entailing environments.
6.3 Decomposing even
To deal with the above puzzle, we decompose even into two components - EVEN and ADD.
The additive component may stay in situ and is devised so as not to yield uninformativity
or contradiction, which is inspired by Rullmann's (1997) treatment of additivity.
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6.3.1 Scalar component EVEN
In (29) we repeat our characterization of the focus-sensitive operator EVEN from the preced-
ing chapters. Its primary contribution is that it triggers the presupposition that there is an
alternative in its domain that is more likely than its prejacent.
(29) [ EVEN ]9,c(C, p, w) is defined only if 3q e C [p <c q.
If defined, [ EVEN J9c(C, p, w) - 1 iff p(w) 1
A trivial example illustrating the semantic contribution of EVEN is given in (30): it leaves
the assertive meaning of the sentence untouched and triggers a scalar presupposition.
(30) [ [EVEN Co] [JohnF arrived late] ]19c(w) is defined only if Iq E Cog {that x
arrived late I x is a relevant person}: that John arrived late <, q. If defined,
[[EVEN Co] [JohnF arrived late] ]9'c(w) = 1 iff John arrived late in w
6.3.2 Additive component ADD
The second component of even is ADD. It triggers a restricted universal additive presuppo-
sition, while its assertive component is vacuous (cf. van Rooy 2003).2 We stipulate that the
restriction of the universal additive presupposition is to propositions that are more likely
than it and are not incompatible with it. This prevents a structure with ADD from presup-
posing propositions that would entail the prejacent of ADD or its negation and thus make
the prejacent (locally) redundant or contradictory.
(31) [ ADD ]g,c(C, p, w) is defined only if Vq E C [(p <c q) A (pnq # 0) -+ q(w) = 1].
If defined, [ ADD ]9gc(C, p, W) 1 iff p(w) = 1
An example illustrating the semantic contribution of ADD is given in (32): just like EVEN,
it leaves the assertive meaning of the sentence untouched. It triggers the additive presup-
position that John read the first four volumes (these volumes are more likely to be read by
John than the fifth volume).
(32) [ [ADD Co] [John read the fifthF volume] ]9,c(w) is defined only if Vq e Co C {
that John read the n-th volume I n E N>o } [ (that John read the 5th volume <,c q) A
(that John read the 5th volume n q # 0) -+ q(w) = 1 ], only if John read the first four
volumes in w. If defined, [ [ADD Co] [JohnF read the fifthF volume g c__(w)
1 iff John read the fifth volume in w
6.3.3 Derivation: high scope of even
We derive first the additive entailment of (23). The sentence in (23) has the structure in (33)
and the meaning in (34). Two presuppositions are triggered by the sentence: the additive
presupposition is described in (33-i), while the scalar presupposition is described in (33-ii).
2A transposition of our analysis into an existential one is trivial.
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(33) [EVEN C6 ] [ADD C5 ] [John is sorry that he openedF the book]
(34) [ (34-a) J9'c(w) is defined only if
(i) Vq E C5 C {that John is sorry that he x the book | x is open, read, understand}:
(that John is sorry that he opened the book <e q) A (that John is sorry
that he opened the book n q f 0) -+ q(w) = 1
(ii) 3q E C6 C {that John is sorry that he x the book I x is open, read, understand}:
that John is sorry that he opened the book <c q
If defined, [ (34-a) ]9'c(w) = 1 iff John is sorry that he opened the book in w
The additive presupposition requires every alternative to the prejacent that is more likely
than it and compatible with it to be true. If the domain of ADD is restricted to, say,
the prejacent and the proposition that John is sorry that he read the book, the sentence
presupposes that John is sorry that he read the book. Namely, that John is sorry that he
read the book is both compatible with the prejacent and arguably more likely than it. The
scalar presupposition of the sentence is that there is an alternative that is more likely than
the prejacent; this is verified by the proposition that John is sorry that he read the book.
6.3.4 Derivation: low scope of even
We now compute the additive inference of the sentence in (22). A possible structure of the
sentence is as given in (35): EVEN scopes above sorry, while ADD stays in situ.
(35) [EVEN C 3 ] [John is sorry [[ADD C6] he openedF the book]]
The sentential complement of sorry in (35) has the meaning in (36). Since it holds that the
proposition that John opened the book is entailed by all of the alternatives, it is at least as
likely as them - i.e. no alternative is more likely than it. This means that the sentential
complement of sorry in (35) does not trigger an additive presupposition.
(36) [ [ADD C6] [he openedF the book] 19'c(w) is defined only if Vq c C6 C {that
John x the book | x is open, read, understand}: (that John opened the book <c q)
A (that John opened the book n q $ 0) -+ q(w) = 1.
If defined, [ [ADD C6] [he openedF the book] ]9,c(w) - 1 iff John opened the
book in w
Accordingly, the only presupposition triggered by (35) is the correct scalar presupposition
described in (37). The structure does not trigger any additive inference.
(37) [ (35) ]9'c(w) is defined only if 3q E C3 C {that John is sorry that he x the book I x
is open, read, understand}: that John is sorry he opened the book <c q. If defined,
[ (35) ]J'c(w) = 1 iff John is sorry that he opened the book in w
If the parse of the sentence in (22) were such that both EVEN and ADD would move above
sorry, an additive presupposition would be triggered, as we have seen in the preceding section.
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To conclude: We have been able to derive different inferences for the sentences in (22)
and (23) by assigning them distinct structures. This is possible because even spells out a
scalar and an additive component, which may take distinct scope at LF. In particular, the
additive component may be stranded when EVEN moves and is effectively neutralized when
it occurs adjoined to a clause that denotes a weak proposition. In this respect, our analysis
bears resemblance to ambiguity approaches to even, which can also assign distinct structures
to the two sentences. Finally, the account makes an intricate prediction: if (i) even were
base-generated as adjoined to a clause that denotes neither the strongest nor the weakest
proposition among its alternatives and (ii) EVEN could move above an operator where its
scalar presupposition would be satisfied, a scalar inference that is generated high in the
clause and an additive inference that is generated low in the clause should be detectable.
We have not yet been able to adequately test this prediction.
6.4 Positive episodic environments
6.4.1 Description of the data
Even in positive episodic sentences tends to trigger an additive presupposition:
(38) a. Even JOHN arrived late
b. Additive inference: Some/All other relevant individuals arrived late
However, it is known at least since von Stechow (1990) and Rullmann (1997) that even in
some cases does not trigger an additive inference in positive episodic sentences. This is
illustrated by the examples in (39).' In none of these examples is it reasonable to claim that
the focal stress is anywhere but on the capitalized words and that, accordingly, the additive
presupposition is weaker than what we would expect it to be with stress on capitalized words
(though see the discussion in Wilkinson 1996).
(39) a. A: Is Claire an ASSISTANT professor?
B: No, she's even an ASSOCIATE professor
b. A: Mary won bronze medal
B: No, she even won SILVER medal
c. Yesterday, John even danced only with SUE
(40) a. She's even an ASSOCIATE professor
b. Additive inference:
6.4.2 Previous approaches
Theories that assume that even in positive episodic environments uniformly triggers an
additive inference are in trouble: although in many cases they make a correct prediction, as
3There is some disagreement among the speakers about the acceptability of these examples. Interestingly,
some speakers do report some kind of an event additive inference for these examples. For instance, some
speakers find (39-c) acceptable only if there has been a previous event in which John danced only with x
where x is distinct from Sue. A more comprehensive empirical study is mandated.
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in (38), they falter when faced with examples like (40). Two prominent examples of such
theories are Karttunen & Peters (1979) and Rooth (1985), according to which the sentence
has a contradictory inference, as is illustrated in (41). Their riposte to this issue would
have to be that in examples like (41), the additive presupposition is somehow systematically
cancelled.
(41) #[ [even Co] [she is an associateF professor] ]19'c(w) is defined only if Claire is
an assistant or a full professor in w.
If defined, [ [even Co] [she is an associateF professor] ]9'c(w) = 1 iff Claire is
an associate professor in w
An approach that does not assume additivity as part of the lexical meaning of even
faces the opposite challenge: it predicts the correct inference for (40) but struggles with
cases where additive inference does obtain (38). If a proponent of such an approach could
derive the additive inference in (38) on independent pragmatic grounds, he would be in a
better shape than someone who encodes additivity into lexical semantics of even. Namely, he
would not have to stipulate a cancellation mechanism that is tailored solely to the additive
presupposition of even. Rullmann (1997:59) attempts to do just that:
Even can only be used if the speaker intends the hearer to draw a scalar inference.
This condition on the use of even can be thought of as a conventional but non-
truthconditional aspect of its meaning, in much the same way that part of the
conventional meaning of but is to draw a contrast between the two conjuncts.
Thus, the fact that the speaker uses even in [(38)] presupposes that the asserted
propositions [that John arrived] is the least likely of the alternative propositions,
but also justifies the hearer in drawing the conclusion that the other (more likely)
propositions in the set of alternatives are also true. In this way what used to be
called the [additive] presupposition can be derived form the combination of the
assertion and the scalar presupposition.
This characterization by itself is enough to derive the additive entailment in (38). But
it requires (40) to have an illicit additive inference as well. To eliminate this, Rullmann
(1997:61) assumes that for the hearer to be justified to draw an additive inference, some
kind of 'pragmatic entailment' needs to obtain between it and the prejacent:
[In (40) ], the alternatives (assistant, associate, and full professor) are mutually
exclusive, and hence there is no entailment relation between them, not even a
pragmatic one. As a result, neither "Claire is an associate professor" nor "Claire
is a full professor" can be inferred from the asserted proposition "Claire is an
associate professor" in combination with the scalar presupposition of the sentence.
The pragmatic explanation is thus simply that the use of even justifies the hearer in con-
cluding that whatever alternative is 'pragmatically entailed' by the prejacent (and thus
compatible with it) and more likely than it is presupposed.
To summarize: To account for the empirical generalization in (42), the standard ap-
proaches to even in positive episodic sentences either assume that even triggers an additive
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presupposition that may be systematically cancelled (Karrtunen and Peters' and Rooth's
approach) or they assume that even triggers no additive presupposition and that an additive
inference is derived post-compositionally by some kind of pragmatic reasoning (Rullmann's
approach).
6.4.3 Derivation
As before, we propose that even in the sentences in (42-a) is the spell-out of the two focus-
sensitive operators introduced above - the additive particle ADD and the scalar particle EVEN
(42-b). Since the semantics that we put forward for ADD incorporates Rullmann's (1997)
consistency requirement, we make the same prediction for (42-a) as he does.
(42) a. Claire is even an ASSOCIATE professor
b. [EVEN C9] [ADD C8 ] [Claire is an associateF professor]
Namely, the additive presupposition of (42-b) is the one given in (43). Since it holds that
the proposition that Claire is an associate professor is incompatible with all the alternatives
- that Claire is an assistant professor, that Claire is a full professor - no alternative satisfies
the restrictor of the universal quantifier in (43) and so no alternative is presupposed.
(43) [ (42-b) ]J9c(w) is defined only if Vq E {that Claire is an x professor | x is assistant,
associate, full}: (that Claire is an associate professor <c q) A (that Claire is an
associate professor n q -/ 0) -+ q(w) =1
The structure in (42-b) also triggers a scalar presupposition that there is an alternative that
is more likely than that Claire is an associate professor. The presupposition is verified by
the proposition that Claire is an assistant professor.
6.5 Exclusive and other types of associates
6.5.1 Description of the data
The first puzzle concerning exclusive associates relates to modal environments: When the
sister of even in its base position is such that its alternatives are mutually exclusive, the
meaning of the sentential complement of a desire predicate containing a weak even is distinct
from the meaning of its counterpart without even. This contrast is illustrated in (44).
(44) a. Mary hopes that her daughter will win even a BRONZE medal
b. > Mary hopes that her daughter will win a bronze medal
c. -> Mary hopes that her daughter will win at least a bronze medal
The sentence in (44-a) conveys that Mary hopes for her daughter to win a bronze or a silver
or a gold medal. This is distinct from the meaning conveyed by (43-b) that Mary hopes for
her daughter to win a bronze medal.
The second puzzle concerning exclusive (and other) associates relates to DE environ-
ments: the sentence in (45-a) entails (45-b). That is, it is not possible to utter (45-a) in a
context in which it holds that I won some medal other than bronze.
154
(45) a. I didn't win even a BRONZE medal
b. =- I didn't win any medal
6.5.2 Previous approaches and the decompositional approach
All previous approaches to even make the wrong prediction for (44-a). Namely, they all
assume that even is truth-conditionally vacuous. So, the sentence should have the meaning
conveyed by (46). Furthermore, the sentence in (44-a) does not entail that Mary hopes for
her daughter to win some medal other than bronze nor does it entail that Mary believes
that her daughter will not win bronze or that she will not win gold. That is, the additive
inferences predicted by Karttunen & Peters' and Rooth's accounts, respectively, are false.
(46) Mary hopes that her daughter will win a bronze medal
All previous approaches make a more or less correct prediction for (45-a). For example,
the scope-theoretic approach assigns the sentence the structure in (47-a) and the additive
presupposition in (47-b). Rooth's approach predicts (45-a) to have the same presupposition
and in Rullmann's pragmatic approach a similar inference is derived as well.
(47) a. [even C 1] [not [I won a bronzeF meda]]
b. [ (47-a) ],c(w) is defined only if 3q E {that I didn't win an x medal I x is
bronze, silver, gold}: qf4 that I didn't win a bronze medal A q(w) = 1
The decompositional approach described above makes a wrong or inadequate prediction
on both counts. It assigns the sentence (44-a) the same meaning that the sentence (46) has.
Furthermore, it does not derive any additive inference for (45-a) since it allows the sentence
to have the structure in (48) where ADD is in the scope of negation: the alternatives over
which ADD quantifies in (48) are all incompatible with the prejacent and so no additive
presupposition is triggered.
(48) [EVEN C1] [not [ADD Co] [I won a bronzeF meda]]
6.5.3 Derivation: AT LEAST
We assume that there is an appropriate covert existential or disjunctive operator in the
sentential complements of the above sentences (Schwarz 2005).4 More generally, whenever
EVEN scopes out of its base position, an existential operator is inserted. We define it as in
(49): the operator quantifies over the alternatives determined by the focus structure of its
complement and asserts that its propositional argument or a less likely alternative is true.
(49) [AT LEAST ]9,c( , C, p, w) = 1 iff 3r E C [(r < p ) A ( r(w)=1)
4 Schwarz (2005) assigns the meaning in (49) to the scalar particle auch nur in German, which corresponds
to weak even. Schwarz discusses solely the occurrences of auch nur in DE environments and our discussion
of weak even in these environments mirrors his discussion of auch nur.
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The sentence in (44-a) has the structure in (50-a) where we assume that all three covert
operators associate with bronze.5 The structure is assigned the assertive meaning in (50-b).
Namely, the prejacent of EXH in (50-a) denotes the proposition that Mary hopes that her
daughter won a bronze or a silver or a gold medal. The alternatives over which EXH quan-
tifies include the proposition that Mary hopes that her daughter will win a silver or a gold
medal. The output of the exhaustification operator is that the prejacent is true and that the
latter alternative, which entails the prejacent, is false (50-b). The meaning that we obtain
corresponds to the intuitions about (44-a): namely the sentence conveys that Mary hopes
that her daughter will win at least a bronze medal.
(50) a. [EVEN C 2] [EXH C 1] [Mary hopes [[AT LEAST Co] her daughter wins a
bronzeF medal]
b. If defined, [ (50-a) ]9'c(w) - 1 iff Mary hopes that her daughter will win a
bronze or silver or gold medal and it is not the case that she hopes that her
daughter will a silver or gold medal in w iff Mary hopes that her daughter will
win a medal and she is okay with her daughter winning a bronze medal in w
The negative sentence in (45-a) has the structure in (51-a) where EVEN scopes above
negation and AT LEAST is inserted in the base position of EVEN. The structure has the
assertive meaning in (51-b): it is the negation of the proposition that I won at least a bronze
medal. This corresponds to the intuitive meaning of the sentence.
(51) a. [EVEN C 1] [not [[AT LEAST Co] I won a bronzeF medal]]
b. If defined, [ (51-a) ]J9,'(w) = 1 iff I did not win a bronze or a silver or a gold
medal in w
6.5.4 Summary
We have proposed a decompositional approach to even according to which distinct objects
bear the scalar and the additive presupposition. This allowed us to derive the correct predic-
tions about the additive inferences accompanying even that associates with an element that
forms an entailment scale with its alternatives. However, the analysis failed to derive the
correct inferences for modal and DE examples where the associate of even and its alterna-
tives do not stand in an entailment relation. This was remedied by assuming that movement
of EVEN involves an insertion of AT LEAST at the base-position of EVEN.
6.6 Two puzzles
We conclude the chapter with two open problems for the analysis sketched above as well as
for other approaches discussed in this chapter. They relate to the behavior of weak even
in some environments that are not strictly DE - i.e. in non-monotone environments and in
Strawson DE environments.
5We leave ADD out of the representations since, as we have seen above, it does not make a noticeable
semantic contribution in these examples.
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6.6.1 A puzzle about non-monotone quantifiers
We have pointed out in the introduction that (52-a) does not entail (52-b). The scope-
theoretic approach to even by Karttunen & Peters, however, predicts that the entailment
does hold. Namely, they assign (52-a) the structure in (53-a) where even scopes above the
non-monotone quantifier; even is predicted to trigger the presupposition in (53-b).
(52) a. Exactly four people in the whole world have even OPENED that dissertation
b. #> Exactly four people in the whole world have read that dissertation
(53) a. [even C2] [exactly 4 people ...] 1 [ ti openedF that dissertation]
b. T (53-a) ]I9c(w) is defined only if exactly four people in the whole world read
that dissertation in w
The approach we advocated above predicts no entailment along the lines of (53) since we
disassociate additivity from the scalax component of even. The structure that we assign to
the sentence in (52-a) is in (54). Since AT LEAST does not effectively change the meaning of
its prejacent, the structure only conveys that exactly four people in the whole world opened
that dissertation and that this is less likely than a relevant alternative, say, that exactly four
people in the whole world read that dissertation.
(54) [EVEN C2] [exactly 4 people in the whole world 1
[[ADD C1] [AT LEAST Co] ti openedF that dissertation]]
A switch to an exclusive associate, however, brings out a weakness in our approach: a
prediction is made that is too weak. For example, the sentence in (55-a) entails both (55-b)
and (55-c). We predict it to entail at most (55-c). Namely, the sentence in (55-a) is assigned
the structure in (56). This structure has the assertive meaning that exactly four people in
the whole world won a bronze or a silver or a gold medal. We cannot derive the inference in
(55-b) in our system.
(55) a. Exactly four people in the whole country have won even a BRONZE medal
b. => Exactly four people in the whole country have won a bronze medal
c. -> Exactly four people in the whole country have won a medal
(56) [EVEN C2] [exactly 4 people in the whole world] 1
[[AT LEAST Co] ti won a bronzeF medal
6.6.2 A puzzle about factive desire predicates
Schwarz (2005:164-5) noticed in his discussion of auch nur under surprise that an analysis
that assumes that the meaning of auch nur corresponds to AT LEAST predicts a weaker
factive presupposition for sentences where auch nur is in the scope of surprise than what
actually obtains. His considerations naturally extend to our treatment of weak even under
factive desire predicates. For example, it holds that (57-a) entails (57-b). We predict it
to entail at most (57-c) due to the presence of an AT LEAST operator in the sentential
complement of the desire predicate in (57-a).
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(57) a. John is glad that he won even a BRONZE medal
b. -> John won a bronze medal
c. => John won at least a bronze medal
This is in stark contrast with the behavior of weak even under non-factive desire predicates
where, as we have observed above, the pattern in (58) obtains. It is not immediately clear
how the presuppositional 'no at least' fact in (57) and assertive 'at least' fact in (58) can be
reconciled.
(58) a. John would like to win even a BRONZE medal
b. > John would like to win a bronze medal
c. => John would like to win at least a bronze medal
6.6.3 A puzzle about at least
There exists a class of examples that seem to suggest that the preceding issue might not
be endemic to even. In some configurations - e.g. when it is base-generated high in the
clause - the focus-sensitive particle at least leads to parallel inferences as even did in desire
statements. This is illustrated in (59) and (60). (59-a) has a free choice reading described
in (59-b) - that is, (59-a) does not entail that John hopes to win a bronze medal but that
he hopes to win a bronze or some shinier medal. An additional inference is triggered that
bronze is the least preferred medal that he wants to win.
(59) a. John hopes to at least win a BRONZE medal
b. -> John hopes to win a medal & John is okay with winning the bronze medal
& John is okay with winning the silver medal & John is okay with winning the
gold medal
The inference is different if we replace the non-factive desire predicate with the factive glad.
Namely, (60-a) entails (60-b), which mirrors the pattern that we have observed in (57).
(60) a. John is glad that he at least won a BRONZE medal
b. =- John is glad that he won a bronze medal & John won a bronze medal
Thus, (59) and (60) seem to be another instance of a paradigm where a focus-sensitive
operator appears to have a disjunctive or indefinite interpretation at the assertive level with
non-factive predicates (it triggers free choice), while with factive predicates a non-disjunctive
meaning is projected.
6.7 Conicusion
We have provided an account for an asymmetry between additive entailments triggered by
(i) even that associates with a weak element in its immediate scopes and scopes above ap-
propriate operators at LF and (ii) even that associates with a weak element but is generated
above those operators. The asymmetry is exemplified in (61)-(62).
158
(61) a. John is sorry that he even OPENED the book
b. Additive inference:
(62) a. John is even sorry that he OPENED the book
b. Additive inference: John is sorry that he read or/and understood the book
We proposed that even consists of an additive and a scalar component. The former may
be stranded in the lower clause in (61). In the embedded clause it then fails to trigger an
additive presupposition since it denotes a universal quantifier that is restricted to alternatives
more likely than the prejacent of the additive component (cf. Rullmann 1997).
To deal with the cases where the associate of even does not form an entailment scale with
its alternatives, we have assumed that there is additional existential operator AT LEAST in
the clause in which EVEN is base-generated and from which it scopes (cf. Schwarz 2005). We
concluded the chapter by presenting two issues for such a treatment. The first issue involved
entailments of sentences in which weak even occurs under non-monotone quantifiers, while
the second issue involved entailments of sentences in which weak even occurs under factive
desire predicates (due to Schwarz 2005). Finally, we pointed out that the peculiar behavior of
even across factive and non-factive desire predicates might not be endemic to it but appears
to also be found with at least some instances of at least.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion
The three main objectives of the dissertation have been (i) to describe and explain the dis-
tribution of weak scalar particles - weak even, in particular - in non-downward-entailing
environments, (ii) to explain the distribution of NPIs in non-downward-entailing environ-
ments, and (iii) to develop a parametric account of typological differences among scalar
particles. Finally, we have tried (iv) to gain a better understanding of the additive infer-
ences accompanying scalar particles.
Scalarity
Even that associates with a weak predicate in its immediate surface scope - weak even - has
a restricted distribution. We have identified two (or three) previously undiscussed classes of
environments where it may occur:
" Weak even under non-monotone quantifiers
" Weak even under desire predicates (non-factive, factive)
" Weak even in imperatives
We have shown that these occurrences of weak even can be properly understood only if
one adopts the scope-theoretic approach to even (Karttunen & Peters 1979, Lahiri 1998).
Namely, only this type of approach can shed light on the particular conditions that need to
obtain in the context for weak even to be acceptable in these environments.
Polarity
The restricted distribution of weak even mirrors the distribution of NPIs. Linebarger (1987)
and Kadmon & Landman (1993) have observed that NPIs may occur in two non-downward-
entailing environments: under non-monotone quantifiers and factive desire predicates. We
add imperatives and non-factive desire predicates to the list (cf. Giannakidou 2006):
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e NPIs under non-monotone quantifiers
" NPIs under desire predicates (non-factive, factive)
" NPIs in imperatives
The strong correlation in their distribution and context-dependence between NPIs and weak
even in these environments suggests that we are dealing with closely allied phenomena.
Indeed, we explain these occurrences of NPIs and their context-dependence by assuming
that their licensing is governed by a covert even (cf. Krifka 1995, Chierchia 2006).
Typology
Even is a member of a variegated family of scalar particles. We have identified two issues
left unexplained in previous work on cross-linguistic distribution of scalar particles:
" Distribution and import of so-called concessive scalar particles
* A parametric account of typology of scalar particles
We propose that scalar particles are morphologically complex (following Guerzoni 2003,
Lahiri 2010), they form scales and compete for insertion. We have shown that the typology
of scalar particles can be captured by just two morphological parameters. Concessive scalar
particles additionally spell out an existential quantifier.
Additivity
We show that weak even under non-monotone quantifiers, under desire predicates, in imper-
atives and under factive predicates provides new evidence for the following observation:
* Scoped even does not trigger an additive inference
We propose that this is because even decomposes into a scalar and an additive component.
The scalar component may move at LF and strand the additive component, which triggers
no additive inference if it has a weak prejacent. Some issues were discussed for the approach
that originate with examples where the associate of even does not form an entailment scale.
The solution we adapted from Schwarz (2005) effectively reduced the associates that form a
non-entailment scale to ones that form an entailment scale.
161
APPENDIX A
(Non-)monotonicity of desire
The goal of this appendix is to evaluate some arguments that have been put forward for the
non-monotonicity of desire predicates. It is shown that von Fintel's (1999) doubly-relative
modal analysis of desire predicates, coupled with some uncontroversial assumptions concern-
ing the evolution of modal discourses, does better in modeling their inferential behavior than
negation-related analyses (e.g. Heim 1992).
A.1 Overview of the inference patterns
There are several types of challenges related to inference patterns that an adequate semantics
of desire should explain: (i) the presuppositions triggered in the scope of desire predicates
like want need not be taken to be desirable (Good Samaritan), (ii) many inferential patterns
impress one as showing that desire predicates are monotonic (Valid upwardness) and, in the
same spirit, (iii) it seems that incompatibility between two propositions makes it impossible
to desire both of them if the background is fixed (True conflicts). However, (iv) some desire
discourses are suggestive that desire predicates are non-monotonic rather than monotonic
(Weakening failure, Free choice). Finally, (v) desire does not seem to be closed under (be-
lieved) material implication (Non-closure). Most of these puzzles have their antecedents in
deontic and epistemic logic where there is a long tradition in finding counterexamples to the
schemata in (1). Accordingly, many of the responses that we will present to the challenges
in (i)-(v) will simply be transplants of what has been proposed to deal with the violations
of (1). In the following, we describe the puzzles mentioned in (i)-(v) in more detail.
(1) a. If p entails q, then ought p entails ought q
b. If p entails q, then believe p entails believe q
Ad (i). Good Samaritan. The sentential complement of want in (2-a) triggers the
presupposition that there has been a murder. The sentence as a whole does not entail (2-b)
but rather (2-c). An adequate semantic theory of want should provide the resources to
account for this pattern. The intuition reflected in (2) is that the (derived) context in which
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the presupposition in (2-a) needs to be satisfied is John's belief state rather than some other
context. Thus, an adequate semantics of want should make such a context accessible.
(2) a. John wants to solve the murder
b. > John wants there to be a murder
c. -> John believes there has been a murder
(D1) Good Samaritan
If the sentential complement of a desire predicate triggers the presupposition
p, it does not have to hold that the attitude holder desires that p
Ad (ii). Valid upwardness. In many ways desire predicates exhibit the same inferential
behavior as doxastic modals and attitude predicates. For example, there are many instances
of intuitively valid weakening inferences, i.e. instances where desire predicates seem to exhibit
a proper upward-entailing behavior. Three examples of this sort are given in (3). Moreover,
von Fintel (1999:120) points out that the sequences that would violate this schema and that
do not involve explicit shifts in background assumptions are infelicitous (4). This is expected
on an approach that assigns doxastic and priority modal expressions a similar semantics. For
an approach that does not treat them as sufficiently alike this data might be problematic.
(3) a. I want to read five books
.*. I want to read one book
b. I want to meet Mary and Sue
.*. I want to meet Mary
c. I want to buy the couch at 25% discount
.-. I want to buy the couch
(4) a. #I don't want to buy the couch but I do want to buy it at a 25% discount
b. #I want to buy the couch at a 25% discount but I don't want to buy it
(D2) Valid upwardness
If want p is true, q is not disjunctive and p entails q, then want q is true
Ad (iii). True conflicts. There are many discourses that appear to contradict the gener-
alization in (D2). The first example suggestive of non-monotonicity of desire predicates that
we will look at involves the apparent possibility of having conflicting desires. This clashes
with upwardness, which requires that desiring a certain proposition to obtain entails that
you desire any proposition that you believe is incompatible with it not to obtain. The two
examples in (5) appear to contradict this theorem (cf. Levinson 2003): their felicity suggests
that it is possible to have conflicting desires.
(5) a. [John knows he can only marry one of Polly and Sue:]
John wants to marry Polly and he wants to marry Sue
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b. [John knows he can only accept one of the two job offers:]
John wants to accept job offer A but he also wants to accept job offer B
Although a semantic theory of desire (and desire discourses) should account for the felicity of
(5), doing so can be achieved without allowing for genuinely conflicted cognitive agents (see
Levinson 2003 for the same intuition). There are at least two strategies on how to achieve
this. According to both of these we would not be dealing with authentic conflicts in (5) but
with interpretations of the conjoined sentences with respect to different backgrounds. First
strategy: it could be argued that a shift in perspective occurs between the two sentences,
which is a well-known phenomenon in the study of modality (6).
(6) [John asks a friend for advice. As always, the friend is evasive:]
Given Kantian principles, you ought not lie in this situation, but given the utilitarian
principles, you ought to lie in this situation
Accordingly, the first sentence of (5-a) might be interpreted with respect to a background in
which wealth is accentuated (Polly but not Sue is rich), while the second sentence might be
interpreted with respect to a background in which beauty is accentuated (Sue but not Polly
is beautiful). Second strategy: instead of a shift in perspective, we might be dealing with a
shift in what alternatives are taken into consideration when evaluating the two sentences. For
example, the first sentence of (5-a) might be interpreted with respect to the Smith women,
while the second sentence may be interpreted with respect to the Wilson women. In any
case, both lines of thinking about (5) find support in examples like (7).
(7) a. [John knows he can only marry one of Polly and Sue:]
#John wants to marry both women
b. [John knows he can only accept one of two job offers:]
#John wants to accept both job offers
If genuinely conflicting desires may be consistent, we would expect the sentences in (7) to
be licit: they may be assigned LFs along the lines of (8-a) where the problematic DP scopes
out of the embedded clause and leads to the interpretation in (8-b).
(8) a. [both job offers] 1 [John wants to accept t1]
b. Vx E {job offer A, job offer B}: John wants to accept x
The markedness of the sentences in (7) suggests that the felicity of the discourses in (5)
might not be due to a consistency of genuinely conflicting desires but due to either a shift
in perspective or alternatives under consideration. If the shift is blocked as in (8), the
contradictory nature of genuinely conflicting desires surfaces. An adequate semantics of
desire should be able to cash out a kind of shift discussed above - a shift in perspective or in
alternatives under discussion - or something equivalent that would predict the asymmetry
between (5) and (7).
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(D3) True conflicts
If p is incompatible with q, then want p is incompatible with want q if the
parameters are held fixed
Ad (iv). Weakening failure. Another example of a discourse that at first glance appears
to violate upwardness is given in (9) (von Fintel 1999:120). At one point of the discourse it is
conveyed that John does not want to buy the couch, while at another point of the discourse
it is conveyed that John does want to buy the couch (at 25% discount). All else being equal,
the discourse suggests, first, that John not wanting to buy the couch and John wanting to
buy the couch at 25% discount are compatible, second, that want is non-monotonic and,
third, that upwardness in (3) was illusory. However, in the same spirit as with conflicting
desires, it is conceivable that (9) does not teach us anything about the monotonicity of desire
predicates. Rather, (9-b) and (9-d) could be argued to be evaluated with respect to different
beliefs, as argued by von Fintel. That is, there is a shift in the beliefs of the attitude holder
between (9-b) and (9-d).
(9) John is in a furniture store, looking at a couch that has a very scary price-tag. The
salesman comes up to kim and the following conversation takes place:
a. Salesman: Would you like to buy this couch?
b. John: No
c. Salesman: Would you like to buy it at a 25% discount?
d. John: Yes
(D4) Weakening failure
A discourse containing not want p and want q where q entails p can be
felicitous if appropriate information is introduced between the two sentences
Free choice. The final and most prominent type of examples that at first glance push the
idea that desire predicates are non-monotonic involves invalid disjunctive weakening. This
is illustrated in (10), which is adapted from a famous example in the literature on deontic
logic due to Ross (1944) (cf. Aloni 2007).
(10) a. John wants to send this letter
b. .-. John wants to send this letter or burn it (invalid inference)
Although it does not involve entailment, a parallel effect is arguably exhibited by the falsity
(or infelicity) of (11), which is an adaptation of a famous "simplification of disjunctive an-
tecedent" examples in the literature on counterfactuals (cf. Alonso-Ovalle 2009). It suggests
that if an attitude holder desires one disjunct (that there is good weather), this does not
mean that he also desires a disjunction where the second disjunct is clearly undesirable or
even impossible (that there is good weather or that the sun turns cold).
(11) #John wants there to be good weather or the sun to turn cold
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A shift in John's beliefs cannot be made responsible for the pattern in (10) and (11). Namely,
if the proposition that John sends his letter is compatible with someone's beliefs, then any
proposition entailed by it should also be compatible with her belief, say, that John sends or
burns the letter. On the other hand, tinkering with the perspective would not buy us much
either. Nonetheless, it is obvious that some kind of shift occurs in (10): roughly, (10-a) is
evaluated without attending to the second disjunct in (10-b), while this is not the case in
(10-b). Similarly, (11) feels off because the proposition expressed by the second disjunct
- that the sun turns cold - is disconnected from the explicit desires and beliefs that John
holds. A desire semantics should be able to provide some insight into this process.
(D5) Free choice
Want p or q entails okay p and okay q. Want p does not entail want p or q
Ad (v). Non-closure. The last type of inference patterns that a theory of desire predicates
should account for involves non-closure of desire under believed implication. That is, it
appears that the argumentation schema in (12) is invalid.
(12) a. a wants p
b. a believes that p iff q / p implies q
c. .-. a wants q
This has been discussed by Villalta (2008) on the basis of examples like (13): the premises
in (13-ab) do not entail the conclusion in (13-c).
(13) a. I want to be rich
b. I believe that I will be rich iff I work hard now
c. .-. I want to work hard now
This schema resembles to some extent the one we have described in our discussion of con-
flicting desires. Two possible explanations have been suggested for conflicting desires: that
we are dealing with a shift in either the perspective or the alternatives under discussion.
Due to the family resemblance between the cases, it would not be far-fetched that one of the
shifts is also responsible for the pattern in (13). Another candidate is a shift in alternatives:
it can be argued that in evaluating (13-a) one is not sensitive to the alternative that I work
hard. Indeed, such intuitions have been pursued in the debate concerning closure properties
of other attitude predicates, a debate that goes back to at least Plato's Meno. An adequate
semantics of desire should not stand in the way of a uniform resolution of the problem of
(non-)closure under attitude predicates.
(D6) Non-closure
Desires are not closed under believed material implication
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A.2 Good Samaritan
A.2.1 The statement of the paradox
Heim's (1992) paper on the projection behavior of presuppositions in the scope of attitudes
begins by looking at projection of presuppositions in the scope of a belief operator. For
example, the presupposition of the definite description the murder - that there is a unique
murderer - is filtered: (14-a) presupposes (14-b).
(14) a. I believe that I solve the murder
b. . I believe that there was a murder
This is intuitively due to the fact that presuppositions of a proposition have to be satisfied in
the context in which the proposition occurs, whereby context is modeled as a set of possible
worlds. In the case of embedding under attitude predicates, this context will not be basic but
derived: each world w in the basic context is assigned a set of possible worlds compatible
with my attitude in w; taken together, these sets form the derived context in which the
presupposition must be satisfied (Stalnaker 1999). Thus, the derived context in (14) is the
union of my belief states in all the different worlds in the basic context and the presupposition
of the complement of believe in (14) must be satisfied in it. Equivalently, we can say that
the presuppositions of the sentential complement of believe must be satisfied in each of my
belief states in the context. In the case at hand, this amounts to me believing that a murder
occurred. If we switch to desire predicates, the derived context does not involve my desire
states but rather my belief states in the context:
(15) a. I want to solve the murder
b. * I want there to have been a murder
c. = I believe that there was a murder
This pattern reproduces the so-called Good Samaritan Paradox from deontic logic (Prior
1958). The original formulation of the paradox was, as noted by Portner (2009), with a
non-restrictive relative clause, in the scope of ought (16). Non-restrictive relative clauses
have a projective meaning component similar or maybe identical to that of presuppositions.
(16) a. It ought to be the case that Jones helps Smith who has been robbed
b. > It ought to be the case that Smith has been robbed
Another instance of the Good Samaritan Paradox discussed by Heim involves invalid
inferences of the kind given in (17).
(17) a. I want to teach on Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester
b. #> I want to teach next semester
The parallelism to the preceding examples is clear once we recognize that in examples like
(17-a) the modification with on Tuesdays and Thursdays can be accompanied by the projec-
tive inference that I will be teaching. This is either due to the inherent focus on the modifier
(Geurts & van der Sandt 2004) or to some other mechanism (cf. Simons 2001, Schlenker
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2008 on quasi-presuppositions). In any case, the facts in (17) fall under the Good Samaritan
Paradox: although the sentential complement in (17-a) triggers the projective inference that
I teach, it does not hold that I want to teach. Importantly, if it is not taken for granted that
I will teach, i.e. the quasi-presupposition of the modification is suspended, the entailment
between the sentences in (17) does go through, as we will see in the discussion of parallel
examples instancing the puzzles of Valid upwardness and Weakening failure.
A.2.2 Resolution in negation-related analysis (Heim 1992)
In Heim's (1992) system, a meaning of a clause is its context change potential (ccp), where
contexts are treated as sets of worlds. A clause may trigger a presupposition, making its ccp
a partial function, i.e. a function that is defined only for contexts that satisfy a particular
property. Transposing the non-dynamic characterization in ?? from chapter 3 into ccp
notation, we get the meaning in (18) (Heim 1992:197).
(18) [ want ]c(-, p, i) = Ac: c C {w | [Dox(i,w) + p {0, Dox(i,w)}}. {w E c | for
every w' E Dox(i,w): SIM(w', Dox(i, w) + p) i,, SIM(w', Dox(i,w) + -,p))}
The immediate context in which the presupposition of p has to be satisfied is the belief state
of the agent, Dox(i,w). The basic context, c, must accordingly satisfy the condition that
every world in it is such that the belief state of the agent is such that the presupposition of p
is satisfied in it. This is illustrated on the prototypical example of the Good Samaritan: the
sentence in (18-a) entails that I believe that there was a murder (19-d). In such a context, the
proposition that I want there to be a murder is undefined (20). This explains the invalidity
of the inferential pattern in (21): if the premise is defined (and true), the conclusion is
undefined.
(19) a. [I want [PRO to solve the murder]]
b. If defined, [ (19-a) ]1(c) ={w e c: for every w' E Dox(I,w):
SIM(w', Dox(I,w) + [ I solve the murder ]) >-,,
SIM(w', Dox(I,w) + -[ I solve the murder ]))}
c. Dox(I,w) + [ I solve the murder ] is defined only if Dox(I,w) C {w I there
is a unique murder in w}
d. c + [ I want [PRO to solve the murder] I is defined only if c C {w | Dox(I,w)
C {w' I there is a unique murder in w'}}
(20) [ I want there to have been a murder ] (c) is defined only if
c C {w I [Dox(I,w) + [ There was a murder ] g {0, Dox(i,w)}}
(21) a. I want to solve the murder
b. *> I want there to have been a murder
The same reasoning applies to the example with adverbial modification (22). Namely, it
follows from the innocuous assumption that adverbial modification exhibits presupposition-
like behavior (Simons 2001, Schlenker 2008) that (22-a) is only defined for contexts in which
I teach, as is shown in (22-d). In such a context the proposition that I want to teach is
undefined (23).
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(22) a. [I want [PRO to teach on Tuesdays and Thursdays]]
b. If defined, [ (22-a) ] (c) ={w E c: for every w' E Dox(I,w):
SIM(w', Dox(I,w) + [ I teach on Tuesdays and Thursdays ]) >,,
SIM(w', Dox(I,w) + -i[ I teach on Tuesdays and Thursdays ]))}
c. Dox(I,w) + [ I teach on Tuesdays and Thursdays ] is defined only if Dox(I,w)
C {w I I teach in w}
d. c + I[ I want [PRO to teach on Tuesdays and Thursdays] ] is defined only
if c C {w I Dox(I,w) 9 {w I teach in w}}
(23) [ I want to teach I (c) is defined only if c C {w I [Dox(I,w) + [ I teach ] ( {0,
Dox(i,w)}}
(24) a. I want to teach on Tuesdays and Thursdays
b. * I want to teach
To summarize: Presuppositions of sentential complements of desire predicates must be
satisfied in the belief states of the attitude holder in Heim's system. Since desire predicates
trigger an independence presupposition - the beliefs of the attitude holder must be indepen-
dent of the propositional argument of the desire predicate - the Good Samaritan Paradox
does not arise: if you desire something that presupposes that p, you in fact cannot desire
that p (with respect to the same modal parameters).
A.2.3 Resolution in doubly-relative modal analysis (von Fintel 1999)
Desire predicates are relativized to two conversational backgrounds (von Fintel 1999). As
in the standard modal semantics (Kratzer 1991), the first conversational background - the
modal base - delivers a set of doxastically accessible worlds of the attitude holder, while
the second conversational background - the ordering source - provides the propositions that
are used in ordering this set. The ordering of worlds proceeds in the following manner: the
ordering source g assigns the agent i and the evaluation world w a set of propositions g(i,w).
These propositions are used to define a partial ordering among worlds along the lines of (25);
a strict partial order is derived in the standard way.
(25) a. w' <g(i,w) w" _df for all p c g(i,w): if w" E p, then w' e p
b. w' <g(i,w) w" =df w' <g(i,w) w" and -,(w" <gi,w) w')
In the case of desire predicates, the set delivered by the ordering source corresponds to the
set of desires that the agent has at the evaluation world (26-a). For perspicuity, we assume
that among doxastically accessible worlds one can always find a set of worlds that are not
worse (with respect to the given ordering source) than other doxastically accessible worlds
(limit assumption). These worlds constitute the set of best worlds according to the desires
of the agent, which we will call desire-best worlds (26-b). The desire statement a want p
then states that all the desire-best worlds for a in w, which are determined by the doxastic
modal base f and the bouletic ordering source g, are such that p is true in them (26-c).
(26) a. g(iw) = {p I p is a desire of i in w}
b. BEST(<,X,Y) ={w I w E X and there is no w' E X such that w' <y w}
c. If defined, I want ]1 ,c(f, g, p, i, w) = Vw' E BEST(Of(i,w), g(i,w)) [ p(w') = 1
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Similar to the negation-related analysis, the modal analysis of want in (26-c) contains a belief
component and an ordering component. The derived context in which the presupposition of
the sentential complement of the desire predicate must obtain can thus be set to the belief
context of the speaker. This can be done in different ways. Perhaps the most intuitive
way of achieving this is via the independence presupposition of want (27). Namely, the
independence presupposition of want is satisfied - and defined - only if the propositional
argument of want is independent of the belief context of the attitude holder - and thus
defined in the belief context of the attitude holder (27).
(27) [ want ]9,c(f, g, p, i, c) is defined only if c C {w I nf(iw) + p {fnf(i,w), 0}}. If
defined, [ want ]9,c(f, g, p, i, c) ={w E c | BEST(nf(i,w), g(i,w)) g p}
Since this will have as a consequence that all the best worlds will be such that the presup-
positions of the desired proposition will be true in them, the explanation of the inferential
patterns in (28) proceeds in the same fashion as in Heim's proposal, as emphasized by von
Fintel (1999:117): want presupposes that the proposition denoted by its sentential comple-
ment is independent from the belief state of the attitude holder - i.e. it is neither entailed nor
incompatible with the attitude holder's belief state. As a result, the propositions denoted
by the sentences on the right in (28) are undefined in the contexts in which the propositions
denoted by the sentences on the left in (28) obtain.
(28) a. I want to solve the murder I want there to be a murder
b. I want to teach on Tuesdays and Thursdays :k I want to teach
A.3 Conflicting desires
The prototypical example of conflicting desires is the following (Levinson 2003):
(29) [John knows he can and will only visit one European city this summer]
John would like to visit Paris and John would like to visit Rome
Both analyses entertained above predict the discourse in (29) to be infelicitous if the modal
parameters are fixed and going to Paris and going to Rome are the only alternatives possible.
Namely, on von Fintel's analysis both sentences in (29) involve quantification over the same
set of worlds. Since none of John's belief worlds (and accordingly none of his desire-best
worlds) is such that both propositions hold of it, the discourse is inconsistent. On Heim's
analysis, if the attitude holder takes it to be possible to go to Rome and to be possible to
go Paris, the sentence has a contradictory meaning - it cannot be that all the closest worlds
worlds in which John goes to Paris are better than the closest worlds in which John goes to
Rome and vice versa. However, this changes if we add a third alternative into the mix - that
John goes to Geneva. It still holds that von Fintel's analysis predicts a contradiction; the
negation-related analysis, however, does not anymore. Let us explicate this. First: assume
that all the closest worlds to John visiting Paris worlds in which he doesn't visit Paris are
John visiting Geneva worlds and that all the closest worlds to John visiting Rome worlds in
which he doesn't visit Rome are John visiting Geneva worlds as well. An inference of the
discourse is then that John visiting Paris and John visiting Rome worlds are better than
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John visiting Geneva worlds. Second: without loss of generality, assume that the closest
world to any John visiting Rome world in which John visits Paris is a specific John visiting
Paris world. The first sentence predicates of this world that it is better than the respective
John visiting Rome worlds. In the same vein, assume that the closest world to any John
visiting Paris world in which John visits Rome is a specific John visiting Rome world. The
second sentence predicates of this world that it is better than the respective John visiting
Paris worlds. All these inferences are mutually consistent. They are all true in a 'grass is
greener on the other side' type of scenario described in (30).
(30) If John is in Rome, he would prefer to be in Paris (though he prefers Rome to
Geneva). If John is in Paris, he would prefer to be in Rome (though he prefers Paris
to Geneva)
Thus, the negation related analysis predicts that it is possible to have conflicting desires in
appropriate contexts (under an appropriate similarity relation). So, at first sight, it seems
that the negation related analysis has an upper-hand.
Since von Fintel's approach predicts the sequence in (29) to be illicit, something extra
needs to be said to capture its felicity. And a natural explanation is at hand: the discourse
is felicitous because the sentences are consistent. And the sentences are consistent because
we interpret them with respect to different conversational backgrounds, in particular with
respect to different ordering sources. The first sentence is interpreted with respect to a
background in which the visit of Paris is privileged (and the visit of Rome is disprivileged),
while the second sentence is interpreted with respect to a background in which the visit of
London is privileged (and the visit of Paris is disprivileged). Two baby backgrounds, which
differ only in whether they contain the proposition that John practices French or that John
practices Italian, are given in (31); the two sentences in (30) can be true with respect to
their backgrounds.
(31) a. [John [wants fi g2] PRO to visit Paris] and [John [wants fi g3] PRO
to visit Rome]
b. g2 (J, w*) = {John visits a European city, John practices French, ...}
c. g3 (J, w*) ={John visits a European city, John practices Italian, ...}
A prediction of the modal account is that if the backgrounds cannot vary, the appearance of
consistency of conflicting desires should disappear. This is borne out in (32).
(32) [John knows he can and will only visit one European city this summer. The candi-
dates under discussion are Paris and Rome]
#John wants to visit both cities this summer
The sentence in (32) may in principle have the structure in (33). The quantifier phrase both
cities takes matrix scope but the ordering source and ordering question remain fixed. As
predicted, the sentence has a distinct flavor of contradictoriness in the given scenario. The
modal analysis thereby regains the upper-hand: the negation-related analysis predicts that
the structure in (33) may have a consistent interpretation (see the Geneva scenario above).
(33) [both cities] 9 [John [wants f2 g4] [PRO to visit t9 this summer]
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A.4 Valid upwardness
Another strength of the modal analysis is that it can straightforwardly explain valid upward
inferences. The validity of inferences in (34) follows in the modal semantics from the fact
that if a set of desire-best worlds is a subset of a given set, it is also a subset of any superset
of that set.
(3) a. I want to read five books
.-. I want to read one book
b. I want to meet Mary and Sue
. . I want to meet Mary
On the other hand, the negation-related analysis does not predict these facts. The easiest
way to show this is to illustrate it on a concrete example. Imagine that the situation in
(34) obtains. It is an empirical fact that both sentences in (35) are evaluated as true in this
situation. That is, even such an elaborate contextual setup as (34) does not mitigate against
the intuition that desire predicates license upward-monotone inferences.
(34) John is playing a game of dice. He bets his entire fortune that the sum of the two
dice that are thrown will be either less than four, in which case he gets his fortune
back, or more than eight, in which case he doubles his fortune. In case the sum of
the dices is between four and eight he loses everything
(35) a. John wants the dice to sum up to more than eight
b. John wants the dice to sum up to more than three
The contextual setup may be re-described in the following way: John prefers for the sum to
be more than eight to less than four; he prefers the sum to be less than four than between
four and eight. The negation-related analysis predicts (35-a) to be true in the given context
- (36-a) is true (= the worlds in which dice sum up to more than seven are better than all
the other worlds) - and (35-b) to be false in the given context - (36-b) is false (= the worlds
in which the dice sum up to exactly two are better than worlds in which the dice sum up to
exactly four).
(36) a. Vw' c Dox(J,w): SIM(w', Dox(J,w)n[ the dice sums up to more than seven 19'')
>-J,w SIM(w', Dox(J,w)i[ the dice sums up to more than seven ]9'c)
b. Vw' E Dox(J,w): SIM(w', Dox(J,w)n[ the dice sums up to more than three ]9,c)
>J,w SIM(w', Dox(J,w)1[ the dice sums up to more than three ]9'C)
A.5 Weakening failure
The next few puzzles are transferred from the literature on sequences of counterfactuals and
deontic logic. Following von Fintel (1999), we show that instead of being arguments for
non-monotonicity, they instance parameter-shift, comparable to what we have encountered
in our discussion of True conflicts.
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A.5.1 Procrastinate
We begin by reproducing a well-known puzzle from the literature on deontic logic - the so-
called Procrastinate puzzle. The puzzle has been prominently discussed by Jackson (1985)
and Jackson & Pargetter (1986) and concerns the intuitive failure to treat ought p and q as
equivalent to ought p and ought q, as the axioms of standard deontic logic demand (37) (cf.
Williams 1965).
(37) ought p & ought q ++ ought (p & q)
Jackson (1985:195) and Jackson & Pargetter (1986:235) illustrate this failure on the backdrop
of the context in (38). They report that in such a situation (39) holds: it is false that Prof
Procrastinate ought to accept the invitation (39-a) but it is true that Prof Procrastinate
ought accept the invitation and write (38-b).
(38) Professor Procrastinate receives an invitation to review a book. He is the best person
to do the review, has the time, and so on. The best thing that can happen is that he
says yes, and then writes the review when the book arrives. However, suppose it is
further the case that were Procrastinate to say yes, he would not in fact get around
to writing the review. Not because of incapacity or outside interference or anything
like that, but because he would keep on putting the task off. (This has been known
to happen.) Thus, although the best that can happen is for Procrastinate to say
yes and then write, and he can do exactly this, what would in fact happen were he
to say yes is that he would not write the review. Moreover, we may suppose, this
latter is the worst that can happen. It would lead to the book not being reviewed
at all, or at least to a review being seriously delayed
(39) a. Prof Procrastinate ought not to accept the invitation
b. Prof Procrastinate ought to accept the invitation and write the review
We can transpose the Procrastinate puzzle to bouletic modals (cf. Lassiter 2011). Assume
that I am informed about Prof Procrastinate's habits as described in (38) and am asked
about what I would like Prof Procrastinate to do: I can truthfully reply that I do not
want Prof Procrastinate to accept the invitation (because I suspect that no review would
be forthcoming) but, after some insistent further prodding, I can also truthfully claim that
I want him to accept and write the review (40).
(40) a. I don't want Prof Procrastinate to accept the invitation
b. I want Prof Procrastinate to accept the invitation and write the review
All else being equal, this is unexpected on the modal analysis that we have introduced
above. If (40-a) is true, it holds that all of my desire-best possibilities are such that Prof
Procrastinate does not accept the invitation to review in them. This conflicts with the
assertion of the (40-b) that all of my desire-best possibilities are such that Prof Procrastinate
accepts the invitation (and reviews). We are at a modal impasse. However, we have been at
similar impasses before, as we will argue below.
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A.5.2 Order in the sequence
Related facts that seem to contradict the predictions of the modal analysis but that do not
involve conjunction are discussed by von Fintel (1999). The starting point of his discussion
is an example by Asher (1987), which was picked up by Heim (1992), which purports to
show that Nicholas not wanting a ride on the Concorde does not preclude that he wants a
free ride on the Concorde. Heim (1992:194) describes the situation in the following way:
Imagine that Nicholas is not willing to pay the $3,000 that he believes it would
cost him if he flew to Paris on the Concorde, but he would love to fly on the
Concorde if he could get the trip for free. Under these circumstances [(41-a)] is
true, yet [(41-b)] is false, despite the fact that taking a free trip on the Concorde,
of course, implies taking a trip on the Concorde.
(41) a. Nicholas wants a free trip on the Concorde
b. Nicholas wants a trip on the Concorde
If the described judgments are correct, this is a problem for the modal analysis in the same
way that the Procrastinate example is a problem: (41-a) asserts that all of Nicholas's desire-
best possibilities are possibilities in which Nicholas has a free trip on the Concorde. If (41-b)
is false, this means that some of Nicholas's desire-best possibilities are such that it does not
hold of them that Nicholas has a (free or any other kind of) trip on the Concorde. The
modal analysis predicts that (41-a) cannot be true if (41-b) is false, contrary to the reported
judgments.
In the discussion of (41) and its ilk, von Fintel notes that the order of the two sentences
in the discourse and the information introduced in between plays a crucial role in getting
at the reported intuitions. For example, the judgments for (41) are indeed uncontroversial
once we put them into a more explicit discourse (42) (modeled after von Fintel 1999:120). If
such a discourse is absent, i.e. if the sentences in (41) are produced (and evaluated) in "one
breath," it does not seem to be reasonable to affirm (41-a) but to contradict (41-b). This is
evidenced by the infelicitous discourses in (43), which mirrors (4).
(42) [A ticket salesman is talking to Nicholas:]
a. Salesman: Do you want a trip on the Concorde?
b. Nicholas: No, I don't want a trip on the Concorde
c. Salesman: What about a free trip on the Concore?
d. Nicholas: Yes, I do want a free trip on the Concorde
(43) a. #Nicholas wants a free trip on the Concorde but he doesn't want a trip on the
Concorde
b. #Nicholas doesn't want a trip on the Concorde but he wants a free trip on the
Concorde
Since, all else being equal, the order of the sequence should not matter for the (in)consistency
of the two modal statements, something special must be going on in (42)-(43) - all else cannot
be equal. Accordingly, von Fintel argues that what might have initially seemed to be an
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argument for a non-monotonic analysis of desire predicates can on the basis of the contrast
between (42) and (43) be used against it. This argument goes through to the extent that he
shows that the modal but not the negation-related analysis has a handle on the asymmetry
in (42)-(43).
So, how does von Fintel explain the felicity of (42) while sticking to a modal treatment
of want? The underlying intuition of his approach is that the doxastic alternatives in (42-b)
and (42-d) are not the same. More precisely, in uttering (42-b) Nicholas is in a belief
state according to which flying with the Concorde entails paying for the flight, which is
natural considering how (for-profit) airlines tend to operate. And paying for the flight with
the Concorde is something that is ex hypothesi undesirable for Nicholas. However, as it is
common in discourse, Nicholas's doxastic alternatives change upon hearing (42-c). After this
pleasant turn of events, he utters (42-d) with the background belief that he may get a free
flight. Since a free flight with the Concorde is a highly desirable event for John, he is being
truthful in uttering (42-d). Furthermore, he does not contradict his previous statement in
(42-b) - the two sentences involve quantification over distinct desire-best possibilities. To
conclude, the crucial difference between (42) and (43) is that in the former but not in the
latter case the two sentences are evaluated with respect to distinct modal bases, e.g. in (42)
but not (43) new information is introduced that changes Nicholas's state of mind. As a
consequence, the latter discourse is felicitous while the former is not.
Returning to our starting point, Jackson's Procrastinate puzzle, the same reasoning ap-
plies. In the description of the scenario, it is highlighted that Procrastinate would not, all
else being equal, accept the invitation and write a review, "were Procrastinate to say yes
[accept to review], he would not in fact get around to writing the review." This fits the
profile of von Fintel's (42). Accordingly, the discourse in (44) is licit: (44-b) is uttered to
the backdrop of a belief state in which accepting (= not writing) is evaluated negatively. A
new possibility is introduced by the question in (44-c) that has not been considered before
(that accepting does not preclude writing) and that required us to revise my belief state. In
this new state, (44-d) can be evaluated as true.
(44) a. Co-editor: As a co-editor, do you want Prof Procrastinate to accept the invita-
tion?
b. Me: No, I don't want him to accept the invitation
c. Co-editor: Do you want him to accept the invitation and write the review?
d. Me: Yes I want him to accept the invitation and write
Parallel to (43), if the intermediate step of introducing a new possibility is eliminated the
sequence becomes illicit. As before, this is either because accept-and-write worlds are not
among doxastic alternatives or, if they are, because the two sentences express contradictory
propositions.
(45) a. #Prof Procrastinate ought not to accept the invitation but he ought to accept
the invitation and write the review
b. #Prof Procrastinate ought to accept the invitation and write the review but he
ought not to accept the invitation
175
We have seen above that the negation-related theory does not predict any entailment relations
to obtain between the sentences in (46) due to its non-monotonic character. This does not
change in (42)/(43).'
A.6 Non-closure
This subsection looks at a puzzling pattern that suggests that desire is not closed under
believed implication. We propose that the puzzle is resolved in a way that parallels the
resolution of similar puzzles in the domain of epistemic modality - an agent may have access
to different conversational backgrounds and these can shift between sentences.
A.6.1 Statement of the puzzle
Villalta (2008) introduces the so-called puzzle of practical inferences, which can be catego-
rized as a cousin of other closure puzzles in the literature on modality. In accordance, we
call it the puzzle of non-closure (under believed material implication or equivalence). An
instance of the puzzle is given in (46) (cf. Villalta 2008:478). The argument in (46) is intu-
itively invalid and shows that I may have desires that are insensitive to some aspects of what
I believe might be required to realize those desires. For example, in (46-b) we see that to be
rich, it is - according to my beliefs - necessary to work hard now; but I don't want to work
hard now (or ever) (46-c). On the other hand, she points out that I should work hard now
is entailed (46-d) (notice the teleological flavor of the modal). She takes this asymmetry to
be indicative that (46-c) does not but (46-d) does have a modal semantics.
(46) a. I want to be rich
b. I believe that I will be rich iff I work hard now
c. .-. I want to work hard now (invalid consequence)
d. .-. I should work hard now (valid consequence)
A similar argument can be provided that shows that I may have desires that are insensitive
to some aspects of what I believe might result from realizing those desires (47).
(47) a. I want to be rich
b. I believe that if I am rich, I won't have much free time
c. .-. I don't want to have much free time (invalid consequence)
The pattern is schematically represented in (12), repeated below. In the following we first
show how at two approaches discussed in the preceding appear to incorrectly predict the
argument to be valid.2
'It can be shown that the neg-raising property of want does not suffice to derive an inconsistency of the
sequence.
2The same type of puzzle has been observed to obtain also with intentions - agents need not intend all
the expected side-effects of their intentions (Cohen & Levesque 1990:218):
For example, imagine a situation not too long ago in which an agent has a toothache. Although
dreading the process, the agent decides that he needs desperately to get his tooth filled. Being
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(12) a. a wants p
b. a believes that p iff q / p implies q
c. .'. a wants q
A.6.2 Apparent predictions of the two accounts
The modal analysis of desire predicts the argument in (47) to be valid: the two premises
entail the conclusion. The reason for this is that all my belief worlds where I am rich are
worlds in which I work hard now. Accordingly, since all my desire-best belief worlds are
worlds where I am rich (premise 1), all my desire-best belief worlds are worlds where I work
hard now. This entails that I want to work hard now. This reasoning, which is laid out more
explicitly in (48), gives us a result that contradicts our intuitions.
(48) a. Premise 1: BEST(nf(I,w*), g(I,w*)) C [ I am rich ]g,c
4 BEST(nf(I,w*), g(I,w*)) c nf(I,w*) n [ I am rich ]gc
b. Premise 2: nf(I,w*) n [ I am rich ],c nf(Iw*) n [ I work hard now ]9,c
c. Conclusion: BEST(g(I,w*),Dox(I,w*)) C [ I work hard now ]9,c
The negation-related analysis of desire predicates is in no better position. The root of
the problem for that account is that the similarity selection function applies to the same set
when it applies to the subset of my belief state where I am (not) rich and when it applies
to the subset of my belief state where I (do not) work hard now. There is then no way to
distinguish between the preferences among these sets. Less concisely, assume that the belief
worlds where I am rich are just the belief worlds where I work hard now and that the belief
worlds where I am not rich are just the worlds where I do not work hard now (49-b). It then
trivially holds that the closest worlds where I am rich to an anchor belief world are just the
same as the closest worlds where I work hard now to that anchor world. And the same holds
for the closest worlds where I am not rich (49-b'). Thus, if the closest worlds where I am
rich are preferred to the closest worlds where I am not, then the closest worlds where I work
hard are preferred to the closest worlds where I do not (49-c). Unfortunately, this is just the
conclusion in (46).
(49) a. Premise 1: [ want ]9,c(f, >-, I, [ I am rich ]J9', w) = 1 iff
Vw' c nf(I,w): SIM(w', nf(I,w)n[ I am rich j9'c)
>-I,w SIM(w', nf(I,w)N[ I am rich ]9'C)
b. Premise 2: nf(I,w) n [ I am rich ]g'c - nf(I,w) n [ I work hard now ]9'c
b' -' Vw' c nf(I,w): SIM(w', nf(I,w)n[ I am rich ]9,c)
= SIM(w', nf(I,w)nl[ I work hard now ]9'c) A
SIM(w', nf(I,w)NI[ I am rich ]J9c)
= SIM(w', nf(I,w)N[ I work hard now
uninformed about anesthetics, the agent believes that the process of having his tooth filled
will necessarily cause him much pain. Although the agent intends to ask the dentist to fill his
tooth, and, believing what he does, he is willing to put up with pain, the agent could surely
deny that he thereby intends to be in pain.
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c. Conclusion: [ want ],Jc(I,[ I work hard now ]9'c,w) = 1 iff
Vw' C nf(I,w): sIM(w', nf(I,w)n[ I work hard now I9'C)
I,W SIM(w', ff(I,w)N[ I work hard now ]2'')
A.6.3 Non-closure of belief
The non-closure of desire bears some resemblance to the puzzles concerning (non-)closure
of belief and knowledge. It has often been argued that certain logical properties of the
standard modal accounts of attitude ascriptions do not do justice to modeling the behavior
of actual cognitive agents. The most common example discussed in this respect is the failure
of modal logic to account for the sensibility of deductive inquiry - e.g. the standard modal
logic predicts that I should know all mathematical truths and that Socrates's students were
wasting their time in dialoguing with Socrates. The theorem of modal logic that is relevant
for us and that is often taken as the starting point of investigating (non-)closure in the logic
of belief and knowledge is provided in (50). It does not appear to be aligned with the actual
behavior of cognitive agents (cf. Chapter 3 in Yalcin 2008, Yalcin 2011 and many others).
(50) Closure of belief under believed material implication (version 1 of 2)
If a believes that p and a believes that if p then q, then a believes that q
The often voiced intuition of what lies behind the failure of the closure principle in (50)
is that our belief systems are compartmentalized (Stalnaker 1984). Accordingly, what goes
awry in (50) is that a belief system in which p holds need not be attuned to whether q
holds. Yalcin (2008:104) provides the following paragraph of Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson
as one illustration of this line of thinking: if two propositions hold in different belief systems,
nothing may be concluded whether they both hold in a single belief system; if they both
hold in the same belief system, agglomeration goes through (51).
Jones may believe that Mary lives in New York, that Fred lives in Boston, and
that Boston is north of New York, but fail to put all this together and form the
belief that Mary will have to travel north to visit Fred. ... [However] Jones may,
consistently with the theory, have a system of belief according to which P and a
different system of belief according to which Q, and so fail to believe that P&Q by
virtue of not having a system of belief according to which P&Q. Indeed, it makes
good sense that subjects should have different systems of belief, just as travelers
often have a number of maps that they use on their travels. (Braddon-Mitchell
& Jackson 1996:199)
(51) Belief systems and agglomeration principle
If a believes that p wrt a belief system 7r and a believes that q wrt a belief system
7r, then a believes that p&q wrt a belief system -r
Thus, cognitive agents may be treated as having different belief systems - i.e. sets of propo-
sitions that they actively believe - which are isolated from each other. And beliefs are closed
only with respect to their individual compartments. This allows us to formulate a more
plausible condition concerning closure under believed material implication:
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(52) Closure of belief under believed material implication (version 2 of 2)
If a believes that p wrt a belief system w and a believes that if p then q wrt the
belief system r, then a believes that q wrt the belief system w
Having different belief systems may be modeled by there being different modal bases that
accessible to the cognitive agent. And if ordering sources are involved in epistemic modality
as well, the cognitive agent may also have access to a variety of these.
A.6.4 Resolution of the puzzle
We suggest that the pattern in (46) only apparently violates the principle of closure under
believed implication. What is going on is rather a shift in the conversational background
between the premises and the conclusion. That is, we are dealing with the pattern in (53).
The fact that the conclusion in (53-c) does not hold if the premises (53-ab) hold is not in
violation of the closure principle in (54). The same step is available for Heim's negation-
related analysis: there is a shift in the preference relation between (53-a) and (53-c). If the
respective parameters are held fixed, the entailment does go through.
(53) a. I want to be rich ( wrt desire background #4 )
b. I believe that I will be rich iff I work hard now
c. .-. I want to work hard now ( wrt desire background ')
(54) Closure of desire under believed material implication
If a desires that p wrt a belief system w and desire background 4' and a believes
that if p then q wrt the belief system 7r, then a desires that q wrt the belief system
7r and desire background 4
Villalta pointed out that the argument in (46) goes through with should. And indeed
our consultants accept the pattern with should more readily. The reason for this is the
following: Given the premises in (46), the conclusion that I should work hard now is indeed
true - but it is true given the goal that I become rich. That is, the ordering source in (55-d)
is conditioned by a goal proposition made salient by the premises.
(46) a. I want to be rich
b. I believe that I will be rich iff I work hard now
c. .-. I want to work hard now (invalid consequence)
d. . . I should work hard now (valid consequence)
A.7 Free choice
This subsection tackles the puzzle of the failure of disjunctive weakening under desire pred-
icates. The data in this section does not adjudicate between the two approaches to desire
semantics: neither the negation-related analysis nor the doubly-relative modal analysis pre-
dicts the respective data without further ado.
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A.7.1 Two puzzles related to free choice
Our characterization of the free choice desideratum in the introductory section consisted of
two parts. The first part relates to the validity of the argument schema in (10), repeated
below. It reproduces an old puzzle from deontic logic due to Alf Ross (Ross 1944; cf. Aloni
2007).
(10) a. John wants to send this letter
b. .-. John wants to send this letter or burn it (invalid inference)
Ross's paradox and the doubly-relative modal analysis
An unmodified standard modal analysis of desire leaves the invalidity of this inferential
pattern unexplained. John wants the proposition p to obtain iff p is true in his desire-best
worlds. If a proposition p is true in a world, then any disjunctive weakening of the proposition
p V q is true in the world. Thus, John wants the proposition p V q to obtain. This is invalid,
as (54) suggests.
Ross's paradox and the negation-related analysis
Heim's theory is in a better position than the modal analysis in situations where it holds that
both John sending the letter and John burning the letter are live options, i.e. compatible
with the beliefs of John. Namely, assume that the worlds in which John does not burn and
does not send the letter are better than the worlds in which John burns the letter, which
seems reasonable enough. We know that due to our live option assumption, there exists
a doxastic alternative w of John's in which he burns the letter. The closest send-or-burn
worlds to w will then include the burn world w itself. Since it holds ex hypothesi that the
burn world w is worse any of the closest non-burn/non-send worlds to w, the conclusion of
the argument is false, while the premise is true.' More generally, the following description
is true of the negation-related analysis:
(55) If p and q are compatible with a's beliefs and if a wants p or q, then a prefers the
closest p worlds to the closest not-p-and-not-q worlds to her doxastic alternatives,
and a prefers the closest q worlds to the closest not-p-and-not-q worlds to her dox-
astic alternatives. That is, it is not the case that a wants not p and it is not the
case that a wants not q
The crucial ingredient in the derivation of the invalidity in (10) in Heim's system is the
existence of contexts in which both disjuncts are live options for the attitude holder. In
contexts where this does not obtain, (10) does go through as a contextual entailment, i.e.
the premise together with appropriate contextual assumptions implies the conclusion.
3 Notice that the two disjuncts being live options does not help the modal analysis: the desire-best
possibilities would still contain send worlds and ipso facto send-or-burn worlds.
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Simplification of disjunction
The above discussion of the negation-related theory leads us to expect (56) to be felicitous.
Namely, if none of John's belief worlds is such that the sun turns cold, all the relevant
good-weather-or-cold-sun worlds will be good-weather worlds and they are preferred to all
the relevant bad-weather worlds. This example reproduces a well-known "simplification
of disjunctive antecedents" puzzle in literature on conditionals (Nute 1975, Alonso-Ovalle
2009:and others).
(11) #John wants there to be good weather or the sun to turn cold (false)
The doubly-relative modal analysis is in the same position as in the discussion of Ross's
paradox. It predicts the sentence in (55) to be true in any context in which John wants
there to be good weather.
To summarize: We have seen that a doubly-relative modal analysis predicts the inference
in (10) to be valid and the sentence in (11) to be true in contexts in which John wants
there to be good weather, contrary to fact. On the other hand, (10) is invalid according to
the negation-related analysis, if we assume that each disjunct is considered possible by the
attitude holder. This is inadequate, as demonstrated by the infelicity of (11) - the sentence
is predicted to be true by the negation-related analysis in any context in which John wants
there to be good weather and does not take the sun turning cold to be a live option.
A.7.2 Negation-related analysis: free choice presupposition
The most inviting modification of Heim's theory that would capture both Ross's paradox
and Simplification of Disjunction is to impose a requirement that all disjuncts under want
must be compatible with the beliefs of the attitude holder. This would allow us to subsume
both Simplification of Disjunction and Ross's paradox under the theorem in (54). Now,
this modification could be derived from the existential modal presupposition, the so-called
independence presupposition, triggered by desire predicates (56).
(56) a. a wants p
b. Presupposition: AwODox(a,w)p
Namely, in our examples, the presupposition is that the proposition denoted by the disjunc-
tive complement of want is compatible with the beliefs of the attitude holder (57-b). If this
presupposition would involve a free choice interpretation of disjunction (57-c) the desired re-
sult would be achieved - both of the disjuncts would have to be compatible with the beliefs
of the attitude holder and (10)/(11) would be subsumed by the theorem in (55). The step
from (57-b) to (57-c) is not trivial.
(57) a. a wants p or q
b. Presupposition: Aw.ODox(a,w)(p or q)
c. Free choice presupposition: Aw.0Dox(a,w)pAO'Dox(a,w)q
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A.7.3 Modal analysis: free choice assertion
The negation-related analysis can deal with the free choice desideratum if the disjuncts
occurring in the scope of desire predicates are required to be compatible with the beliefs
of the attitude holder. The same strategy does not help the modal analysis. Some of the
following discussion features in chapters 3 and 4 of the dissertation.
Free choice disjunction
It is well-known that disjunction in modal environments may lead to inferences different
from what the standard modal logic predicts. These inferences are illustrated in (58) where
E stands for the universal modal and 0 stands for an existential modal.
(58) a. You must have cake or soup - You may have cake and you may have soup
a'. 0(p V q) - Op A Oq
b. You may have cake or soup - You may have cake and you may have soup
b'. O(p V. q) - Op A Oq
The predictions by the standard modal analysis are given in (59). The difference is that in
(58) a conjunctive modal inference is generated, while the inference predicted by modal logic
in (59) is weaker - it is disjunctive. For illustration, assume that in all the best accessible
worlds you eat cake or soup (D(p V q)). This is logically compatible with the proposition
that in all the best accessible worlds you eat cake and that there are no best accessible worlds
in which you eat soup (zip A -i0q). This shows that you must have cake or soup (L](p V
q)) does not imply that you may have cake and you may have soup (Op A Oq). In the same
spirit, assume that there is a best accessible world in which you have cake (Op) and thus
a best accessible world in which you have cake or soup (O(p V q)), but no best accessible
world in which you have soup (-q). This is consistent and shows that you may have cake
or soup (O(p V q)) does not imply that you may have cake and you may have soup (Op A
Oq). Thus, the inferences in (58) are unexpected on the modal analysis; it gives us only the
weaker inferences in (59).
(59) a. You must have cake or soup -+ You may have cake or you may have soup
b'. O(p V q) -4 Op V Oq (if domain of l is non-empty)
b. You may have cake or soup -+ You may have cake or you may have soup
c. O(p V q) ++ Op V Oq
The pertinent question is what is responsible for this discrepancy between the inferences
accompanying disjunction in natural language (58) and the predictions of the modal analysis
(59). At this point, there are at least three vantage points on the issue: (i) the modals (alone)
are the culprit, (ii) the disjunction (alone) is the culprit, and (iii) the interaction of modals
and disjunction is the culprit. The alternative described in (i) is trivially out of the running.
The alternative described in (ii) is more resilient and has been argued for in some form or
another (Zimmermann 2000, Geurts 2005). The idea is that an assertion of a disjunction
of two propositions amounts to an assertion of a conjunction of the possibility of the two
propositions.
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(60) p V q - Op A Oq
In some cases at hand, this leads us to obtain a sequence of possibility modals (61-b). These
can be reduced to a single possibility modal on the basis of the intuitive principle that if I
am an authority in the context and it is compatible with my beliefs that you may have cake,
then (I believe that) you may have cake (Zimmermann 2000, Geurts 2005:for discussion).
(61) a. You may have cake or soup - You may have cake and you may have soup
b. O(p V q) ++ Op V Oq - 0p A 00q - ()Op A (0)Og
However, it is not immediately clear how to extend such an analysis to the (a)-example in
(58) that would fall short of stipulating that we are dealing with a wide-scope disjunction.
And even in that case, the theory would have to be further complicated to arrive at the
inferences in (58) (see Geurts 2005 for details). Instead of pursuing this line of thought in
more detail here, let us look at the alternative gestured at in (iii).
This alternative, which assumes that the inferences in (58) come about from the interac-
tion of modals and disjunction, has an easier task than the two preceding alternatives - if
nothing else, more ingredients are at its disposal. There are now different ways of fleshing
out the dependency between the modals and disjunction: either there is something specific
about the semantics of modal operators that is sensitive to disjunction in their scope (e.g.
Aloni 2007) or there is a more general mechanism that governs the behavior of disjunction in
the scope of a variety of quantificational operators (e.g. Fox 2007). The latter option seems
more attractive in light of the following data:
(62) a. Everyone had cake or soup - Someone had cake and someone had soup
b. Some people had cake or soup -- * Someone had cake and someone had soup
This more general strategy abstracts away from the type of quantifier involved - i.e. whether
its domain contains individuals or worlds (63). The rest of the section is devoted to an
instance of it.
(63) a. Vx(px V qx) - ]x(px) A Ex(qx)
b. 3x(px V qx) - 2x(px) A ]x(qx)
Pragmatic strengthening in grammar
The inferences in (58) have been argued to be conditioned by a general pragmatic enrichment
mechanism operative in grammar that is responsible i.a. for generation of scalar implicatures
(Fox 2007 among others). The mechanism consists of an exhaustification operator EXH,
whose meaning corresponds to that of the focus-sensitive operator only. It applies at the
clausal level, whereby the respective clause may also be embedded. The meaning of the
operator and the auxiliary definitions are in (64) and (65) (Fox 2007).
(64) [ EXH jI'c - AC(st)t. Ap(st). Aws. p(w) = 1 A Vq c IE(C,p) [ q(w) =0
(65) a. IE(C,p) = n{A'cA: A' is a maximal set in A s.t. A'' U {p} is consistent}
b. A'-' = {,p: p EA }
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A derivation of scalar implicatures triggered by scalar items some and or are given in (66)
and (67). The domain of EXH is thereby resolved to the set of the scalar alternatives to the
prejacent, as sketched in (66-c) and (67-c) (see chapter 4 for discussion of (67)).
(66) You read some books
[EXH C 1] [you read some books]
C1 = {[ you read some books 19,', [ you read all books ]j9c}
(66-b) 19,c(w) = 1 iff [ you read some books ]9,c(w) - 1
A V q c {[ you read all books ]9'c} [ q(w) = 0 ]
(67) a. You had cake or soup
b. [EXH C1] [you had cake or soup]
c. C1={[ you had cake or soup ] [ you had cake ]9,c, [ you had soup ],
[ you had cake and soup ]1'}
d. [ (67-b) ]I9'c(w) - 1 iff [ you had cake or soup ]9'c(w) - 1
A V q E {[ you had cake and soup ]j,c} [q(w) =0
Pragmatic strengthening and free choice
There are two positions in which EXH may be inserted in sentences with modal operators -
above and below the modal. If the operator is inserted above the universal modal, the free
choice inference is generated. This is shown in (68).
(68) a. You must have cake or soup
b. [EXH C 1] [must [you have cake or soup]]
c. C1 = {w(you have cake or soup), o(you have cake), E(you have soup), EI(you
have cake and soup)}
d. [ (68-b) ]9,c(w) = 1 iff L(you have cake or soup)(w) 1 A V q e {E(you have
cake), o (you have soup), ElO(you have cake and soup)} [q(w) =0
iff LI (you have cake or soup) (w) = 1 and E(you have cake) (w) = 0 and 0 (you
have soup) (w) = 0 and l (you have cake and soup) (w) = 0
iff - (you have cake or soup) (w) = 1 and 0 (you have cake) (w) = 1 and O (you
have soup)(w) = 1
In the case of existential modals, an insertion of EXH above the modal does not yet generate
the free choice inference, as can be seen in (69).
(69) a. You may have cake or soup
b. [EXH C 1] [may [you have cake or soup]]
c. C1 = {O(you have cake or soup), O(you have cake), O(you have soup), O(you
have cake and soup)}
d. [ (69-b) ]9'c(w) 1 iff O(you have cake or soup)(w) = 1 A V q E {0(you have
cake and soup)} [q(w) = 0 1
iff (you have cake or soup) (w) = 1 and O (you have cake and soup) (w) = 0
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However, if two exhaustification operators are inserted, as in (70), the free choice inference
is derived. The domains of the two exhaustification operator are thereby different (70-cd),
which is unsurprising considering they have different prejacents.
(70) a. You may have cake or soup
b. [EXH C 2] [EXH C 1] [may [you have cake or soup]]
c. C1 = {0(you have cake or soup), O (you have cake), ) (you have soup), K (you
have cake and soup)}
d. C2 = {O(you have cake or soup) A ,0(you have cake and soup),
O(you have cake) A -i(you have soup),
O(you have soup) A -0(you have cake), O(you have cake and soup)}
e. IE(C 2 , O(you have cake or soup)A-(you have cake and soup)) =
{ K(you have cake) A -i0(you have soup),
O(you have soup) A -0(you have cake),
0 (you have cake and soup) }
f. [ (70-b) ]I9,c(w) = 1 iff K(you have cake or soup)A--,0(you have cake and soup) (w)
= 1 and V q e IE(C2 , O(you have cake or soup)A-,K0(you have cake and soup))
[q(w) = 0] iff O(you have cake or soup)A-',0(you have cake and soup)(w) 1
and O (you have cake) (w) = 1 and O (you have soup) (w) = 1
Derivation of Ross's paradox and Simplification of Disjunction
If we apply the exhaustification mechanism introduced above to the conclusion of (10), as
we do in (72), we get the inferences that do not follow from the premise of (10), given in
(72-b). This accords with the reported judgments.
(71) a. John wants to send this letter
b. [EXH C 1] [John wants to send this letter]
c. => John is okay with sending this letter
(72) a. John wants to send this letter or burn it
b. [EXH C 1] [John wants to send this letter or burn it]
c. => John is okay with sending this letter & he is okay with burning this letter
Unfortunately, simply having the ability to insert EXH into the structure is not sufficient
to account for the non-entailment in (10). In a way, the account sketched above begs the
question: why is the insertion of EXH required? This is particularly vexing because the the
insertion of EXH is generally considered to be an optional maneuver. For example, positive
sentences that contain scalar items but that do not trigger scalar implicatures arguably do not
trigger them because of the absence of EXH. To derive Ross's paradox and Simplification of
Disjunction, a principle along the lines of (73) has to be postulated. For the derivation to be
explanatory, the postulate should be derived from some more basic principle of interpretation
of desire predicates.
(73) Obligatory exhaustification
A disjunctive operator in the scope of a desire predicate obligatorily associates with
an exhaustification operator
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The characterization in (73) also leaves it open what the exact scope of the exhaustification
operator has to be: if the desire predicate occurs under a downward-entailing operator,
EXH could either scope right above the desire predicates or above the downward-entailing
operator. The different scopes would result in different readings.
(74) <> I doubt that John wants to get an A or a B. He probably wants to get an A
A further comparison that should be undertaken is with other types of modality - i.e. whether
Ross's paradox and Simplification of Disjunction can be reproduced with doxastic predicates.
A.8 Summary
We have reviewed six arguments for and against treating desire predicates as upward-
monotonic operators. On all counts, we have seen that a doubly-relative modal analysis
has at least as good of a grip on the data as the non-monotonic analysis; on three counts
it does better. This is summarized in the following paragraph. The tentative conclusion
relevant for the purposes of the dissertation is that desire predicates are not non-monotone
but rather upward-monotone operators.
1. Good Samaritan: Both the negation-related analysis as well as the modal analysis
assume that there is a doxastic component to desire in which the presuppositions of the sen-
tential complement of the desire predicate need to be satisfied. 2. Valid upwardness: The
modal analysis was able to explain the apparent validity of inference patterns indicative of
upward-monotonicity of desire predicates. The negation-related analysis predicts these pat-
terns to be invalid. 3. True conflicts: The modal analysis explained the apparent felicity
of conflicting desires by relying on a shift in modal parameters - a shift the ordering source.
The negation-related analysis predicts true conflicts to be possible. This was shown to yield
wrong results in examples where a modal parameter-shift was blocked. 4. Weakening
failures: The apparent cases of weakening failure were shown to obtain only in appropriate
discourses. They were explained in the modal analysis by treating them as a further case of
parameter-shift - a shift in the modal base. The negation-related analysis incorrectly pre-
dicts weakening failure to be possible outside the respective discourses. 5. Non-closure:
The apparent cases of non-closure of desire under believed implication were argued to come
about due to a shift in the modal parameters. 6. Free choice: Neither the modal nor the
negation-related analysis have a ready-made explanation of the puzzling transpositions of
Ross's paradox and Simplification of Disjunction puzzle to desire statements. An account of
them was provided that treats them as cases of obligatory free choice. In the modal analysis
free choice was derived in grammar by inserting a covert exhaustification operator into the
structure. This operator plays a significant role in the following sections.
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